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Abstract
By early March 2020, five million Venezuelans had fled their home country after its
complete economic and institutional collapse, and over 1.6 million have migrated to
Colombia. Migrants struggle to start their lives over in Colombia, having arrived
with few economic resources, and often no legal documentation, in cities with little
to offer them. Venezuelan migrants, however, rely heavily on mobile phones and so-
cial media networks as lifelines for information, opportunities, and resources—making
WhatsApp both a critical tool for migrants’ settlement and integration, as well as an
invaluable source of data through which we can better understand migrant experi-
ences.
This thesis explores the dynamics of public WhatsApp groups used by Venezuelan
migrants to Colombia, and what they can tell us about how migrants use and share
information. We center our research on information spread and trust, especially as
they intersect with concentration and geographic heterogeneity within groups. We
analyze messages and memberships broadly, then explore interaction within groups,
fake news and economic scams, and effects of the coronavirus pandemic. Our results
have a range of policy implications, from reflections on Colombia’s decision to shut its
borders amidst the coronavirus pandemic, to understandings of how aid organizations
can effectively share information over social media channels.
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Preface
In the title, “a world unknown” has three important meanings, all of which motivated
and guided this project.
First and foremost, it refers to the harrowing journey undertaken by Venezuelans
fleeing a country under crisis, where people now eat garbage and die of treatable
diseases because there is no medicine. The migration itself is perilous, but even
after migrants arrive in places like Colombia, there are few resources for them and
fewer jobs. To be sure, Venezuela and Colombia share much in common, but this
is still a story of migrants starting over in a place they know little about, without
people or institutions they can turn to. Can WhatsApp groups make the difference,
helping migrants learn about crossing the border, or helping them find employment
in Colombia? Should aid organizations disseminate information over these networks?
Second, the world of Venezuelan migrants is largely unknown outside Latin Amer-
ica, but perplexing even to the experts who study it. The transience and vulnerabil-
ity of migrants—many cross irregularly, many live in informal settlements or on the
street—make traditional data collection impossible, so an unconventional data source
like WhatsApp groups and messages can offer otherwise undiscoverable insight.
Finally, so much of this is a world unknown to me. I’m immensely grateful
for what I’ve learned at Princeton: mathematical concepts like probability distri-
butions and regularization, and of equal importance, ideas about society and human
development—topics like Locke and Rawls, the Rwandan genocide and Colombian
civil conflict, and power and neocolonialism. But I started with very little knowledge
about migration, WhatsApp, and the Venezuelan and Colombian contexts. More
than anything else, this project is an exploration—of an unimaginable humanitarian
crisis, of what we can learn from digital data, of how technological means can im-
prove the lives of the least well-off, and of how a Princeton education grounded in the
technical might intersect with communities and cultures halfway around the world.
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To migrants—
and to those who make their journeys possible.
There are few greater injustices than the lottery of where we are born.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Across their country, Venezuelans face widespread malnutrition, extreme medication
shortages, exponential inflation, and a host of related concerns, including political
repression and increased crime. By early March 2020, five million Venezuelans had fled
their home country after its complete “economic, social, and institutional collapse,”
with the figure expected to top eight million by the end of 2020 [1].
More than a third of Venezuelan migrants,1 over 1.6 million, have permanently
migrated to Colombia, with most others residing in other Latin American countries.
These are only the official counts; many do not cross legally. Thousands more cross
back-and-forth between Venezuela and Colombia daily, in order to earn money and
to purchase food, medicine, and other essentials no longer available in Venezuela.
1The 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees, the main international instrument of refugee law,
defines refugees as those “forced to flee [their] countries because of persecution, war or violence”
[2]. Per the United Nations, refugees have a “well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group.” This definition
doesn’t apply to the majority of Venezuelans, even given the country’s devastating circumstances,
so we instead use the term migrant.
1
1.1 Venezuelans in Colombia
Venezuelan migrants are often highly educated, having left professional and academic
lives behind [1], but they’re forced to resort to low-skill, low-paying jobs in Colombia,
to the consternation of Colombians who face increased competition for already scarce
work. For this and other reasons, including perceived increases in crime, the reception
towards Venezuelan migrants in Colombia has been mixed, with many migrants facing
xenophobia, especially in border regions where per capita concentrations surpass 20%.
At the same time, hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans have been regularized—
granted permanent residency and employment permits—under the administrations of
Colombian presidents Juan Manuel Santos and Ivn Duque. In August 2019, Duque
announced that Colombia would grant citizenship to more than 24,000 undocumented
children born to Venezuelan refugees, proclaiming, “Today Colombia gives this mes-
sage to the world: to those who want to use xenophobia for political goals, we take the
path of fraternity” [3]. Still, most migrants, especially newcomers, are not regularized,
forcing them into informal work that’s often exploitative.
On top of social and legal challenges to settlement, acceptance, and integration,
migrants face a slew of economic difficulties. Migration journeys often involve rob-
beries and violence, especially if migrants enter Colombia through trochas, irregular
border crossings controlled by criminal syndicates. Consequently, migrants come with
few material possessions, often lacking legal documents or even the means to pay for
them, and must eke out survival in border cities overwhelmed by migrants and their
complicated needs. Many migrants sleep outside in public, and either beg or work
informal hawking jobs on the street [1]. Women, in particular, are often forced to
resort to selling their bodies and/or parts thereof, with both prostitution and the sale
of hair to wigmakers common practices along the border [4].
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1.2 Digital Aspects of the Migrant Crisis
Cell phones and social media networks serve as lifelines of information and resources
for migrants during their arduous journeys. As Oscar Prez, the president of the
Unin Venezolana en Per, a nonprofit that assists the settlement of migrants, says,
“The Venezuelan...has finished with that old adage that the best friend of man is the
dog. For a Venezuelan, his best friend is the cellphone” [5]. Mariangie Tarzona, a
Venezuelan migrant who arrived in Lima in February 2017, describes her experience
of resettlement by recounting, “I had Jesus in social networks.” Questions she asked
over Facebook groups included: “How much did you spend on your route?”, “What
was the best bus that you took?”, “Where did you go to buy the bus ticket?”, “How
much did it cost you?”, “What was the service like on it?”, “How long did it take you
to leave Venezuela?”, “How is the border?”, and “How are you doing now?” [5].
Joshua Collins, a journalist who has extensively covered the Venezuelan migrant
crisis in Colombia, has reported on a network of shelters, kitchens and healthcare
checkpoints for migrants along the resettlement routes from the Colombia-Venezuela
border (many migrants make the 600km journey from Ccuta to Bogot on foot over
eight days, passing through high altitude and subzero temperatures, because they
cannot afford the $30 bus fare) [6]. Per Collins, before and during this journey,
migrants communicate information about distances, conditions, shelter availability,
and other factors in various Facebook and WhatsApp groups.
Facebook and WhatsApp groups of strangers, however, do not come without their
own complications. Because of how decentralized and democratic they are, users
often encounter scams and misinformation, and in general don’t trust information or
users from such groups. In Chapter 2, we discuss reflections on field interviews with
Venezuelan migrants in Colombia, many of whom use but place little trust in public
Facebook and WhatsApp groups.
3
1.3 Research Motivation and Overview
As we discussed in the preface, WhatsApp groups offer information, assistance, and
resources that can help migrants in their settlement and integration. More than this,
however, groups can also serve as an unconventional data source through which we
research migrant experiences.
In Chapter 2, we begin with reflections on two weeks of field work, in which we
spoke to migrants about how they obtain information and resources, both offline and
on social media networks, and heard their perspectives on—and experiences with—
aspects of the crisis like xenophobia and regularization. We also spent time with
three leading aid organizations, in an attempt to learn about their responses to the
crisis, and to understand how they might begin to distribute information about their
programs and offerings through public WhatsApp groups.
Chapter 3 discusses related work on social media networks, and the limited re-
search done so far on WhatsApp groups. In Chapter 4, we share our methodology
for collecting data from public WhatsApp groups, focusing on various technical chal-
lenges involved in joining and scraping WhatsApp groups en masse (including the
all-too-real possibility of being banned from WhatsApp), as well as limitations of our
methodology and the data we collect.
Next, Chapters 5 and 6 dive into the memberships and messages within our collec-
tion of WhatsApp groups. We construct measures for the concentration, inequality,
and geographic diversity of our groups, which are important characteristics that may
affect how migrants connect and share information. We examine patterns in connec-
tions between users from different Latin American countries, as well as the network
structure of both groups and users. In the chapter on messages, we analyze messages
of various content types, and also construct a measure for group activity robust to
our being removed from certain groups.
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Chapter 7 studies replies to messages, an important marker of attention and in-
teraction given WhatsApp’s minimal feature set. We discuss the limitations of using
data about replies, and propose an alternate measure—(structural) virality—to better
compare interaction across content types and groups. We show how these features are
correlated with the group characteristics we constructed earlier, and provide possible
explanations grounded in the context of the migrant crisis.
Chapter 8 investigates misinformation—fake news and economic scams—within
WhatsApp groups, beginning with how we identify and label misinformation. We
attempt to understand how user and group characteristics are linked to the prevalence
of misinformation, and later apply various machine learning classifiers to the problem
of automatically detecting scams. Finally, in Chapter 9, we briefly put our research
in the context of the coronavirus pandemic and its consequences in Colombia, which
include the closure of borders and a nationwide lockdown.
These are broad topics—and this is a broad thesis—but the issues related to
Venezuelan migrants in Colombia are wide-ranging, and call for investigation along
multiple intersecting perspectives. Moreover, studying the Venezuelan migrant crisis
through WhatsApp groups is a completely new research area,2 compelling this kind
of wide-ranging exploration.
2In general, research on WhatsApp groups is scant. As of April 2020, there are a total of 12
English-language papers, with most focused on political groups in Brazil.
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Chapter 2
Reflections on Field Interviews
I spent two weeks in Colombia in early January 2020, between the cities of Bogot,
Riohacha, Maicao, and another city on the border. While some migrants return home
to Venezuela over the Christmas/New Year period, there were still ample Venezuelans
to speak with across these cities, and the migrant flow was high during the last half of
my trip, as Venezuelans who went home for the holidays returned to Colombia with
more family members.
My interviews were in Spanish, except for those with Joshua Collins (an Amer-
ican journalist) and Jen Daum (an American who is Director of Programs at the
NGO MercyCorps Colombia). In Bogot, I spoke with Venezuelan street vendors and
artisans, Colombian shopkeepers, the manager at a popular remittance service to
Venezuela, Joshua, Jen, and various Venezuelan delivery workers for a GrubHub-like
food delivery service. In Riohacha, I joined MercyCorps Colombia for two charac-
terization activities, in which they surveyed potential recipients for an unconditional
cash transfer scheme; I spoke with MercyCorps staff members, clients participating in
the characterization, and migrants left out of the program. In Maicao, I spent a day
with the charity Save the Children, which maintains vast operations in the city with a
full-time staff of 120+. We visited the border and a sexual health clinic run by Save,
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and I spent time talking with Venezuelan migrants served by Save, with Save staff
members, and with Save’s wonderful director Mara Ins Fernndez. Finally, elsewhere
on the border, I met with the staff of the NGO International Rescue Committee, and
interviewed visitors to their sexual health clinic. I also spoke with street vendors in
the city and at the border crossing, as well as various (formal and informal) mobile
phone vendors.
Notes from these interviews are included in Appendix B. Below are reflections
along general themes.
2.1 WhatsApp Use
Everyone I spoke to in Colombia knew what WhatsApp was, and this was true even
amongst the Venezuelan migrant population. Use of WhatsApp, however, was lim-
ited by the need to own a smartphone (those who do have a smartphone all use
WhatsApp...indeed, the app is one of the primary reasons for people to purchase
a smartphone). Estimates of what percentage of Venezuelan migrants have smart-
phones varied wildly, with semi-official sources giving answers from “very few” to
“nearly everyone.” Around half of the integrated migrants I spoke with (those who
had been in Colombia for at least several months) had smartphones.
With basic smartphones priced in the $30-40 range in Colombia, and many times
more in Venezuela (motivating many Venezuelans to purchase phones in Colombia
when they pickup remittances), cost was the only reason I encountered for individ-
uals to not have a smartphone. Most Venezuelan migrants seem to have smart-
phones intermittently—nearly everyone had one in Venezuela, but migrants either
were robbed while crossing through the trochas or sold their phones to pay for food
or buses during their migration. High rates of crime, especially in La Guajira, further
deterred people from owning smartphones.
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The other factor that limited smartphone and WhatsApp use was the need for a
data plan. Claro, the largest operator in Colombia (50% market share), offers service
at around $12 monthly; the smaller providers (both of which have h20% market
share) offer service at around $8. Neither offering is terribly cheap, especially for
poorer migrants who may only make $5 daily.
For those with smartphones, WhatsApp, as one migrant I spoke to stated, is “pri-
mordial.” Staying in contact with family in Venezuela always tended to be migrants
primary reason for using WhatsApp, though such communication often also took
place on international calls (which, while more expensive than WhatsApp, dont re-
quire family members to also have smartphones and WhatsApp...but they do require
electricity in family members’ dwellings, which is never certain in Venezuela).
Those without smartphones are not out of the loop entirely. Most maintain Face-
book accounts that they use primarily to communicate with family, and are able to
access these accounts at cybercafes, or on borrowed phones. Many individuals, with-
out smartphones of their own or in their immediately family, share smartphones with
neighbors; Venezuelan migrant families often live with other migrant families in the
same dwelling.
In general, smartphones and WhatsApp/Facebook are very well used amongst
migrants. One NGO staffer told me of instances when aid recipients, while holding
smartphones, told her how they did not have enough food to eat.
2.2 Use of Public WhatsApp/Facebook Groups
When stating uses for WhatsApp, no interviewee ever outright described large
migrant-centric WhatsApp groups. Yet many did cite WhatsApp as an important
source of information and resources, even beyond their immediate contacts, so use of
these groups is likely prevalent amongst migrants who use WhatsApp. When I asked
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directly about such groups, around 50% of those with a smartphone reported being
active members of public WhatsApp groups, either currently or previously. Nearly
everyone knew about these groups.
Motivations for using these groups, as described by individuals for themselves
or people in general,1 included finding employment (primarily), finding assistance
and aid resources (primarily), reading news about Venezuela (secondarily), buying
and selling items, finding housing, and finding romantic partners. Nobody I spoke to
mentioned going on these groups for fun, even though several of the public WhatsApp
groups we joined, which were also amongst the most active, were dedicated to memes
and jokes, their names literally translating to “Fucking Around” or “Venezuelan Fuck-
ers.” It could certainly be that members in fun/social groups are from demographics
I didnt encounter as often (e.g., younger people with more time on their lands, and
likely more stable economic situations that wouldn’t bring them out onto the street),
but it might also have been that people only chose to report more serious uses.2
Generally, migrants in large/public groups learned about such groups from friends,
or were directly added by friends.
2.3 Trust Towards Public WhatsApp/Facebook
Groups
Nobody I spoke to placed significant trust in public WhatsApp groups. Yet most peo-
pled reported that they at least knww someone (personally) who trusted these groups
enough to have conducted important transactions through them, especially finding
employment. Several interviewees described horrific outcomes of such endeavors, in-
1Framing it this way may have encouraged individuals to share motivations they would be em-
barrassed to assign to themselves (e.g., using these groups to find romantic partners).
2If you ask me why I spend time on Facebook, Id answer to keep in touch with friends and follow
their lives, even though much of my attention on Facebook diverts to random news, memes, and so
on.
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cluding wage theft and outright sexual exploitation. Overall, the situation seemed
like a 50/50, in that there do exist legitimate opportunities in these groups (which
are almost certainly low-paying, like call center work), and because of that, there
exists a decent contingent of migrants who expend serious efforts using these groups
to find employment and/or assistance. In general, however, migrants’ perception of
large/public WhatsApp groups was that they were not an honest or accountable sit-
uation, and that many migrants only participate in transactions and/or employment
offers out of desperation.
General information in these groups, whether news about Venezuela or informa-
tion on how to obtain regularization, is seen as more trustworthy by migrants, around
the same level as hearsay on the street. Migrants do have a good understanding of the
various actors that might be in play behind this kind of “free” information, whether it
be Venezuelan opposition forces or scammers who have something to gain from false
information about the regularization process.
We discuss issues of trust in Chapter 8, but even more basically, it might be
interesting to create some kind of central reputation system for these groups (i.e., a
WhatsApp bot, if it doesnt get banned). Imagine that our bot records and publicly
displays users transaction histories—say, after every transaction, one party activates
the bot with a command, and the bot waits for the counter-party to confirm that the
transaction was successful. This concept certainly requires refinement, but something
as simple as this would still be better than the completely uncertain landscape in
which users currently perform transactions over WhatsApp.
2.4 Gender
One of the clearest conclusions I reached was that women face extremely difficult
circumstances when using public WhatsApp groups to find employment. A significant
10
percentage of employment offers—at least 25%—is outright advertised as sex work
(most commonly, being webcam models), but greater issues abound in employment
advertised as “domestic” work or “assistant” work, with most such postings only
soliciting females for some reason. Even if such positions are legitimate, many women
I spoke with told me that those employment offers come with romantic and/or sexual
strings attached.
In spite of this, it seemed like women and men used public WhatsApp groups
equally, with one source even arguing to me that women are more likely to be in
these groups, since their male partners typically do odd jobs or work in construction.
Those industries not being available to women, women instead resort to WhatsApp
groups to find other employment or assistance.
By far, women were much more likely to have relationships with aid organizations
than men, sometimes by the design/choice of NGOs. Medical clinics, for example,
were usually dedicated to sexual and reproductive health, since no such care is avail-
able in Venezuela. But even in more gender-neutral programs, participants skewed
heavily towards women. In Riohacha, for example, 90% of MercyCorpss participants
the first day and 80% of the participants the second day were women; the focus group
that Save the Children invited me to speak with included ten women and one man.
The combination of these factors—women being the primary recipients of aid
(aid might be shared in the household, but it was still women who showed up),
and women frequenting public WhatsApp groups amidst endless unscrupulous em-
ployment offers—might make distributing information about social services in these
groups an extremely valuable proposition.
11
2.5 Migrants’ Knowledge about Aid and Social
Services
Many fewer migrants took advantage of social services than I expected. Outside of
the days I spent with Save the Children and MercyCorps, very few people I spoke
with described any significant use of aid (of course, migrants might not be particularly
keen to be seen as reliant on aid3).
Why might this be? UNHCR, NGOs, and migrants all reported that knowledge
about aid programs largely came from participation in related aid programs (pro-
grams themselves sometimes make direct referrals), so failing to make contact with
aid organizations upon arrival in Colombia would make it less likely for migrants
to know where to turn to for help later on. Per staff from Save the Children and
UNHCR, most incoming migrants arrive prepared for at least their first few weeks
in Colombia, with enough resources (possibly through selling their smartphone) to
cover food and onward transport. Consequently, fewer than 20% of permanent mi-
grants who cross into Ccuta stop by the UNHCR/Red Cross aid station at the border
(where there are also UNHCR shelters and a World Food Programme soup kitchen).
In Maicao, the number is much, much less: the UNHCR/Red Cross station at the
border is a 10 × 20 garden shed (compared to a fenced-in, football field-sized space
in Ccuta), which was even closed when we visited.
Other factors could also explain the low usage of aid. Even for poorer migrants,
the availability of informal work likely makes turning to aid programs (for example,
3Still, there doesnt seem to be significant shame attached to participating in aid programs, espe-
cially given the well-known hardship of migrating from Venezuela. Never in my conversations about
xenophobia, for example, were Venezuelans characterized (either by themselves or Colombians) as
reliant on or taking advantage of aid. Some Colombians have complained that Venezuelan migrants
are taking jobs and resources meant for them, but its less of a feeling of “theyre so dependent” than
“theyre taking what we deserve.”
In many of my interviews at MercyCorpss programs, migrants did state that this was the first
time they sought assistance, usually after I asked how they found out about MercyCorps. That
could reflect them not wanting to be seen as reliant on aid, but it probably reflects more on how
little they knew about aid programs.
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a soup kitchen where you wait an hour or two in line) less appealing. In two hours of
selling coffee on the street, migrants earn enough to cover a meal.
More than anything else, however, the limited use of aid stems from the extremely
limited availability of aid. Cash transfer schemes, for example, are mandated by the
Colombian government to give no more than 252k COP ($74) monthly to a family of
four or more (families are very often a lot more than four), even if aid comes privately
or from overseas. But 252k COP is a quarter of the minimum wage for one person.
More generally, its commonly estimated that approximately $50,000 in aid sup-
ports each Syrian refugee who arrives in Europe. The corresponding amount for
Venezuelan migrants to Colombia, Jen Daum (MercyCorps) told me in an early con-
versation, is $50.4
Participants in aid programs generally reported finding out about the assistance
through acquaintances/friends, or through participation in related aid programs (for
example, eating at the soup kitchen where MercyCorps hosts their characterization
activity). Occasionally, migrants do report learning about aid programs from other
migrants on public WhatsApp/Facebook groups, but none of the organizations I spoke
to shared official information over these groups.
2.6 Migrants’ Knowledge about Life in Colombia
A vast majority of the migrants I spoke to said they learned about life in Colom-
bia through Venezuelan friends and family who had arrived months or years prior.
The remainder said they came without much knowledge, simply asking questions to
strangers along the way and, as they often put it, letting God show them the way.
4Given these numbers, the Colombian governments largely open-arms response to the Venezuelan
migrant crisis is nothing short of exemplary.
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Migrants I spoke to who had more stable employmentin restaurants and stores,
or even the quite lucrative business of selling craftstypically found their jobs through
other Venezuelans they met in Colombia.
Outside of WhatsApp and Facebook groups, migrants rarely use other sources
of digital information, as both migrants and NGO staff told me. WhatsApp and
Facebook are what people are familiar with and used to, making it critical to distribute
information over these existing and well-known platforms. Creating a new app or
website, as certain NGOs responding to the migrant crisis have done, makes little
sense.
2.7 Xenophobia
Xenophobia is a widespread and well-known issue, and its presence in different ge-
ographies seemed to heavily depend on the economic fortunes of Venezuelan migrants
in the area (both Colombians and Venezuelans explained the link as due to crime,
with worse job opportunities increasing crime and anti-Venezuelan sentiment, but Im
sure it also has to do with the presence of beggars, integration of Venezuelans into
the local economy, and so on).
Unsurprisingly, the people I spoke with reported xenophobia being the worst in
La Guajira (Riohacha and Maicao), an economically depressed region to begin with.
Still, relations with Venezuelans were much better in Colombia than in Peru, Ecuador,
and Chile (which are seen by Venezuelans as more attractive destinations with higher
salaries): worse work opportunities in those countries, and greater ethnic distance
(Colombia and Venezuela both being “la tierra caliente”) were migrants main expla-
nations for increased xenophobia in those countries. The difference between Colom-
bias response (widespread acceptance and slight attempts at integration/regulariza-
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tion) to migrants, and that of Ecuador/Peru/Chile (closed borders, strict document
requirements), certainly matters.
Very interestingly, explanations for xenophobia in Colombia rarely involved racial
or ethnic grounds—which might be obvious, given that Colombians and Venezuelans
are quite similar in appearance, both being from the browner part of South America.
Both Colombians and Venezuelans typically attributed xenophobia, either from oth-
ers or themselves, to criminal activity by Venezuelans or their practices like giving
birth to many children. Even behind these factors, racial or ethnic factors never came
out, and people instead pointed to the environment in which Venezuelans lived inso-
cialism, several Colombians told me, meant that Venezuelans never learned to work
hard. Sometimes, people would even unknowingly blame the conditions Venezuelans
grew up in (as opposed to the character of Venezuelans themselves): one taxi driver
complained about how Venezuelans had so many children, and I later found out this
was because no contraceptives were available in Venezuela.
2.8 General Issues in the Migrant Crisis
I was extremely surprised by the disparity in incomes between Bogot and cities on
the border. Were talking 4-5x as much income for the same work, with street vendors
able to earn $600 monthly in the capital but only $150 in La Guajira or Ccuta.
Most people I spoke to near the border cited either high cost-of-living in Bogot or
unaffordable transport as the main reasons stopping them from moving to the capital.
Some had more personal reasons for staying near the border, wanting to be closer to
their family or their “land” (Venezuela). Some felt stable in their current situations,
especially if they were using aid resources like the WFP soup kitchen.
Migrants who cite cost as the main obstacle seem ripe for some kind of credit-based
solution, since the increase in even a single months income from moving to Bogot
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would more than cover associated expenses. Even considering that potential migrants
(everywhere in the world) often assign extremely high subjective costs to moving,
it doesnt seem like that cost would surpass the $400/month they could gain from
moving. Of course, individuals current stability, current community integration, and
desire to be close to the borderwhile difficult to economically quantifyare extremely
important factors and should never be ignored. Nonetheless, it still seems like too
few people are choosing to migrate onwards to Bogot. With this, it might be valuable
to distribute information over WhatsApp groups about the experience, costs, and
benefits of moving to the capital.
I commonly encountered Venezuelan migrants who wished to become regularized
but were unable to do so because they never entered legally, more due to document
requirements than anything else. All had Venezuelan ID cards, but few could afford
passports in Venezuela (which, nowadays, cost from $1,000-5,000, the bulk of that sum
being bribes); gaining legal residency requires having legally entered with a passport.
The prevailing sentiment, by far, amongst everyone I spoke to, was that life in
Colombia was hard but good, with its stability and economic prospects. Most were
grateful to Colombia for being able to restart their lives there (and possibly even
gaining legal residency), and thismore than anything else!emphasized to me how dire
things are in Venezuela. Along the border, even people earning less than $150-200 a
month were grateful for their situations, which were still much better than Venezuela;
income isn’t everything, but $5 a day is an extremely difficult life.
In comparison to Colombia, countries like Peru, Ecuador, and Chile offer higher
salaries. Yet many migrants have curtailed desires to migrate onward because of
the difficulty of legally emigrating to those countries and finding work there. Peru,
Ecuador, and Chile have much stricter document requirements, and Venezuelans face
significantly greater discrimination in those countries, as we discussed in the section
on xenophobia.
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Chapter 3
Related Work
3.1 CDRs
Originally, we sought to center our work on call detail records (CDRs), which typi-
cally contain line-by-line metadata of all phone calls and SMS messages transmitted
over a network operators infrastructure, including origin and destination accounts
(with operator account numbers and/or operator-agnostic IMEI), time and duration,
nearest cell towers, and more. Like social media data, CDRs offer an innovative
source of information in situations where populations may be hard to survey—for
example, refugees or other vulnerable groups—or formal censuses/surveys may be
inappropriate (e.g., too slow during disaster response).
CDRs would seem to offer several advantages over social media data, especially
in better representing migrant populations. Active WhatsApp users skew younger,
wealthier, and more educated than the typical Venezuelan migrant; phone calls and
SMS messages, on the other hand, are a more traditional and much more accessible
form of communication. Moreover, unlike communications data from WhatsApp,
network operators provide formal access to CDRs, and thus eliminate the biases of
sampling communication from public, advertised groups.
17
In research published to date, only one network operator in Colombia has provided
access to CDRs, which were used in a 2016 paper by Bogomolov et al. examining
neighborhood activity in Bogota [7] and in a 2017 study by Florez et al. studying
Bogota commuting networks using origin-destination matrices [8]. At this time, the
operator, Telefnica Colombia, has formally denied our request to access CDRs, as it
transitions toward a business model of analyzing data in-house and selling aggregate
results.1
Disappointing? Certainly. But WhatsApp data offers numerous and significant
advantages compared to CDRs. For one thing, CDRs only include metadata, making
interpretability of results difficult and precluding any analysis of what is actually being
communicated. More importantly, WhatsApp is the primary medium that migrants
actually use to communicate, especially for seeking information, opportunities, and
resources.
3.2 Social Media Network Analysis
There is a broad literature of research that seeks to understand social interaction as it
unfolds on internet sites and communications networks [9] [10], with topics including
connectivity and distance between users, the strengths of ties between users, informa-
tion flow through networks, and homophily. Ediger et al., in a 2010 paper, construct
undirected Twitter interaction graphs—with users as nodes—related to crisis topics
(the H1N1 pandemic, and the 2009 Atlanta floods) and find the distribution of user
degrees fits a power law, with media and government accounts having especially high
degrees [11].
1https://luca-d3.com/products-services
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3.3 Research on WhatsApp
WhatsApp is an internet-based messaging application comparable to and more
feature-rich than SMS messaging. By the early months of 2020, WhatsApp was used
by over two billion daily users, who send many billions of messages every day [12].
Beyond allowing individuals to message each other (for free and with multimedia
content), WhatsApp also allows individuals to create and join group messages with
up to 256 users total, a feature that has significantly fueled WhatsApps growth.
Many groups are public and able to be accessed with links shared in various sources.2
Relatively little attention is paid to WhatsApp compared to other social me-
dia networks. As of April 2020, Google Scholar returns only 214,000 articles about
WhatsApp, compared to 6.2 million results for research on Facebook and 7.3 million
on Twitter; there are even 1.1 million articles on Pinterest.
To date, formal access to WhatsApp data has remained proprietary and outside
of the hands of researchers. Because of this limitation, until the previous few years,
most studies of WhatsApp groups have involved qualitative methodologies, centering
on surveys and interviewsfor example, of students at a university who self-report
WhatsApp usage (and share their personal WhatsApp data directly with researchers)
[13].
3.3.1 Analysis of WhatsApp Public Groups
More recently, several researchers have taken a more quantitative, systematic ap-
proach of joining public WhatsApp groups en masse. These researchers scrape various
sources for links to join public WhatsApp groups, automatically join these groups on
some regular (usually daily) basis, and scrape messages and data from the groups,
including links to join further WhatsApp groups. Research on WhatsApp groups,
2See, for example, https://whatsgrouplink.com/, or simply the Google search results for
”chat.whatsapp.com” plus any query of interest.
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then, has shifted from working with users (through interviews and accessing their
personal WhatsApp accounts) to working as users (by joining hundreds to thousands
of public WhatsApp groups).
Bursztyn and Birnbaum take such an approach to study politically-themed Whats-
App groups leading up to the 2018 Brazilian election, and analyze aspects including
network metrics (constructing, for example, a graph of users as nodes and edges
as co-participation in any group) and sharing of media from different sources [14].
Garimella and Tyson, in a 2018 study, research WhatsApp public groups generally,
without any subject or demographic in focus (they join groups found on Google and
other topic-agnostic websites) [15]. They analyze the distribution of messages between
and within groups, the geographic distribution of users,3 and the content, language,
and multimedia within messages.
A Brazilian group at the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG) has started
to dominate this subfield. Out of the 12 English-language studies that analyze Whats-
App public groups (as of late March 2020), six have been published by the same group,
with lead investigators F. Benevenuto and J.M. Almeida, both associate professors at
UFMG. They began their work around 2018, developing a system to help journalists
analyze and visualize the activities of political WhatsApp groups during the historic
Brazilian election that eventually put Jair Bolsonaro in power [16]; their tool analyzed
the political views and demographics of groups. Later in 2019, with Garimella, they
extended this tool to India, incorporating the Perceptual Hashing (pHash) algorithm
to identify re-shared images that were slightly altered [17].
Other work by UFMG researchers includes a 2019 paper that tracks replies within
WhatsApp [18]—which constructed directed graphs from reply cascades, character-
izing and analyzing structural attributes of these graph—and a 2019 paper studying
3The geographic distribution of users in groups collected by Garimella and Tyson are quite
illustrative of the biases of sampling from public WhatsApp groups advertised on Google and other
highly-public sites. From their paper, the top countries include India (25K), Pakistan (3.6K), Russia
(3K), Brazil (2K) and Colombia (1K).
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textual content in WhatsApp groups [19]. This latter paper attempted to identify
misinformation, and separately analyzed text properties like message size, linguistic
elements, and sentiment and topic analysis. The UFMG group has also studied mis-
information and information spread within Brazilian WhatsApp groups [20], as well
as the content and propagation of audio messages within such groups [21].
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Chapter 4
Collecting Data
In this section, we detail our data collection methodology, limitations on WhatsApp
data collection in general, limitations of our methodology, and privacy concerns. De-
tails about technical implementations, as well as full source code, are available in
Appendix A.
4.1 Methodology Overview
At a high level, we collect information from WhatsApp groups by joining groups as
user. We adapt and alter the methodology of several recent researchers, as described
in Chapter 3.3 on related work. At a high level, we:
1. Search for links to join WhatsApp groups across various Facebook groups.
These links are all of the form chat.whatsapp.com/...
2. Join these WhatsApp groups, either on the WhatsApp Web interface using
Python and Selenium or directly on smartphones.
3. Continuously collect message and member information from each WhatsApp
group, on the WhatsApp Web interface using Python and Selenium.
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4.2 Joining Groups
To search for WhatsApp groups to join, we first searched for Facebook groups related
to Venezuelan migrants in Colombia. We included all public Facebook groups of
50,000 members or more that appeared in search results for (“Venezuela” OR “Vene-
zolanos”) AND (“Colombia” OR various large cities in Colombia1). We collected all
WhatsApp links posted in these groups between November 1, 2019 and January 23,
2020, either posted directly or as comments/replies to other posts (most were the
latter).
In total, we collected 280 unique links, and were able to join around 200 groups.
A few links were broken/mistyped, but most unsuccessful links had been revoked by
the owner of the WhatsApp groups—indeed, some of the links had last been posted
months prior. There are several flaws inherent to this process, which center on the
fact that if we don’t collect and join links in real-time (as they are posted), links may
be revoked by the time we attempt to join.
Its not clear how links being revoked would bias our data, the sample not purport-
ing to represent anything in the first place, but avoiding revoked links is certainly good
for expanding the size and diversity of the dataset. Facebook posts/comments them-
selves may also be deleted as time passes. A better and more systematic approach
to joining groups would involve continuous (or at least daily) monitoring of Face-
book groups, which is made difficult by the fact that Facebooks API doesnt allow for
automatic scraping (Facebooks rather clunky/glitchy user interface also means that
a Selenium-based approach, as we implement to collect data from WhatsApp Web,
would be quite error-prone).
Joining groups from their invite links is rather simple, involving a few button
clicks on WhatsApp Web, which can be automated using Selenium.
1Specifically, we searched for all groups using the terms (“Venezuela” OR “Venezolano”) AND
(“Bogota” OR “Medellin” OR “Cali” OR “Barranquilla” OR “Cartagena” OR “Cucuta”), which
are the six largest cities in Colombia.
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As described above, collecting and joining group links in real-time (or at least
daily) would solve the issue of links being revoked. Yet joining groups every day
at the same hour (more specifically, groups that likely just had invite links created)
would probably raise WhatsApps suspicions. In this sense, any efforts to systematize
our processes are also more likely to create obvious patterns, raise the suspicions of
WhatsApp, and ultimately lead to adverse action against us. Randomizing join time
might help–say we collect links every day at midnight, then join them at some random
time (within reasonable hours) in the next day.
4.3 Interference Measures by WhatsApp
Joining many groups, it turns out, is incredibly suspicious to WhatsApp. On mul-
tiple instances, midway through joining a list of groups, accounts became banned
from WhatsApp. With high confidence, these were automatic bans, both because of
their instantaneous mid-process nature and because they took place near the same
chokehold each time (around the 40th to 50th group joined by that account).
The obvious solution was to limit how quickly we joined groups; we eventually
found that joining no more than 30 groups in any 24 hour period was enough to stave
off the auto-ban. More than this, we also found that multiple smartphones (each
with their own WhatsApp account) were necessary to reduce the suspiciousness of
our processes. To join 200 groups, each on at least two smartphones (as a resiliency
measure), we eventually used six smartphones of different models/operating systems,
each with their own phone number and WhatsApp account.
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4.4 Collecting Data from Groups
Most studies in the literature collect data from groups by decrypting a WhatsApp
message database that is stored locally on the smartphone2 [14] [15]. This published
method involves the somewhat dodgy (and sometimes illegal3) exercise of rooting
Android phones (akin to “jailbreaking” iPhones), which is necessary for obtaining
the encryption key WhatsApp uses to secure this message database.
Our process of collecting data from groups significantly differs from this known
approach. Using Selenium and WhatsApp Web, we navigate to each group in the
WhatsApp Web interface, and then in each group record the groups members and
log the groups messages. This approach is more complicated than simply decrypting
the message database, since it relies on the rapidly changing and quite “fragile”4
WhatsApp Web, but is better in certain aspects:
• Our method doesn’t require rooting, which is sometimes illegal but also gener-
ally dependent on a highly ad-hoc community of mobile software development
engineers occasionally publishing root “exploits.”
• Our method is much less likely to be rendered impossible by WhatsApp. Whats-
App could easily change how they store and secure the message database, mak-
ing the known method infeasible or substantially more difficult. But access to
WhatsApp Web is a given.
Admittedly, several tools to scrape messages from WhatsApp Web have already
been published,5 but our implementation is much more complete than any available
2Specifically, all WhatsApp studies that explicitly mention how they collect data mention this
method; the UFMG studies do not explicitly mention how they collect data.
3In the United States, the Digiital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA) made it illegal to root
Android phones. Later exemptions made it temporarily legal to root certain devices (phones but
not tablets), but overall, rooting is a legal grey area in the United States as well as globally [22].
4This is a term from Kiran Garimella, author of various articles in the recent literature on
WhatsApp public groups.
5See, for example, https://github.com/UoMResearchIT/whatsapp-scraper, or https:
//github.com/bansalsamarth/whatsapp-chats-scraper, or https://github.com/codenoid/
WhatsappScraper. More generally, these tools can be found by searching GitHub.
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method. The scripts available are almost all between 200-300 lines long, while our
implementation is just short of 700 lines; quantity is not quality, but all 700 lines in
our implementation are needed to fully deal with the intricacies of WhatsApp Web.
Anything shorter fails to capture certain information (for example, multimedia data)
or deal with extreme cases (for example, groups with thousands of daily messages).
On top of this, none of the public tools include implementation details, only (e.g.)
Python scripts for scraping. Questions like how often we should scrape and with what
infrastructure we should scrape remain unanswered.
We share most implementation details, and a final Python script, in Appendix A.
Below, we detail some more novel aspects of our implementation (hereafter referred
to as “traverseGroups,” named after the Python script that we use to traverse groups
and collect data), including frequency of data collection, infrastructure, and anti-
interference measures.
4.4.1 How do we uniquely identify groups?
A part of this process involving some sophistication was finding a way to keep track
of groups and identify them uniquely.
Once we join a group, theres no obvious and foolproof way of identifying the group
uniquely. In the WhatsApp Web interface, the only information viewable about the
group are title, group icon, message history, other members, and (rarely, if the group
administrator created one) group description. Even in HTML, where other sites
may include some kind of (hidden) unique identifier, WhatsApp doesnt. Of course,
WhatsApps intended use case doesnt center on users being in many groups with
identical titles.
We needed to be able to uniquely identify groups from the scant information avail-
able. Using title and/or array of other group members were our initial guesses, but
those change over time and are not necessarily unique (in our case, there were multiple
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groups with the titles “Venezuela,” “Venezolanos en Bogota,” and “Emprendedores”
(Entrepreneurs)). Group profile pictures (specifically, the link to the image) are a
more unique alternative, since the same picture, if used as the icon for more than one
group, would be uploaded to distinct links.6 Yet profile pictures can also be changed,
and not all groups have profile pictures (around 10-20% of groups we joined did not).
It turned out that, buried7 in the link to a groups profile picture (if it has one),
is some kind of unique group identifier, of the form “58416572XXXX-157097XXXX”.
In this string, the first half is the phone number of the group creator (which stays
constant over time), and the second half appears to be some kind of unique group
identifier. Even when profile pictures change, the same unique group identifier re-
mains in the link to the new profile picture.
This solves the question of groups that have profile pictures. Some groups still
dont, so we resorted to using a cryptographic hash of the full HTML of the title
(which includes both the text and any emojis in the title). So we recorded the unique
identifier for each group, which we call its uid, as either: the profile picture link’s
unique identifier (if the group has a profile picture), or the cryptographic hash of
its title (if it doesn’t have a profile picture). Combining these methods resulted in
100% success in identifying groups uniquely, and > 90% success in tracking groups
over time (when they add/remove profile pictures, or change titles). Still, this is not
foolproof: a group’s uid may change if, for example, it removes its profile picture
completely, or if it changes title without having a profile pictures.
In general, there isnt a foolproof way to perfectly identify groups. Using as many
details as possible about the groups (everything from message history to member
6This is not true of all images; some commonly-used images, like emojis, are shown from base64
directly in HTML without a separate link. Strange nuances like this kept appearing on WhatsApp
Web, and made the entire process of scraping WhatsApp Web quite tedious.
7The profile picture link looks something like: https://
web.whatsapp.com/pp?e=https%3A%2F%2Fpps.whatsapp.net%2Fv%2Ft61.24694-24%
2F71104943 726169654564928 648446692972455XXXX n.jpg%3Foe%3D5E35C2D4%26oh%
3Dc8619054cae8f2c2766c3ce819d3ea7f&t=s&u=58416572XXXX-157097XXXX%40g.us&i=
1571100754. This identifier really is buried in there.
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array) would allow for greater confidence in tracking a group over time should details
(like title HTML) change, but this seems overly complicated for the scope of this
thesis. In Appendix A.2.2, we describe how in preprocessing data we are able to
identify and link groups even when their uids change.
4.4.2 How frequently do we collect data?
Due to the design of WhatsApp Web, scrolling to an earlier message requires simul-
taneously loading all later messages, which imposes heavy resource (CPU/memory)
usage. If messages 31-45 are currently loaded, scrolling to messages 15-30 would
mean loading messages 15-45 (i.e., keeping messages 31-45 loaded while loading the
new messages).8 Clearly, checking for messages every n hours has cost greater than
O(n) each time, since the CPU/memory are strained by having to load n hours of
messages all at once, and cannot read/log messages as efficiently.
Using sample data, we estimated the processing time to be around O(n2). In our
sample, we checked around 200 groups every three hours (for 48 hours total), and for
each group-time pair, we recorded the number of new messages in that group, how
long it took to read those messages, and how long it took to scroll to those messages.
We ran this process on two servers, a late-model Macbook and a server from Amazon
Web Services, and had approximately 2600 group-time pairs on each server.
8This differs from how WhatsApp loads groups in the sidebar, which is more efficient. In the
sidebar, WhatsApp only loads 15 groups at a time.
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A plot of the number of messages and read time for each group-time pair is shown
in figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Read time is quadratic in number of messages; the CPU/memory are
taxed by having to simultaneously load all messages at once, and consequently run
slower when they actually read messages.
Figure 4.2: Scroll time is linear in number of messages; this is largely due to the
delay (that we implemented) between each scroll so that earlier messages are properly
loaded.
While the Amazon server was able to read messages almost twice as quickly, on
both servers there was a quadratic relationship betewen number of messages and read
time. The fact that computing time is O(n2) compels us to check groups in small
time intervals. Some testing led us to settle on every three hours, with the workload
typically being finished in an hour. Obviously, theres no guarantee of success here–
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members of every group could send 500 messages in a three hour period–but three
hours seems enough to assure success with near certainty given our data.
4.4.3 What infrastructure do we use to collect data?
The script we use to collect data from groups must run continuously in small time
intervals, so we deployed it to remote servers. Running continuously naturally sug-
gests the Unix scheduler cron. The traverseGroups Python script by itself couldve
been deployed as just a Python script, but the added complication of cron made a
smarter deployment make sense. Using cron requires changing system settings that
could affect other processes on the remote servers; in particular, cron kills Python and
Chrome occasionally to make sure that crashed/glitched processes (which may result
from glitches in WhatsApp Web) dont affect future runs. This could be problematic
when other processes are in play, as they might be on a shared server.
Enter Docker, a platform that uses OS-level virtualization to deliver software
in packages called containers [23]. Essentially, each Docker “container” is designed
to run one specific task; a container begins as some base image (e.g., a bare-bones
Unix distribution), and onto which we can add software, and libraries/configurations
needed for the software to run.
In our case, we started from a Unix distribution with Python already loaded,
then installed the Selenium package, installed Chrome and chromedriver, added the
traverseGroups script, and configured cron. The container functions like a dedicated
virtual machine, but with much less overhead than a virtual machine.
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Figure 4.3: A diagram illustrating how Docker differs from typical deployments.
Once containers are created, they can be downloaded to any machine with the
Docker host, which runs on Mac, Windows, and Linux. There are a variety of benefits
to Docker aside from not needing to change system settings (figure 4.3 illustrates the
differences between Docker and typical deployments):
• As long as a computer can run the Docker host, Docker containers will run
exactly the same on that machine as they would on any other machine. This
meant that we could instantly test code updates on the local computer, and be
confident that they would work exactly the same on remote servers, without
needing to upload and test code on each of them.
• The traverseGroups script also depends on Google Chrome and chromedriver
(which allows Chrome to be controlled by Python/Selenium), which can both
differ significantly across platforms. Using Docker means avoiding any problems
that arise from differences in Chrome version. One version of Chrome may load
certain aspects of WhatsApp Web faster, for example, and this would affect
timings we have in the script.
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• Docker makes it extremely easy for results to be replicated, and for other
researchers to be able to run this code. Instead of needing to configure
{cron,Python, Selenium,Chrome, chromedriver}, all they need to do is down-
load the Docker host and pull our Docker container.
With this, we ultimately deployed the traverseGroups code on six separate Ama-
zon EC2 Unix servers (one for each smartphone). We ended up settling on AWS
t2.medium instances, which offer 2 “burstable” Intel Xeon processors and 4 GiB of
memory, and each cost around $1.11 per day to run.9 As we detail below, the tra-
verseGroups script runs at random intervals to maintain a lower profile, so dedicating
a server to each phone makes the most sense. Standardizing the timings (i.e., having
the process for each account run at different set times) would allow for more efficient
server use, but would appear significantly more suspicious to WhatsApp.
4.4.4 How do we avoid getting banned from WhatsApp?
Our accounts and processes are endlessly suspicious. Each account joins dozens of
groups, but never messages anything or uses WhatsApp outside of these groups. Each
account also logs in every few hours or so from WhatsApp Web, and looks in each
group every time.
To avoid getting banned from WhatsApp, we undertake a two-fold strategy of
making both accounts and processes less suspicious. WhatsApp has infinite data
about each account: IP address of the phone (at every point in time), phone num-
ber, device location (if granted permission), device model and platform, and various
details about how WhatsApp Web is accessed (including browser user agent, screen
resolution, IP address, and more). Beyond this metadata, WhatsApp also records
patterns of activities on each account, such as the groups joined (and when those
groups were joined) and when WhatsApp Web is accessed.
9https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/instance-types/
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We lower the profile of each account as much as we can, by:
• Limiting how many groups each account joins. This requires more smart-
phones/accounts running in parallel, though there are natural limits for how
low we can make this number. For one, additional smartphones are costly to
operate and mtainin, but more than this, more accounts are more suspicious,
especially if WhatsApp can link them in some way (it would be infeasible,
for example, to maintain 30 different smartphones each with individual IP ad-
dresses). We settled on using one smartphone per every 60 or so groups (in
total, six smartphones, so that the 200 groups were each joined by two separate
accounts, in case of technological failure or bans).
• IP address masking of the smartphones. This seemed especially important dur-
ing account creation and when joining groups. Yet technology news sources
report that WhatsApp also flags accounts where the IP address doesn’t match
telephone number geography [24], so this is more difficult than it seems; VPN
addresses are likely also highly suspicious. We ended up running the phones
clearnet on independent Princeton University networks—WhatsApp seems to
consider Bayes’ rule when flagging IP addresses,10 so the high amount of legit-
imate WhatsApp activity from Princeton likely made our accounts less suspi-
cious.
• IP address masking of the servers used to run traverseGroups and collect data.
Each Amazon EC2 instance, by default, has a different public IP, motivating
the use of one server per smartphone. We ran into no issues with this setup,
whatever the EC2 geographies (we used servers in Amazon’s us-east-2 (Ohio),
us-west-1 (N. California), and us-west-2 (Oregon) regions). IP address likely
10On several occasions, WhatsApp outright banned IPs we used to create and modify accounts,
but WhatsApp never banned the Princeton University IP range, on which we conducted over 90%
of our total activity.
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matters much less when simply accessing WhatsApp, in comparison to creating
accounts or joining groups.
• Varying device models and platforms. Six old-model Android smartphones sud-
denly appearing on WhatsApp is much more suspicious than six late-model
iPhones, given their usage in the general population. We ended up using mostly
iPhones of varying models.
• Varying the user agent and screen resolution of the servers that access Whats-
App Web. We spoof this data anyway, so we used a different user agent on each
of the EC2s.
• Varying the times/intervals at which WhatsApp Web is accessed. For each
account, we generated random intervals (uniform between 2.5-4.5 hours), and
from those intervals, we generated cron scripts that ran the traverseGroups
Python script to collect data at random times.
4.5 General Limitations
Our approach has significant drawbacks, beginning with the fact that public Whats-
App groups only represent a small and skewed sample of communications on Whats-
App, with most WhatsApp communication either private or in groups involving close
acquaintances: roommates, colleagues, participants of specific social occasions, and
so on [25]. Yet because of the importance WhatsApp holds in migrant experiences—
and because its proprietary nature means that analysis can only be done either with
user or as user—we still consider our approach to have significant merit.
Moreover, while public groups may not be a good representation of all communi-
cations on WhatsApp, we have strong suspicions that such groups do come closer to
representing migration-related communications of Venezuelans in Colombia. From a
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Reuters survey of social media users in nine countries (which included the US and
UK, as well as Turkey, Malaysia, and Brazil), 76% of WhatsApp users participate
in groups and a vast majority of these users (around 58-65% of all WhatsApp users
in Turkey, Malaysia, and Brazil) are active members of groups that mostly include
people they do not know [26]. We hypothesize, then, that Venezuelan migrants are
indeed likely to be part of public, widely-advertised WhatsApp groups, especially
since they have much greater interaction with strangers in general.
Beyond our analysis only capturing the dynamics of public WhatsApp groups, we
also fall short in capturing only a certain sample of public WhatsApp groups–those
were able to find. The possible biases of joining groups that have been shared on
Facebook or the internet (i.e., these groups are quite heavily advertised) are somewhat
counteracted by the fact that migrants are also more likely to have joined these groups,
compared to other public WhatsApp groups.
With these biases in mind, we proceed with the understanding that our research
should focus not on how our sample represents migrant communication in general,
and instead on the dynamics within our sample, and how they change. Our sample
is certainly interesting in and of itself, even while it may not offer rigorous broader
conclusions toward migration-related communications in general.
4.6 Data Limitations
While our methodology grants us full access to data from WhatsApp groups, we in-
tentionally limit what data we collect. WhatsApp offers a rich variety of content types
for messages, including documents and locations, but many (e.g., documents and lo-
cations) are rarely used in our groups of interest, and add unnecessary complexity to
both our data collection and analysis.
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More significantly, we do not fully download multimedia content (audio recordings,
images, and videos). For images and videos, we only record their cryptographic hash
(and only of the thumbnail for videos); for audio recordings, we only record their
duration. To reiterate, our methodology is fully capable of downloading this content
(indeed, because our process relies on WhatsApp Web, it “sees” exactly what a user
would see), but downloading content involves significant technological complexity,
and would also require significiant manual analysis to reap any benefit (i.e., labeling
images and audio).
Moreover, one of the principal researchers in this field has explicitly warned against
downloading multimedia content,11 since some groups are of an adult nature where
obscene (and sometimes illegal) content is frequently shared [15].
What this means is that images/videos end up useful in two ways: we know that
an image was shared, and we know if the same image or video is ever shared again.
A caveat is that popular images/videos are sometimes altered before being re-shared,
either unknowingly (e.g., a user downloading the image in lower-resolution, or taking
a screenshot, and then re-sharing) or intentionally (in an attempt to circumvent
various systems, like Youtube’s copyright control system [28] or WhatsApp’s anti-
spam filters).
A compromise between our methodology and downloading multimedia might in-
volve perceptual hashes, which matches similar images [29] and audio files [30] at a
high level, without needing to retain the entirety of their contents. Still, perceptual
hashes do not produce any interpretability.
11Interestingly enough, several of his collaborators have come to center their research on multi-
media content in WhatsApp groups. See [27], [21]. One has to wonder.
36
4.7 Privacy Concerns
The ethical considerations of working with social media data are murky, particularly in
the case of WhatsApp, which is seen as a more private messaging service in comparison
to Facebook and Twitter, which are more traditional social media platforms.
WhatsApps terms of service allow for users to access data from groups in which
they are members, so our methodology is compliant with the companys terms. Whats-
App also does not make restrictions on who can join groups. An ethical question
perhaps arises from our act of joining groups (which is without pretense, though still
possibly misleading if group members do not expect researchers to join). Our tar-
get groups, however, are not only public but also advertised somewhere, so it seems
unlikely that we are violating expectations of privacy within these groups.
With regard to other group members (i.e., Venezuelan migrants), WhatsApps pri-
vacy policy states that a user shares their messages and profile information (including
phone number) with other members of the group (both for public and private groups)
[15]. Because our collection process is implemented as user, we collect data symmetri-
cal to what other users are able to access. We find it likely, given WhatsApps intuitive
user interface, that users have full knowledge of what information they and others
can access, so users do understand what data we can collect. Effectively, by joining a
public WhatsApp group, users agree–both formally and informally–to share certain
data with other members of the group, and are aware of what data is being shared
(i.e., their profile information and messages).
An important question remains of delineating between these users agreement and
consent (to join groups and share information), and their choice (to do so), especially
given our context. No users are forced to join any of our target groups, but the
circumstances because of which they join our target groups–the arduous processes of
migration and resettlement–can certainly be coercive. In other words, users may join
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groups intentionally but without choice as we typically understand it.12 While this
concern will remain paramount in our work, for now we emphasize that our research
aims are wholly in line with the well-being of migrants, and that we will heavily
restrict what data we share, as described below.
We will share neither identifying information about individual WhatsApp profiles
nor individual messages from WhatsApp groups, because of the possible expectations
of privacy within these groups–users may expect their profile and messages to only
be seen by other members of the group at that time,13 with the total number of such
members capped at 256. When sharing aggregate results from WhatsApp, we will
take care to ensure that no individuals can be singled out from data.
12This point is heavily inspired by a brilliant essay on sex work and agency written by Lorelei
Lee, an American sex worker and writer. See [31].
13Though again, we reiterate that any person with internet access and a mobile phone number
would have been able to access all of this information, legally and in accordance with WhatsApps
terms of service.
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Chapter 5
Initial Analysis of Members
We begin our analysis by exploring the network of members in our WhatsApp groups.
Principally, we define membership in each group as having sent a message to the group
during the 53 days we collected data.
In total, we recorded 7,860 users participating in 174 groups. Nearly all of these
users (7,377 users, or 93.85%) joined only one group, but 434 were in two groups, 36
were in three groups, 11 were in four groups (of which four had CO phone numbers
and two had VZ numbers), and 2 were in five groups (one with BR phone number,
one with VZ number).
Figure 5.1 shows a histogram of group sizes, which follows a power-law distribution
with a long tail. 44% of groups involve 10 or fewer active members, and 59% involve
20 or fewer, but 9.8% of groups involve over 150 members.1
5.1 Comparing Users by Country
We preface this section by conceding that telephone country codes are an imperfect
approximation of location, and a much worse approximation of nationality. Whats-
1British anthropologist Robin Dunbar famously proposed 150 as a theoretical limit for a person’s
social network size [32]; this number was supported by a 2011 study of communications over Twitter
[33], and likely explains, to some extent, WhatsApp’s hard limit of 256 members per group.
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Figure 5.1: The number of members in groups is heavily skewed; 44% of groups
involve 10 or fewer participants.
App only requires a user’s telephone number when signing up and for occasional
verification purposes; it’s certainly possible for, say, a South African traveling in Peru
to sign up for WhatsApp with a French phone number.
Yet we argue that in our context, the telephone numbers of WhatsApp users
telephone number are a satisfactory, even helpful, approximation of their geographies.
We found in field work that most users in Colombia access WhatsApp over a mobile
network, at least part of the time; Venezuelan network SIMs don’t work in Colombia,
so we expect users to have a phone number that matches what country they’re in.
Whether or not they register this number on WhatsApp is debatable, but we find
it likely for two reasons. First, WhatsApp occasionally requires verification through
SMS sent to the account number; second, we also found in field work that WhatsApp
users occasionally reverted to SMS/phone calls when their data bundles ran out (users
would want their WhatsApp contacts to still be able to contact them, compelling them
to register their active phone number on WhatsApp).
With this in mind, we compute the proportion of each group with phone numbers
from Colombia (CO), Venezuela (VZ), and other countries including Ecuador (EC),
Chile (CL), and Peru (PE). In nearly all groups, fewer than 10% of members were
from EC, CL, or PE. In figure 5.2 below, we show that while most groups have fewer
than 25% of members from VZ, a decent number of groups have member bases that
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are 25-50% VZ, and some groups are even over 90% VZ. In contrast, there are many
groups that are 75-100% CO.
Figure 5.2: Most groups involve a large percentage of CO members and few VZ
members.
In figure 5.3, we present histograms of group sizes, for groups where there are
more CO members than VZ members, and for groups with more CO members than
VZ members. Of groups with more CO members, the histogram of sizes is nearly
identical (with scaling) to the histogram of group sizes in general, while for groups
with more VZ members, groups tend to be larger.
Figure 5.3: The distribution of sizes of CO-dominant groups is close to the overall
distribution of group size, but groups with more VZs tend to be larger.
5.1.1 Who’s connected to who?
For the rest of this chapter, we treat users as connected if they’ve participated in the
same group. Figure 5.4 below shows that Ecuadorian and Peruvian users are around
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equally well-connected to CO and VZ users, with the vast majority of users from both
countries having connections to 50 users or fewer from either CO or VZ.
Figure 5.4: Users from Ecuador and Peru are equally well-connected to CO and VZ
users.
Next, figure 5.5 shows that CO users strongly tend to be well-connected with
other CO users, and poorly connected with VZ users; the opposite relation holds for
VZ users. This gives credence to our hypothesis that WhatsApp users use phone
numbers from their current locations; if VZ migrants retained +58 (Venezuelan)
phone numbers after migrating to Colombia, we wouldn’t see nearly as strong a
relation here.
Figure 5.5: Users from Colombia are much better connected to other users from
Colombia; Venezuelan users are much better connected to others from Venezuela..
A strange nuance appears in the connections of CL users. In figure 5.6, CL users
appear extremely well-connected to VZ users, and much more poorly connected to
CO users. This pattern appears somewhat suspicious to us, meriting a look at the
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actual data, which reveals that this disparity was driven by one 251-member group,
which included 113 CLs and 111 VZs.
But more than mere coincidence, geography explains this disparity better than
anything else. Colombia shares a (very porous) land border with Peru and Ecuador
but not Chile; Santiago, the Chilean capital, is over 2,600 miles away from Bogot
(Quito, EC and Lima, PE are 441 and 1,167 miles respectively). So while migrants
to EC and PE are likely to have recently spent time in CO, migrants to CL are much
further along in their journeys—so we expect them to retain relatively weaker ties to
CO users. The 251-member group described above, indeed, is titled Venezolanos por
migrar (“Venezuelans for migrating”).
Figure 5.6: Chilean users appear extremely well-connected to VZ users, and much
more poorly connected to CO users.
An alternative look at this phenomenon shows that the geographical hypothesis
holds, even without the effects of the CL/VZ-heavy 251-member group. The four
graphs in figure 5.7 depict country breakdowns of users in general, of users connected
to EC users, of users connected to PE users, and of users connected to CL users.
The first three graphs are all quite similar, but the fourth reveals that relatively
more VZ users (compared to their presence in the overall population) are connected
to CL users. Aggregating connections in this way (looking at all users connected
to CL users, as opposed to CO/VZ connections per individual CL user) decisively
reduces the influence of the 251-member group described above. For the CL graph
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in figure 5.7 to follow the pattern of the other graphs, nearly 460 fewer VZs (10% of
4603) would have to be connected to CL users.
Figure 5.7: There are around twice as many CO users as VZ users, and this is also
true amongst users connected to EC users, and users connected to PE users. But
there are disproportionately more VZs amongst users connected to CL users.
5.2 Geographical Diversity within Groups
Next, we investigate the geographical diversity of groups, using users’ telephone coun-
try codes as an approximation of current (national) location. Given the signficance of
xenophobia in the experience of Venezuelan migrants to Colombia, as well as migrants’
hesitation towards trusting public WhatsApp groups, quantifying how “cross-border”
and transnational each group is can allow us to better understand relationships and
activity within groups.
Conventionally, two main indicies are used to measure diversity: (Shannon) en-
tropy and the Simpson index [34]. In our case, let there be users from countries
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1, . . . ,m in a group, so that pi of users are from country i. Then the entropy is
calculated as −∑mi=1 pi log pi, while the Simpson index is calculated as ∑mi=1 p2i .
Figure 5.8 shows that these two indicies are very closely correlated across our
groups, as they should be (Pearson r = −0.962). A slight nuance enters in that
because entropy and the Simpson index measure different things, they may not always
be so closely related. Intuitively, the Simpson index gives the probability of two users
drawn from a group being from the same country; Shannon entropy, on the other
hand, is more a measure of uncertainty, representing the average number of bits
needed to convey which country a user is from.
Figure 5.8: The relationship between entropy and Simpson index is close to linear,
but not quite.
We default to using entropy in later parts of this thesis, simply by how we frame
our research interest. If an aid organization is deciding which groups to send a message
to, it makes more sense to consider the uncertainty of geography in the group—
approximating the uncertainty of where the message may end up—rather than the
similarity or diversity of users. In any case, Shannon entropy and the Simpson index
exhibit close to a linear relation across our groups, so it shouldn’t matter.
The histogram in figure 5.9 illustrates how homogeneous some groups are.
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Figure 5.9: Histogram of group entropies.
5.2.1 Correlates of Diversity
Figure 5.10 plots entropy of each group against proportion of users from CO and
proportion of VZ users, respectively. Both graphs are characteristically bounded
below by the minimum entropy curve −p log p−(1−p) log(1−p) (this is approximately
4p(1 − p), which is Bernoulli variance scaled to 1); the minimum entropy curve is
obtained if users are from only two countries with proportions p, 1−p (naturally, this
curve peaks at p = 0.5).
Figure 5.10: Scatter plots of entropies against proportions CO and proportion VZ of
groups.
We see that there are many more heavily CO groups than there are heavily VZ
groups, but more starkly, groups with few VZs are relatively homogeneous, while
groups with few COs are relatively diverse. Entropy and proportion CO are moder-
ately negatively correlated (Pearson r = −0.50, p < 0.001), while the entropy and
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proportion VZ aren’t correlated (r = 0.08, p = 0.31). In individual regressions with
entropy as the dependent variable, the OLS coefficient on proportion VZ is 0.20, and
a much more drastic -0.88 on proportion CO, with the same p-values.
Figure 5.11a plots entropy against the proportion of users from neither CO nor VZ.
Generally, groups with more 3rd country users are more diverse (Pearson r = 0.51,
p < 0.001), but the effect is diminished by a few groups that are mostly 3rd country
users yet very homogeneous; we can imagine these as Peru-centered groups, Ecuador-
centered groups, etc. Finally, figure 5.11b plots entropy against group sizes; larger
groups tend to be more diverse, but the effect is weak.
(a) Scatter plot of entropies against pro-
portion of users from neither CO nor VZ..
(b) Scatter plot of entropies against
group sizes.
Figure 5.11: Scatter plots with entropy.
To restate that entropies and Simpson indicies are nearly interchangeable, all
of the results above were equally statistically significant/insignificant when using
Simpson index, and correlations/OLS coefficients were in the direction we’d expect.
For example, the Pearson r between entropy and proportion CO was −0.50 (p <
0.001), while the Pearson r between Simpson index and proportion CO was 0.53
(p < 0.001).
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5.3 Network Properties
As we saw in Chapter 3, the network structure of users and groups offers important
insights on how information propagates on WhatsApp.
5.3.1 Network Properties of Groups
We first construct an undirected graph with groups as nodes, connecting groups if they
share a user in common. Of 174 groups, 107 are connected to at least one other group,
and the largest connected component involves 86 groups (49.4%). This is reasonable;
work like that by Resende et al. (2019) found varying sizes of largest connected
components (LCCs): 25 groups of 136 groups related to a Brazilian truckers’ strike
(18.4%), and 206 of 333 political groups related to the 2018 election (61.9%) [27].
Taking an alternate look, our network of groups is actually really well connected.
Only 107 groups (of 174) are connected to any other group, so we might imagine
that the remaining 67 might simply never be connected, for whatever reason—they
might be, for example, dedicated business channels where only group administrators
can send messages (this restriction is possible on WhatsApp). So of groups that are
connected to other groups, over 80% are in the largest connected component!
We present in figure 5.12 a visualization of this graph with groups as nodes.
The behemoth LCC is clear here, and, as expected, we see that there aren’t any
other connected components of significant size (indeed, the second LCC involves four
groups). We shade groups by whether they’re mostly CO users, mostly VZ users, or
neither.
It appears that the main hubs connecting groups in the LCC are not VZ-dominant
groups (i.e., either blue or yellow). For groups in the LCC, we calculate their average
(shortest path) distance to all other groups as a measure of their centrality (a perfectly
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Figure 5.12: Visualization of group network. We only include the 107 groups that
are connected to any other group.
central group would have average-shortest-path 1). Of the 16 most central groups in
the LCC, indeed, only one is VZ-dominant (it’s easily identifiable on the graph).
Averaged across all groups, however, the centrality of CO-dominant groups, VZ-
dominant groups, and groups that are neither CO-dominant nor VZ-dominant are
all quite similar. The average shortest path distances are 3.487, 3.684, and 3.590
respectively; neither ANOVA nor a t-test between CO-dominant and VZ-dominant
groups were significant.
For groups in the LCC, their centrality was moderately positively correlated to
their size (Pearson r = −0.27 between average-shortest-path and size, p = 0.01),
though the effect is small. From an OLS regression with just these variables, an
increase in group membership by 100, on average, is linked to a reduction in average-
shortest-path by 0.2.
Figure 5.13 shows a histogram of group degrees. Given that 67 groups are not
connected to any other groups, this highly-skewed distribution is unsurprising; 60%
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of groups have degree less than 5, but 20.7% have degree larger than 20. The average
degree of all groups is 13.1, and the two extremely well-connected groups, with degrees
123 and 157, are both general/just-for-fun groups (one about salsa, the other a general
interest group for Ccuta).
Figure 5.13: Histogram of group degrees.
Unsurprisingly, degree is moderately positively correlated with both size and en-
tropy of groups; larger and more diverse groups are immediately adjacent to more
groups. The relationship with both is significant even when controlling for one an-
other: an OLS regression of group degree on size and entropy yields coefficients
0.134 on size (p < 0.001) and 6.45 on entropy (p = 0.01). Even when dropping
highly-connected groups (e.g., groups with degree > 70), the relationship holds—the
coefficients about halve, but remain signficant.
Finally, we examine the clustering coefficient of groups, which is the prob-
ability that for any two groups connected to a group, those other two groups
are also connected. At node i with degree di, the clustering coefficient Ci =
# of triangles involving i
# of possible triangles involving i
= # of triangles involving i
di×(di−1)/2 [10]; the clustering coefficient repre-
sents the presence of triadic closure around a group—the tendency for two nodes
both to a third node to themselves connect [9].
In our scenario, the clustering coefficient at a group meaningfully approximates
interactions around that group. Figure 5.14 shows a histogram of group clustering
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Figure 5.14: Distribution of group clustering coefficients (only including groups with
degree ≥ 2).
coefficients. Of 107 groups with degree at least 2, around 40 have clustering coef-
ficient 0 and around 30 have clustering coefficient 1, while the remainder of groups
fall in between. Clustering coefficient is weakly negatively correlated to group size
(Pearsonr = −0.29, p < 0.01).
Three Class Graphs
As one perspective on the centrality and distribution of groups in this network, we
classify groups into three classes based on various metrics—size, proportion CO, pro-
portion VZ, proportion non-CO/non-VZ, and entropy. For each metric, we consider
groups in the 0-30th percentiles of all groups for that metric, groups in the 30th-70th
percentiles, and groups in the 70th-100th percentiles. For group size, for example,
groups are categorized based on whether they have ≤ 5 members, have 6-46 members,
or have > 46 members.
We graph the largest connected component in the group network below, shading
groups by their classification.
In figure 5.15, large groups seem a lot more central. Indeed, the smallest groups
have average-shortest-path 3.93, medium-sized groups (6 to 46 members) have
average-shortest-path 3.69, and the largest groups have average shortest path 3.35.
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Figure 5.15: Visualization of group network, shading groups by their size.
Both ANOVA (across all three classes) and a t-test (between the smallest/largest
groups) yielded p < 0.05.
This is an important characterization, since we might imagine a trade-off between
sending messages to a group with many active participants, and a group with few
active participants. An aid organization, for example, might consider disseminating
information to a more active group, at the risk of being crowded out by the many
active participants. While attention/interaction is a different story, one we discuss in
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Chapter 7, it’s clear that messages sent to the group with many active participants
require fewer steps to be disseminated more broadly.
Figure 5.16: Visualization of group network, shading groups by their proportion of
CO members.
Figure 5.16 classifies groups by what proportion of their members are CO. CO-
dominant groups are slightly more central, but this relationship is weak. For brevity,
we exclude the graphs where we classified groups by proportion VZ, by proportion
non-CO and non-VZ, and by entropy; under none of those classifications was there a
statistically significant difference in centrality.
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5.3.2 Network Properties of Users
Finally, we construct an undirected graph with users as nodes, connecting users if
they are both part of any group. Of 7,860 users in our graph, 5,693 users (72.4%) are
part of the largest connected component; this kind of “giant” connected component
has been shown in nearly every social network. In [27], 8,934 of 10,860 WhatsApp
users (82.3%) were in the LCC; [14] calculates LCC sizes as ∼ 80% and ∼ 95% of
the networks in two samples; the text Networks, Crowds, and Markets explains that
most large, complex networks should have exactly one “giant component” [9].
Figures 5.17 and 5.18 attempt to visualize this LCC, a difficult (and rather futile)
task given that this graph includes 5,693 nodes (we settled on coloring nodes with
very low opacity). Still, it certainly appears that the more central clusters in each
graph are more diverse than clusters on the outskirts. We skip over any analysis here,
since our exploration of the network of groups covered most relevant aspects.
We do graph in figure 5.19 the distributions of user degrees. One user (from
Mexico of all places) has degree 701, while of the 20 users with highest degree, seven
are from VZ and six are from CO. The mean and median user degree are close,
at 167.8 and 155.0 respectively; 70.6% of users have degree over 100, and 35.7% of
users have degree over 200. The distribution of degrees of CO users does not differ
significantly from that of VZ users (their means are 162.0 and 166.0 respectively).
We note that while distributions of user degree in social networks often follow the
power law, this is not the case for us. Indeed, our measure of connection between
users is relatively weak—only requiring them to be in a group together—so we should
not expect the exponential distributions that have been observed elsewhere.
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Figure 5.17: Visualization of user network.
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Figure 5.18: Visualization of user network.
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Figure 5.19: Histogram of degrees, of all users and of VZ vs. CO users.
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Chapter 6
Initial Analysis of Messages
In this section, we provide an overview of messages from our dataset.
We recorded 171,634 messages between February 13th, 2020 and April 5th, 2020
(inclusive) from 174 unique groups and 7860 unique users. These messages included
101,414 messages with text (59.1%); 38,455 messages with images (22.4%); 8,918
audio messages (5.2%), and 15,596 videos (9.1%);1 28,886 messages (16.8%) included
emojis, which could have been sent with text or by themselves.
6.1 Descriptive Statistics
6.1.1 Text Messages
For the 101,414 messages with text, figure 6.1a shows a histogram of word counts,
which nearly perfectly follows a power law distribution. 14.1% of text messages are
exactly one word, 25% of messages are three words or fewer, and 75% of messages are
≤ 16 words. The tail of this distribution, as we expect, is extremely long, with 5.1%
of messages over 100 words and 1.1% of messages over 500 words.
1Because messages could have included multiple content types—images with captions, for
example—and because some messages were of miscellaneous content types (documents, location
pins, etc.), these proportions do not add to 100%.
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(a) Histogram of word count of Whats-
App text messages.
(b) Density estimation of word count of
tweets, from [35].
Figure 6.1: Comparison of distributions of word count, between our WhatsApp
dataset and Twitter.
Our distribution of word count contrasts nicely with figure 6.1b, which estimates
the probability density of word counts in tweets; on Twitter, word count peaks around
10 words, and doesn’t sharply fall until 30-40 words. Thus, even though our dataset
consists entirely of public groups, it’s clear that the lengths of messages are more
similar to what we’d expect in SMS and private WhatsApp conversations, rather than
a public forum like Twitter. In particular, this might mean that official actors (e.g.,
governments and aid organizations) who distribute information over public WhatsApp
groups should pay attention to message length, since even a 20 word message would
be longer than 79.8% of other messages.
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Yet the reception towards longer messages likely differs across groups. Indeed, in
figure 6.2a, we notice that some groups have sharply longer messages, on average,
than others; the same is true of users, as shown in figure 6.2b.
(a) Histogram of average word count of
various groups.
(b) Histogram of average word count of
users; we only include users with average
word count over 100.
Figure 6.2: Some groups and some users have lengthy messages.
In figure 6.3, we see that the distribution of character counts of messages, like
the distribution of word counts, also follows an exponential distribution, with a peak
at around 10 characters. We had found that 5.1% of messages are over 100 words.
Average word length in Spanish is around 5.22 words,2 and 5.7% messages are over
5.22× 100 characters, so character count distribution closely matches the word count
distribution.
Figure 6.3: Histogram of character count of WhatsApp text messages.
2http://www.puchu.net/doc/Average Word Length
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After stemming words (e.g., merging different conjugations of verbs) and remov-
ing commonly used words, techniques we describe in much more detail in Chapter
8.1 (on labeling misinformation), we obtain the word cloud in figure 6.4. Some com-
mon phrases remain, like “buen da” (good day), but we can better see themes like
Venezuela, the dictator Maduro, the opposition leader Juan Guaid, coronavirus, news,
work, and so on.
Figure 6.4: Word cloud of WhatsApp text messages, after stemming words and re-
moving commonly used words.
Using latent dirichlet allocation—which models documents as random mixtures
over hidden (latent) topics, which themselves involve probabilistic distributions of
words—we can very nascently parse out topics from text messages in our dataset.
Parameterizing this as 10 topics with 10 words each, we obtain the following topics:
1. bs hol grup venezuel whatsapp tas pes hoy pag 1
2. dios senor dia amen vid mund amor mand vide cre
3. man virus 591 mil pued clar pes sal seman dos
4. graci pas bien ok buen dia feliz cambi dias grup
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5. coronavirus venezuel cas fuent inform carac nacional covid19 pais servici
6. venezuel madur gua venezolan pais eeuu nacional gobiern president regim
7. grup jajaj fals verd vide envi asi notici fot informacion
8. experient trabaj am jajajaj pm vid mes envi interes priv
9. coronavirus cas ultim noti covid19 chin hor nuev confirm pais
10. q buen hac pued pas dias sol sab amig gent
We notice that topics 1, 4, 8, and 10 largely consist in greetings; topic 2 is religious;
topic 6 is quite political; and topic 5 centers on the coronavirus.
6.1.2 Audio and Video Messages
Figure 6.5 shows histograms of audio and video message lengths. The length of audio
messages nearly follows the power law distribution of text message length, though
falls much less dramatically—52.9% of messages are longer than 30 seconds. The
tail is fatter than for text messages, with 11.2% of audio messages between 100-199
seconds, and 14.6% of audio messages between 200-299 seconds.
Figure 6.5: Histograms of audio and video message length. We only plot to 400
seconds, but there are much longer audio recordings and videos; 12.1% of audio
messages and 7.5% of videos are longer than five minutes.
The distribution of video message length exhibits an interesting shape, with an
unmistakably sharp peak at 30 seconds—nearly 17.5% of videos are exactly 30 seconds
long (compared to 6.3% that are 29 seconds and 0.7% that are 31 seconds). A likely
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explanation for this may be that specialized content creators, like news organizations
or propagandists, directly tailor their videos to this length; much of the video content
in our groups, then, may be semi-professionally created.
Note that our dataset includes forwarded messages (15.2% of all messages, but
26.3% of all audio messages and 40.2% of videos),3 so the distributions in figure 6.5
are not necessarily indicative of the length of original content. But even when limiting
our analysis to non-forwarded messages, the distribution remains basically the same:
20.5% of non-forwarded videos are 30 seconds long, compared to 7.4% that are 29
seconds long and 0.8% that are 31 seconds long.
Given that speaking speed in Spanish is typically between 7-8 syllables per sec-
ond,4 it’s likely that audio and video messages include substantially more information
than text messages on average.5 From the perspective of a content creator, say an
aid organization attempting to disseminate information, it’s likely wise to consider
sharing textual content instead as spoken audio or narrated video. Anything over 20
words is an outlier amongst text messages, but 30-second audio recordings and videos
aren’t; this isn’t to say that users necessarily pay less attention to long text messages,
but simply that users are more accustomed to content-heavy audio and video.
6.1.3 Group Activity
To measure how active groups are, we use a normalized measure of how many messages
they send in our collection time period. This isn’t just a simple sum (or dividing that
sum by the 53 days we collected data), since we didn’t have complete access to every
group for the entirety of our time period. Specifically, some groups kicked out the
3Here, we only consider “forwarded” messages as per the forwarding feature on WhatsApp. Of
course, it’s possible that users may simply download and re-upload audio/video content, though this
is difficult to identify, given the data limitations we discussed in Section 4.6.
4https://www.transfluent.com/en/2015/07/why-spanish-uses-more-words-than-
english-an-analysis-of-expansion-and-contraction/
5This has immediate disclaimers: some audio messages may only be music, some videos may not
include any spoken words, and so on.
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accounts we used to collect data,6 which is both unsurprising and inevitable given
that we never send any messages, and also join from US phone numbers.7
To account for this discrepancy between groups, we calculated the number of days
between the first message collected in each group and the last message (inclusive),
and divided the total number of messages we collected in that group by this number of
days. This approximates a group activity rate of messages/day, but clearly with large
margin of error: we may have collected data from groups on off-days or extremely
active days,8 we may bias upwards the activity of very inactive groups,9 and so on.
Still, this is a relatively robust measure for group activity.
Figure 6.6a shows a histogram of our group activity measure; figure 6.6b examines
if being kicked out of groups might be endogeneous to how active they are (this would
mean that our activity measurements for active groups are more error-prone/higher
variance, since we collect data for fewer days in those groups).
(a) Histogram of our group activity mea-
sure. (b) Histogram of how many days we col-
lected data from groups.
Figure 6.6: Exploring our measure of group activity.
6Recall that with six total accounts/smartphones, we joined every group with two different ac-
counts/phones.
7Non-Colombian/non-Venezuelan phone numbers, especially ones from outside of Latin America,
are suspicious in general, though U.S. phone numbers likely attract a disproportionate amount of
attention since WhatsApp orders the list of members by ascending country code.
8We joined groups around the same time, though, so this seems like a minor issue.
9Imagine that we never get kicked out a group, but it only has one message on Day 1 and no
more messages for Days 2-53; we erroneously record its activity as 1 instead of 153 ).
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If we set 20 messages/day as the delimiter for inactive/active groups, then there is
no statistically significant difference between how long we were able to stay in inactive
groups vs. in active groups (we actually stayed longer, on average, in active groups).
Group activity is moderately positively correlated to group size (r = 0.36, p <
0.001) and group entropy (r = 0.39, p < 0.001). The OLS estimate for a regression
of group activity on size and entropy is presented in table 6.1.
Table 6.1: OLS regression of group activity on group size and group entropy.
Coefficient (Std. Err.) t P-Value
Intercept −18.9513(14.228) −1.332 0.185
Size 0.4721(0.130) 3.638 0.000∗
Entropy 62.8113(14.730) 4.264 0.000∗
n = 174 (171 d.f.) R2 = 0.213
Unsurprisingly, larger groups are more active—each additional member is linked to
an average increase of 0.47 messages/day—and more diverse groups are significantly
more active even while controlling for size. There might be some reverse causality
in both of these relationships—people, and people from different countries, might be
more likely to join more active groups—though there are likely strong effects in both
directions. We might imagine that entropy spurs activity in cases like cross-border
transactions, cross-border information exchange, and so on. Or we can imagine that
cross-border groups have a higher barrier-to-entry (both because they’re more difficult
to find, and because discussion topics are more limited), so members who do join
cross-border groups are more active on average.
Figure 6.7 shows scatter plots of our activity measure against group size and
entropy.
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Figure 6.7: Scatter plots of our activity measure against size and entropy.
6.2 Message Concentration and Inequality
We now present measures of concentration and inequality within groups, as deter-
mined by the within-group distributions of how many messages are sent by each user.
A large part of the motivation for these measures is the decentralized nature of
the Venezuelan migrant crisis: unlike in other crises where migrants frequently inter-
face with central authorities and institutions—imagine, for example, refugee camps
in Greece—Venezuelan migrants have very little interaction with government and aid
organizations in Colombia. Much of this stems from the relatively little funding allo-
cated to the crisis by the international community (around $50 for each Venezuelan
migrant to Colombia, compared to around $50,000 for every Syrian refugee in Eu-
rope). However, many of the migrants we interviewed also had family and friends
in Colombia, and the transition from Venezuela to Colombia is less overwhelming
then, say, from Syria to Western Europe, making turning to aid organizations less
necessary.
Within our dataset, some groups are dominated by one or a few users—news
groups and dedicated channels for businesses, for example—while others involve much
more organic interaction between members. Given the decentralized nature of this
crisis, it’s worth exploring how concentration in groups can affect how migrants use
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and share information. More generally, concentration and inequality are important
aspects of social networks that impact the relationships and activities of members.
As our principal measure of concentration, we calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman
(H-H) index
∑N
i=1 s
2
i , where si is the share of messages in the group sent by user i,
across all N members in the group. Note that this is the same measure as the Simpson
index we used to calculate similarity of user countries in groups; since our context—
dominance of messages in a group—is closer to industry dominance by firms (the
origin of the H-H concentration, an economic concept) than biodiversity, we name it
after Mr. Orris C. Herfindahl and Mr. Albert O. Hirschman.
In a group dominated by one user, the H-H concentration is 1, while a perfectly
egalitarian group has H-H concentration
∑
( 1
N
)2 = 1
N
. We also calculate the top 5
concentration of each group, simply the proportion of messages sent by the 5 most
active members. Figure 6.8a plots these concentration measures against each other.
(a) Scatter plot of H-H concentration and
top 5 concentration. (b) A typical Lorenz curve.
Figure 6.8: Measuring concentration and inequality within groups.
H-H concentration and top 5 concentration are closely correlated (r = 0.73; p <
0.001), especially for egalitarian groups (where both concentration measures are low);
groups dominated by five (or fewer) members range in concentration. For the rest
of this thesis, we default using the H-H concentration, since the top 5 concentration
doesn’t generalize well between (e.g.) very small and very large groups.
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To measure inequality in groups, we calculate the well-known Gini coefficient,
which is typically derived from the Lorenz curve, which orders individuals from low-
est income to highest income (fewest messages to most messages), and then plots
cumulative share of total income (messages) against cumulative share of people [36].
A typical Lorenz curve is shown in figure 6.8b. The 45◦ line would represent perfect
equality, since it integrates a uniform distribution; the Gini coefficient is twice the
area of A, the region between the actual Lorenz curve and the perfect equality curve,
so A would have no area under perfect equality. Perfect inequality would involve
A = 1
2
and B having no area, since the last person has all of the income (messages).
We show a scatter plot of H-H concentration against Gini coefficient for each
group in figure 6.9a; the same plot without one-person groups, which are perfectly
concentrated yet perfectly equal, is shown in figure 6.9b.10
(a) Scatter plot of H-H concentration and
Gini coefficient. r = −0.71 (p < 0.001).
(b) Scatter plot of H-H concentration
and Gini coefficient, dropping 1-member
groups. r = −0.37 (p < 0.001).
Figure 6.9: Measuring inequality within groups.
It may seems surprising that H-H concentration and Gini/inequality are nega-
tively correlated; we expect that highly concentrated groups are also highly unequal.
But the perfectly-concentrated, perfectly-equal one-person groups give us a hint, in
that concentration and equality measure different things. Namely, the concentration
10There are 22 one-person groups, so they’re not uncommon. These groups aren’t as strange as
they sound: many businesses restrict their business WhatsApp group so that only they can send
messages (imagine a currency exchange operation sending out daily rates).
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measure is centered on messages, while the equality measure is centered on users:
many “poor” users (i.e., users who send one message) joining an active group doesn’t
affect its concentration, but makes it significantly more unequal.
6.2.1 Correlates of Concentration and Inequality
Amongst the group characteristics we found earlier, concentration is negatively cor-
related with group size, entropy, degree, and activity; group inequality is positively
correlated with these factors. An OLS regression of concentration on these character-
istics is shown in table 6.2. Regressing Gini coefficient on these characteristics yields
nearly the same coefficients in the opposite direction (in particular, 0.0013 on size
and 0.1386 on entropy, both p < 0.001), so we omit that table.
Table 6.2: OLS regression of group concentration on group size, group entropy, group
activity, and group degree.
Coefficient (Std. Err.) t P-Value
Intercept 0.5460(0.030) 18.028 0.000∗
Size −0.0015(0.000) −5.021 0.000∗
Entropy −0.1651(0.033) −5.023 0.000∗
Degree −0.0011(0.001) −1.106 0.270
Activity 0.0000(0.000) 0.043 0.966
n = 174 (169 d.f.) R2 = 0.375
We do not rule out reverse causality here, but there are strong explanations for
these results. In particular, larger groups are less concentrated, on average, since
more members in a group likely means more active participants. Figure 6.10a plots
H-H concentration against group size; groups of significant size are less concentrated
(i.e., in groups with over 100 participants, there’s less than a 25% chance that two
randomly selected messages come from the same user).
Larger groups are more unequal, likely because of natural bounds on how many
users can truly participate in a WhatsApp conversation. As in many social contexts,
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WhatsApp groups probably include an “inner circle,” while most other members
participate very little; the scatter plot in figure 6.10b shows that once groups are of
size 50 or so, they become quite unequal.
(a) Scatter plot of group size and H-H
concentration. r = −0.50 (p < 0.001).
(b) Scatter plot of group size and Gini
coefficient. r = 0.54 (p < 0.001).
Figure 6.10: Larger groups are less concentrated but more unequal.
We can frame the negative relationship between entropy and concentration around
barrier-to-entry: groups that are more geographically diverse have higher barriers of
entry to joining. Users are less likely to find cross-border groups, and if they do,
they likely have stronger motivations for joining, whereas users may join news/enter-
tainment groups (which are more likely within national boundaries) with abandon.
Conditioned on having scaled the higher barrier to entry, we expect that users will
be more active in geographically diverse groups, reducing their concentration.
The positive relationship between entropy and inequality is more difficult to ex-
plain, but we might imagine that geographically diverse (high entropy) groups are
more transaction-based. Indeed, imagine currency exchange businesses or transport
businesses, or a group where already-crossed migrants (with CO phone numbers) an-
swer questions from crossers (who have VZ phone numbers). Within these groups
likely exists a stable element of users (i.e., the business owners, or group administra-
tors), and a plethora of transient users who come and go—a structure which would
produce a large Gini coefficient. Scatter plots with entropy are given in figure 6.11.
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Figure 6.11: Geographically diverse groups are less concentrated and more unequal.
6.3 Repeatedly Shared Content
In this section, we briefly investigate images, text, and videos that are repeatedly
shared in our dataset. As we described in Section 4.6, our methodology is limited
in only being able to identify content that is shared exactly or near-exactly: we can-
not identify images that are slightly altered, or videos that are trimmed and then
re-shared. Still, understanding what drives content to be re-shared should inform
strategies for disseminating information over public WhatsApp groups, and for eluci-
dating the structures (of users, and of hidden groups) that underlie this network.
We previously identified 38,455 messages with images, and out of these found
23,131 unique images being shared. 75.3% of these images were only shared once,
but in figure 6.12 we show the distribution of number of shares, for 5,704 images that
were shared multiple times. Most (55.2%) such images were shared only twice.
Figure 6.12: Histogram of number of shares per image.
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In total, 96.3% of unique images were shared five or fewer times. To better un-
derstand what may drive re-sharing, we consider the 850 images that were shared
more than five times. Of our original 174 groups, we find 66 groups where these
images were first shared (in our dataset), and 96 groups where these images were
ever shared. Comparing the set of “first share” groups to non-“first share” groups,
we find statistically significant differences in size, entropy, degree, activity, concen-
tration, and inequality (there were no statistically signficant differences in proportion
VZ, proportion CO, proportion US, proportion PE, proportion CL, proportion non-
CO/non-VZ). Groups where popular images were first shared had average activity
118 messages/day, for example, while non-first share groups had an average of 12
messages/day.
This shouldn’t surprise us, since analogously we’d expect early adopters of con-
sumer electronics to be younger, wealthier, and more educated than laggards. Com-
paring “any share” groups to groups where these popular images were never shared
yields similar results.
To more accurately understand this dynamic, for our 23,131 images we record
certain characteristics of the group where they first appear. An OLS regression of the
number of shares for each image on these characteristics is presented in table 6.3.
Table 6.3: OLS regression of number of shares of each image, on size, entropy, degree,
activity, concentration, and inequality of the group where each image first appeared.
Coefficient (Std. Err.) t P-Value
Intercept 1.4880(0.183) 8.129 0.000∗
Size −0.0033(0.000) −11.599 0.000∗
Entropy 0.3285(0.036) 9.220 0.000∗
Degree 0.0070(0.001) 11.993 0.000∗
Activity −0.0002(0.000) −1.449 0.147
H-H Concentration −1.5340(0.215) −7.122 0.000∗
Gini/Inequality 0.5078(0.295) 1.719 0.086
n = 23131 (23124 d.f.) R2 = 0.021
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Make no mistake: these coefficients are all small, which comes from the vast
majority of images that are only shared once (performing the regression with only
the 5,704 images shared twice or more yields larger coefficients in the same directions,
with R2 = 0.032).
Still, there are important signals here, in that images shared in more geograph-
ically diverse groups are more likely to be re-shared, while images shared in more
concentrated groups are less likely to be re-shared. Neither of these relationships is
surprising: a nationally diverse member base means expanded conduits for an image,
and concentration in a group means content is less likely to arise or spread organically.
More unequal groups are linked to more re-shares, which might be because they enjoy
a large pool of silent users who mainly consume content.
This is not to imply a causal direction: the reverse direction might be possible,
in that images that are more likely to be re-shared might simply be shared first in
less concentrated, geographically diverse groups. But that would still mean that
geographic diversity and low concentration are tied to information spread, in the
direction we expect.
We can also examine the time range for which images are shared, calculated as
between when they’re first shared in our dataset and when they’re last shared (0 for
images shared only once); a histogram of these time ranges is shown in figure 6.13.
Figure 6.13: Histogram of the time range for which images (that are shared multiple
times) are shared.
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Regressing the time range that images are shared for on the above variables yields
coefficients in the same directions: coefficients on entropy, concentration, and Gini are
37.2854 hours, -160.1983 hours, and -13.5362 hours respectively. Uing only non-zero
time ranges (i.e., images shared twice or more), these effects become even stronger,
and are shown in table 6.4.
Table 6.4: OLS regression of time each image was shared for (hours) on size, en-
tropy, degree, activity, concentration, and inequality of the group where images first
appeared; we only include images that were shared multiple times.
Coefficient (Std. Err.) t P-Value
Intercept 655.5457(54.962) 11.927 0.000∗
Size −0.3593(0.082) −4.357 0.000∗
Entropy 120.0194(10.093) 11.891 0.000∗
Degree 1.3974(0.154) 9.068 0.000∗
Activity −0.4606(0.029) −15.975 000∗
H-H Concentration −367.1378(69.990) −5.246 0.000∗
Gini/Inequality −528.2028(87.003) −6.071 0.000∗
n = 4462 (4455 d.f.) R2 = 0.108
It’s not clear why the coefficient on Gini is negative (whereas for number of shares
the coefficient on Gini was positive); we may try to explain this as that “poor”
members (users who send few messages) in unequal groups consume and spread more
content, but are less invested in re-sharing this content, leading to more shares but
for shorter periods. To be clear, this is rather suspect reasoning, but the dynamics of
these groups and their memberships are complicated.
Finally, we address the negative coefficients on activity and size: all things being
equal, smaller and less active groups mean less crowding out of content and less
competing for attention/re-shares.
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6.3.1 Repeatedly Shared Videos
We consider analyzing repeatedly shared text, first eliminating any text with fewer
than 20 characters, to eliminate trivial messages like “hola” and “gracias.” But of
the remaining 61,159 unique texts, 93.6% are shared only once, and 98.1% are shared
fewer than two times. This leaves a very small sample to work with, so we instead
choose to move on to videos; later, we extensively discuss text-based misinformation—
fake news and scams—within our groups, in Chapter 8.
Of 15,596 video messages, there were 13,733 unique videos in our dataset (we
labels videos as identical if they have the same thumbnail and length); 89.6% of these
videos were shared only once. An additional 8.4% of videos were shared exactly twice.
We proceed as we did for images, recording next to each unique video the prop-
erties of the group where it first appeared. Then, only including videos that were
shared more than once (the number of videos shared only once is 9x the number of
videos shared twice or more; for images, this multipler was 3x, so it makes sense now
to limit our sample), we regress number of shares on the same aforementioned group
characteristics. The only significant coefficients are a slight negative coefficient on
entropy (-0.1765) and a slight positive coefficient on degree (0.0012).
When we regress the time range that videos (that were shared multiple times) were
shared for, we obtain the estimates in table 6.5. We again see the significant positive
coefficient we’ve come to expect on entropy, and the significant negative coefficient
we expect on concentration.
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Table 6.5: OLS regression of how long videos were shared for (hours), for videos
that were shared multiple times, on size, entropy, degree, activity, concentration, and
inequality of the group where the video first appeared.
Coefficient (Std. Err.) t P-Value
Intercept 73.5493(42.349) 1.737 0.083
Size −0.1421(0.065) −2.190 0.029∗
Entropy 31.4391(8.263) 3.805 0.000∗
Degree 0.4011(0.096) 4.189 0.000∗
Activity −0.0725(0.032) −2.235 0.026∗
H-H Concentration −105.5255(50.429) −2.093 0.037∗
Gini/Inequality −35.2518(63.275) −0.557 0.578
n = 1435 (1428 d.f.) R2 = 0.045
76
Chapter 7
Reply Cascades
By design, WhatsApp provides scant information about how messages are received
and regarded by other users. Unlike Facebook and Twitter, users cannot “like”
or share1 messages. In [18], Caetano et al. call WhatsApp “an unsophisticated
platform” since “information is shared through a very loosely structured interface.”
Yet we derive critically important information about messages from features like
“likes” and “shares”; they illustrate how others perceive certain content—or if they
saw the content at all. When Instagram removed “likes,” for instance, it “completely
changed the platform” [37].
WhatsApp, however, allows users to send replies to other messages (and the orig-
inal message is explicitly mentioned in the reply). Caetano et al. analyze replies in
[18], tying their investigation to “information overload” within groups, arguing that
messages compete for “cognitive resources” and form an “economy of attention.”2 Per
Caetano, since replies include a snippet of the original message, they bring renewed
attention to that message, valuable in the scarce attention economy.
1Users can forward messages to other groups, but WhatsApp doesn’t link forwards of a message
to the original message.
2The concept of an attention economy was first theorized by Herbert Simon [38], who had said
that, “A wealth of information creates a poverty of attention” [39].
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Within our groups, however, this “information overload” effect doesn’t seem as
drastic. For messagem in group i at time t (minutes), we define “competing” messages
as other messages in group i in the time interval [t − 5, t + 5] (minutes). Figure 7.1
shows a histogram, for messages with replies, of how many messages they compete
against. Of messages with replies, we find that 44% are “competing” with fewer than
10 other messages, and that 64.9% are competing with fewer than 20 other messages.
But even 20 messages in a single 11-minute interval ([t− 5, t+ 5]) isn’t excessive, and
shouldn’t suggest to us any kind of “information overload” as Caetano et al. assert.
Figure 7.1: In our groups, most messages aren’t “competing” for attention.
Nevertheless, replies are important because they do characterize, to some (lim-
ited) degree, user attention and interaction. Moreover, on WhatsApp, replying to
messages and forwarding messages involve the same two-step process of highlighting
the message and clicking on a new toolbar that appears. Whether users click on
the “reply” button may give us the best approximation of whether users click on
the “forward” button, which is important for official actors—governments and aid
organizations—seeking to disseminate information over WhatsApp.
In the following sections, we discuss the prevalence of replies in our dataset, and
pushback on directly understanding replies as popularity or engagement measures, as
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suggested in Caetano et al. [18]. We move on to understanding what might drive
replies within groups, including concentration and geographic entropy of each group.
Later, we analyze the structural characteristics of reply cascades by interpreting them
as graphs, constructing a “virality” metric similar to (but not the same as) that
used by Caetano et al. in [18]. We show how this measure of structural virality
better accounts for different content types, and is still correlated to various group
characteristics.
7.1 Overview of Replies
Out of 171,634 messages in our dataset, 49,212 messages (28.7%) were replies. We
only managed to fully trace 43,912 (89.2%) of these replies to their source, for various
reasons: some replies were to messages sent before we joined the group (though we
gave a 24-hour buffer after we joined groups before recording messages), some original
messages were deleted before we could capture them, and so on.
Of the 171,634 messages in our dataset, 34,444 (20.1%) were replied to. In Fig-
ure 7.2 below, we plot a histogram of the distribution of how many replies each of
these messages received, but an overwhelming majority—29,478 messages (85.6%)—
received fewer than five replies; 16,959 messages (49.2%) received only one reply, and
6,944 (20.2%) received exactly two replies.
Figure 7.2: Histogram of number of replies received. We cut the graph off at 10, but
some messages received many more than 10 replies.
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In Table 7.1 below, we break down messages by content type, and calculate what
proportion of each type received replies.
Table 7.1: Breakdown by content type, showing proportion of each type that receives
replies. Note that number of messages don’t add up to anything meaningful, since
messages can contain more than one content type (or not contain any).
Content # Messages # with Replies % with Replies
Text 101,414 25,191 24.8%
Image 38,455 6,768 17.6%
Video 15,596 1,872 12.0%
Emojis 23,886 4,305 14.9%
Audio 8,918 2,053 23.0%
Forwarded 26,168 1,354 5.2%
By far, text messages are most likely to receive replies (24.8% of text messages re-
ceive replies, compared to 17.6% of images and 12.0% of videos); this should instantly
give us pause in how we understand and analyze replies. On other media platforms
like Facebook, images and videos are by far the most popular content, and also have
the highest levels of engagement; one report estimates that the average video post on
Facebook reaches 12.05% of page audience, the average image reaches 11.63% of page
audience, and text updates only reach 4.56% [40]. The newspaper The Guardian sees
users engage most with text articles on its own website, but video content on social
media platforms [40].
Though we don’t have access to true engagement/view data from WhatsApp,
there’s no reason to not expect this trend to also hold in WhatsApp groups. So if
images and videos are actually the most popular and engaging content, what does it
mean for text messages to receive replies at much higher rates? Across categories,
replies are not a good measurement of a message’s popularity or engagement. For
whatever reason, users may find it unnatural to reply to photos (akin to quoting
a photo, we might say); alternatively, it’s possible that images/videos shared in our
groups are forwarded from other sources (as opposed to text more likely being original
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content), so users are less likely to respond to such forwarded content.3 This latter
point is shown in our table; forwarded content, by far, is less likely to receive replies,
with only 5.2% of forwarded messages receiving replies.
What does this mean for us? First and most importantly, that across content
categories, we cannot use replies as an accurate metric for popularity, engagement, etc.
(within categories, this metric is significantly less suspect). But this also means that
when comparing replies across groups, we must either restrict or normalize content
type, since a highly-interactive group where only videos are shared could result in
many fewer replies than an inactive group where only texts are shared. Finally, this
means that the understanding in [18] of replies as attention is outright misleading;
they had written that, “‘We say that...messages in the cascade caught the attention
of a group member, motivating her to interact.”
Comparing Messages by Sender Country
With the discussion above, before we compare messages sent by Colombian numbers
vs. those sent by Venezuelan numbers, we first compare content type distributions.
We found that of messages sent by Colombian numbers and Venezuelan numbers,
there were roughly equal proportions of text messages (62.6% of messages by Colom-
bian numbers, and 60.3% of messages by Venezuelan numbers), images (20.1% and
24.2% respectively), and video messages (8.2% and 7.3% respectively).
17.9% of messages from Venezuelan numbers received replies, while 20.7% of mes-
sages from Colombian numbers received replies. This small difference is somewhat
accounted for by the subtle differences in content type distribution—Venezuelan users
send more images and fewer text messages.
3By forwarded, we don’t only mean forwarded through WhatsApp: only 14.2% of image content
is “forwarded” through WhatsApp (from one conversation to the other, using the forward feature in
WhatsApp). Many images, for example, are downloaded by users and re-uploaded, though we have
no way of determining this.
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Comparing Messages by Time of Day
Figure 7.3 shows the average number of replies to each message, by time of day. This
mirrors what we expect, though we might be surprised to see messages receiving many
more replies in late-night hours. This might be the result of more active/serious users
being on at that time, or conversations turning more personal, and so on.
Figure 7.3: Messages in the wee morning hours are barely replied to; starting in mid-
morning, messages start to receive more replies, and this pattern rises through the
night before peaking at 12-1 AM.
Graphing the proportion of all messages that are replies in figure 7.4, these ex-
planations seem plausible.
Figure 7.4: Few of the messages sent at 4-5 AM are replies, but in mid-day through
evening nearly 30% of messages are replies, peaking to 40% of messages at 12-1 AM.
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Replies Within Groups
Given the patterns we’ve seen with repeatedly shared images and video (specifically,
that number and timespan of re-shares is positively correlated with geographic diver-
sity, and negatively correlated with group concentration), we might wonder if similar
patterns of interaction take place with replies. For each group, we calculate the av-
erage number of replies to all messages; this is plotted in the histogram in figure 7.5
(in 50 groups, no replies are recorded).
Figure 7.5: Histogram of average number of replies to messages within each group.
Before proceeding, we re-emphasize that comparing average number of replies
across groups is suspect, since different content types are replied to at different rates;
this was the discussion in Section 7.1. Later, in Section 7.3, we redo the following
analysis using an alternative measure robust to content types. Still, it’s interesting
to compare the average number of replies across groups, as is.
The average number of replies to messages in each group is correlated with group
size, entropy, activity, degree, concentration, and Gini. Previously, we saw that the
rate at which (and timespan for which) images are re-shared is linked to the entropy,
concentration, and inequality (Gini) of the group where they’re first shared. With
this, we decide to regress the average number of replies within groups on these three
group characteristics; the results are shown in table 7.2.
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Table 7.2: OLS regression of average number of replies for messages within a group, on
entropy, concentration, and inequality of the group. When regressing only on groups
with replies (n = 124), the effects are stronger and remain statistically significant.
Coefficient (Std. Err.) t P-Value
Intercept 0.2548(0.100) 2.551 0.012∗
Entropy 0.1328(0.046) 2.876 0.005∗
H-H Concentration −0.3739(0.117) −3.195 0.002∗
Gini/Inequality 0.0815(0.136) 0.601 0.549
n = 174 (170 d.f.) R2 = 0.253
We see the familiar pattern: the average of number of replies is higher in more
geographically diverse groups, and lower in more concentrated groups. Restating the
hypotheses discussed in Chapter 6.3, concentrated groups are less fertile ground for
organic interaction with and spread of content. More replies in cross-border groups
could again arise from the purpose-directed nature of these groups: imagine currency
exchange operations, or groups where potential migrants ask questions of Venezuelans
already settled in Colombia. Scatter plots of entropy and concentration with average
number of replies are shown in figure 7.6.
Figure 7.6: There are more replies in more geographically diverse groups, and fewer
replies in highly concentrated groups.
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7.2 Construction of Reply Graphs
We now proceed to investigate the structural characteristics of replies and reply cas-
cades (chains).
Define a reply cascade by all messages that terminate their reply chains at the
same root. Similar to [18],4 we construct for each reply cascade an undirected graph
where there is an edge between messages X, Y if X is a reply to Y or vice versa.
Within each cascade/graph, we calculate both the average shortest-path distance
between nodes, and the maximum shortest-path distance between any pair of nodes;
we obtain both with the canonical technique of breadth-first search from each node
in a reply cascade. The average distance between nodes represents, to some effect,
the “virality” of a message, where virality is not only a measure of some content’s
popularity, but also how much of that popularity was driven by peer-to-peer sharing
[41]. Contrast this to “broadcast” content, whose sharing is less peer-to-peer than
driven by some central source. Bad Superbowl ads still reach many people, but they
never go viral.
If we represent replies as graphs, high virality implies a certain decentralization,
with a larger average distance between nodes. In [41], Goel et al. define structural
virality as exactly this measure. Specifically, in graph G with n nodes, structural
virality v(G) = 1
n(n−1)
∑
i,j dij where dij is the length of the shortest path between
nodes i and j.
4In [18], Caetano et al. (incorrectly) construct directed acyclic graphs, where characteristics like
average distance are not well-defined since paths between nodes may not exist.
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Consider, for example, the two graphs in figure 7.7. In the binary tree, each user
receives a message and shares it with to two others, while in the broadcast graph, most
of the sharing is driven by two central users; most people who receive the message do
not later go on to share it. The structural virality of the first graph is much higher
than the structural virality of the second graph, since the second graph is highly
centralized, so all nodes are close to some central nodes (and thus, to each other).
(a) A (perfect) binary tree. (b) A “broadcast” graph.
Figure 7.7: The binary tree has a much higher average distance between nodes (vi-
rality) than the broadcast graph.
To better illustrate virality, we generate perfect “broadcast graphs” (one central
node connected to all other nodes, which are only connected to the central node) and
perfect binary trees of various sizes, and plot their viralities in figure 7.8.
Figure 7.8: The virality, per Goel et al., of perfect binary trees and perfect broadcast
graphs. The virality of the broadcast graph is bound by 2 (specifically, its virality is
1×(n−1)+(n−1)×[1+2(n−2)]
n(n−1) =
2(n−1)2
n(n−1) =
2(n−1)
n
→ 2), no matter its size, while the virality
of the binary tree is unbounded.
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Note that Goel et al., as well as Caetano et al. from UFMG, compute structural
virality as the average distance over all pairs of distinct nodes. We argue for instead
using a different measure of structural virality, where we define v(G) = 1
n2
∑
i,j dij.
Instead of averaging over all distinct pairs of nodes, we simply average over all pairs
of nodes (i.e., include distances from nodes to themself). Effectively, we scale down
the Goel et al. measure by n−1
n
. With large n, this difference is clearly insignificant,
but we argue for its importance on small graphs.
Consider 2-node, 3-node, and 4-node chains. Using our virality measure, where
we compute over all pairs of nodes (instead of all distinct pairs of nodes), the virality
of a 2-node chain is 0.5 (since each node is connected to itself with distance 0 and
the other node with distance 1), while the Goel et al. structural virality for such a
graph is 1. Now consider a 4-node chain ◦ − ◦ − ◦ − ◦. The distance matrix is given
by
0 1 2 31 0 1 22 1 0 1
3 2 1 0
, so the Goel et al. structural virality yields 2012 ≈ 1.67. On the other
hand, our measure of structural virality is 20
16
= 1.25. These viralities, as well as those
of a 3-node chain, are shown in table 7.3.
Table 7.3: Our measure of structural virality vs. Goel et al.
Graph Our Virality 1
n2
∑
dij Goel et al. Virality
1
n(n−1)
∑
dij
◦ − ◦ 1
2
= 0.5 1
◦ − ◦ − ◦ 8
9
≈ 0.89 11
3
≈ 1.33
◦ − ◦ − ◦ − ◦ 11
4
= 1.25 12
3
≈ 1.67
A 2-node chain—a message with one reply—is much less viral than a 4-node
chain, where a message is replied to, its reply also replied to, and that second reply
also replied to. Yet the Goel et al. measure puts the virality of a 2-node chain at
60% of the virality of a 4-node chain, while our measure puts it at 40% of the 4-node
chain’s virality.
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Our virality measure makes more sense when considering the 3-node chain as well.
A 2-node chain (a message with one reply) is substantially less viral than a 3-node
chain; the Goel et al. measure puts a 2-node chain at 75% of the virality of a 3-node
chain, while our measure puts it at around 56%.
In short, using our virality measure instead of that by Goel et al. allows us to
much better compare viralities when we include 2-node chains (i.e., messages with
one reply). Since most messages with replies in our dataset (and likely in general) are
2-node chains (given the power-law distribution of number of replies), our measure
allows us to more robustly investigate virality.
For good measure, in figure 7.9, we plot our measure of structural virality vs. the
Goel et al. measure, for the aforementioned perfect binary trees and perfect broadcast
graphs. Both measures quickly converge as n increases. But our measure increases
less steeply for smaller cascades, which we argues makes sense, since a 2-node cascade
(a message with one reply) really isn’t that viral.
Figure 7.9: Our virality converges to the Goel et al. virality, but starts out less
steeply. We argue that this makes the most sense, since a message with one reply
shouldn’t be considered as very “viral.”
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7.3 Virality
Figure 7.10a shows a histogram of virality for each reply cascade (only counting each
cascade once, regardless of how many messages it includes), and the scatter plot in
figure 7.10b plots the virality of each root node against how many replies it receives.
(a) Histogram of virality across reply cas-
cades.
(b) Scatter plot of how many replies each
root is connected to, compared to its vi-
rality.
Figure 7.10: Virality in our dataset.
For messages within reply cascades (including the root), we set their virality as
the virality of the reply cascade they’re in. The most important motivation for this
measure is that it allows us to compare reply cascades across content types, since we
no longer focus on the prevalence of reply cascades, but on properties within reply
cascades.
In particular, we previously saw that text is replied to at much higher rates than
images, even though we know images to typically be more “viral.” Now, the av-
erage virality across all images in reply cascades is 1.71, which is 14% higher than
the average virality of text in reply cascades, which is 1.50. Similarly, we saw that
messages from Venezuelan users received replies at a lower rate than messages from
Colombian users. When examining messages from Venezuelans that are part of reply
cascades, compared to messages from Colombians in reply cascades, it turns out that
Venezuelans’ messages are more viral (1.53 vs. 1.45, p < 0.001).
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Diameter
Instead of computing virality, the average distance between nodes in a reply cascade,
we might consider diameter, the maximum distance between nodes. Letting the
diameter of each message in a reply cascade being the diameter of the reply cascade,
figure 7.11 reveals that these are nearly the same measure.
Figure 7.11: Virality (average distance between nodes in a reply cascade) and diam-
eter (maximum distance) are nearly the same measure.
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7.3.1 Virality Across Groups
That virality can be compared across content types means we can also compare
virality across groups. We define each group’s virality as the average virality of all
messages in that group that are part of reply cascades;5 for groups without any replies,
we imputed their virality as 0.
Figure 7.12a shows a histogram of virality across groups, and the scatter plot
in figure 7.12b plots virality against the average number of replies to each message
across groups. The two are closely correlated (Pearson r = 0.90), though from here
we default to using virality, since, as we mentioned, it allows us to better compare
reply cascades across content types (and, consequently, groups with different content
types).
(a) Histogram of average virality (within
reply cascades) across groups.
(b) Scatter plot of virality in each group,
which can be more accurately generalized
across content type, with average number
of replies in each group.
Figure 7.12: Virality in groups.
Before, we had found that the average number of replies in each group was linked
to the group’s entropy, concentration, and inequality. Here, we perform the same
regressions with virality as the dependent variable, yieling the results in table 7.4.
A separate regression using only groups with replies (recall that 50 groups have no
5If we defined virality as the average virality of all messages (including messages that are not
part of reply cascades), that quickly yields a near-identical measure to the average number of replies
measure we used in Section 7.1.
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replies, likely either they’re highly inactive or dedicated business channels where only
group administrators can send messages) is shown in table 7.5.
Table 7.4: OLS regression of virality in a group, on entropy, concentration, and
inequality of the group.
Coefficient (Std. Err.) t P-Value
Intercept 0.5648(0.147) 3.830 0.000∗
Entropy 0.1381(0.068) 2.027 0.044∗
H-H Concentration −0.7948(0.173) −4.601 0.000∗
Gini/Inequality 0.7055(0.200) 3.526 0.001∗
n = 174 (170 d.f.) R2 = 0.474
We see patterns we’re all too familiar with by now: concentration in groups means
that reply cascades are less viral (which is completely unsurprising, since messages are
more centralized); entropy in groups is linked to more virality and decentralization
(we can imagine, for example, a reply cascade splitting into separate chains amongst
Venezuelan and Colombian members in the group). Inequality in groups is linked to
more virality, which might come from “poor” group members (users who send few
messages) breaking off into separate discussion.
Table 7.5: OLS regression of virality in a group, on entropy, concentration, and
inequality of the group; we only include groups with replies.
Coefficient (Std. Err.) t P-Value
Intercept 0.7623(0.183) 4.177 0.000∗
Entropy 0.2393(0.073) 3.257 0.001∗
H-H Concentration −1.1033(0.311) −3.543 0.001∗
Gini/Inequality 0.4438(0.262) 1.694 0.093
n = 124 (120 d.f.) R2 = 0.246
To re-iterate, when using virality as a measure (and especially dropping groups
without replies), our analysis no longer involves the prevalence of reply cascades, but
simply the dynamics within reply cascades. That these patterns retain significance
92
means that even controlling for the fact that there are more replies in unconcentrated
and geographically diverse groups, replies in those groups are still more viral.
7.3.2 Temporal Characteristics of Reply Cascades
Virality is a structural characteristic of reply cascades; in [18], Caetano et al. also
focus on cascade duration (defined as the time between the message time of the root
node, and when the last reply is sent), which they term the “main temporal attribute”
(emphasis ours) of reply cascades. Amongst other findings, Caetano et al. report that
“political cascades last longer than non-political ones...A possible explanation is that
political cascades stir more debate among the participants of the group” [18].
Clearly, Caetano et al. associate cascade duration with the amount of participa-
tion in each cascade; 12-hour reply cascades involve much more back-and-forth dis-
cussion than 6-hour reply cascades. This might be true if both groups were equally
active, but that’s not how public WhatsApp groups work (unless Brazilian groups
are somehow staggeringly different from Colombian groups). Some groups are highly
active, but many aren’t, making cascade duration a blatantly flawed and deceptive
measure. Just imagine a highly-inactive group where someone replies to messages a
few days later, on average, with no other messages in between; “cascades” in that
group last much longer than cascades in a higly-active group with many people par-
ticipating (and many more messages being sent). What could anyone possibly say
about cascade duration given that these circumstances do exist?
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In figure 7.13, we plot the size of reply cascades against their duration, for all
cascades and for cascades lasting less than 12 hours. Most cascades of any significant
size have short durations—which is what we’d expect, since viral/popular cascades
likely take place in highly active groups where attention soon turns to new topics.
The slope of the best fit line in the top picture is 0.018; in the bottom picture, it’s
0.579. Even 0.579 is miniscule, telling us that for each additional hour of a cascade,
there are 0.579 more messages in that cascade, on average. So cascade duration and
cascade size aren’t even moderately correlated (Pearson r = 0.04 between duration
and size across all cascades; Pearson r = 0.15 for < 12 hour cascades).
Figure 7.13: Scatter plots of the size of reply cascades against their duration. The
top plot includes all cascades; the bottom plot only includes cascades with duration
less than 12 hours.
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Figure 7.14 shows scatter plots of the virality of reply cascades against their dura-
tion. Longer cascades are very, very slightly more viral (r = 0.03 across all cascades;
r = 0.10 in cascades lasting less than 12 hours), but in general, cascade duration says
little about how active/involving/popular cascades are.
Figure 7.14: Scatter plots of the virality of reply cascades against their duration. The
top plot includes all cascades; the bottom plot only includes cascades with duration
less than 12 hours.
With this discussion, we completely discard temporal characteristics of reply cas-
cades; structural characteristics like virality are clearly much more useful measures
of the activity that drives reply cascades.
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Chapter 8
Misinformation: Fake News and
Scams
During our fieldwork, we found that most migrants with knowledge of public Whats-
App groups also had significant concerns about misinformation within groups. Mi-
grants were most concerned with employment-related scams, like job offers where
employers would skip town before payday, or unscrupulous “domestic” positions for
women that would turn out to be sex work (or worse). A second major area of
concern involved fraudulent service providers, like exchange/remittance services that
steal customers’ funds.
While these kinds of criminality are certainly present in our network, they’re
extremely difficult to investigate with the data we have. Nothing necessarily distin-
guishes legitimate employment offers from deceitful ones, and the same advertisements
are used by both legitimate service providers and fraudulent ones.
But more obvious internet-based scams are also present in these groups, and
they’re easily identifable. Consider the following message, for example, which offers
free food cards:1
1Here, “food card” refers to the cash transfers implemented by (e.g.) the World Food Programme,
which are distributed as prepaid debit cards.
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BONOS NUEVA TARJETA ALIMENTARIA 2020-2025:
-Madres solteras
-Madre trabajadora
-Joven estudiante
-Vives con tus padres
-Madre separada
-Madres extranjeras
-Estos y Mas...
TARJETA ALIMENTARIA DE:
$6550.65 (BONO).
NUEVA TARJETA ALIMENTARIA EN:
https://tarjetas.global/solicitud-tarjeta-alimentaria-aquii/
Clic en el link encima para enviar su solicitud y preparar su entrevista
INICIO IMEDIATO!
Fonte: G1 - O portal de noticias del Globo
In the 53 days we collected messages, this scam was shared 34 times, in 15 unique
groups by 30 different individuals (these numbers don’t even include the numerous
variants that are also shared). Or consider the following scam that purports to offer
free mobile data due to the coronavirus quarantine:
100 GB de datos de Internet sin ninguna recarga Por Motivo de CUARENTENA (
CORONA VIRUS)
Obtenga 100 GB de datos de Internet gratis en cualquier red movil durante
60 dias.
Consiguelo ahora AQUI
https://appcutt.link/netfree
While internet-based scams like these are certainly different from offline scams (like
unscrupulous employment offers or fraudulent service providers), and less a cause of
concern for migrants, we argue that online scams are meaningfully related to offline
scams. Groups with more internet-based scams likely contain more offline scams;
users who fall prey to internet-based scams will more likely be victims of serious
employment-related scams. To be clear, this is exactly broken windows theory, but
online and offline scams are probably more connected than turnstile jumping and
homicide.
These online scams might be easily identifiable to our eyes (or to an algorithm),
but many users fall prey to them. In section 8.3, we show that such (easily identifiable)
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scams are nonetheless widespread across groups and users. Either there are a lot of
dedicated scammers, or many users have had accounts taken over by scammers, or
both; in any case, the concerted effort to spread easily-identifiable internet scams in
these groups makes clear that they do trick users.
One Good Samaritan group administrator puts it best. In an English translation
of their message:
* ATTENTION GROUP To help us from home
THERE are the links that circulate in Whatssap groups and other networks
There are no free megabytes.
No free bonuses.
No national or international company is looking for employees with
astronomical salaries.
Coca Cola is NOT giving away fridges.
Pepsi is NOT giving away bonuses.
Nike is NOT giving away shoes
Zara is NOT giving away bonuses.
Netflix is NOT giving away accounts.
WhatsApp is free, you do NOT need to forward anything.
It will not change the color of WhatsApp nor will they verify your account.
No one is giving away wheelchairs or medicines.
What will happen to you is that when you click on those links that are
viruses, they will hack you and lose your data, they will steal your
social media accounts, impersonate You to scam with dollars, your cell
phone collapse and many other things.
Does not exist!
Talk to your friends and family so they don’t fall into the trap.
Some users even accuse the Venezuelan and Cuban intelligence services of being
behind common scams (we share an English translation):
URGENT:
Don’t even think about opening the link to Exito right now [referring to
free coupons for the Exito chain of grocery stores], and of course tell
your contacts not to open an email or message that says ‘‘free
internet’’ and another that says free pensions. It is a virus that
SEBIN [the Venezuelan intelligence service] and the Cuban G2 [
intelligence service] are promoting to harm cell phones and computers
to block social networks.
Tell all the contacts on your list not to accept a video called
Ministeriodetrabajo. It is a virus that erases your mobile. Be careful,
it’s very dangerous. Pass it on to your list as people open it
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thinking it’s a joke. They are broadcasting it today on the radio. Pass
it to whoever you can.
More generally, other misinformation—particularly fake news—is also widespread
on social media networks in Venezuela and Colombia, and popularly disseminated
through WhatsApp [42] [43].
In the historic 2018 Colombian presidential election, Oscar Palma, professor of
political science at Rosario University in Bogot, declared that “WhatsApp chains
are [the] worst thing to have happened in this election” [42], after many Colombians
engaged with false content concerning the candidates. In Venezuela, Carlos Correa,
director of free expression NGO Espacio Pblico, called his country “an information
desert” [44]. “Counterclaims, fake news, and outright lies” are spread by both the
Venezuelan government and opposition supporters, through both official media outlets
and social media [43].
In this chapter, we analyze fake news and online scams within our dataset, and how
their prevalences vary across groups and users. We begin in chapter 8.1 by discussing
our methodology for labeling fake news and scams, centering on text pre-processing
techniques and the cosine similarity metric. In chapter 8.2, we move on to analyzing
fake news, in its message properties, as well as user and group dynamics; we then do
the same for scams in chapter 8.3. Finally, in chapter 8.4, we employ various machine
learning classifiers in an attempt to classify scam messages, using the content of the
messages and some additional features, based on the results in section 8.3.
In most contexts, scams receive comparatively less attention from researchers than
fake news and other forms of misinformation. As of late March 2020, for instance,
Google Scholar returns around 68,500 articles for the query “Facebook fake news,”
but only 15,400 for the query “Facebook scam(s)” (the corresponding numbers for
“WhatsApp fake news” and “WhatsApp scam(s)” are 11,600 and 1,550).
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This disparity may be largely because online users typically treat social media
networks as sources of entertainment and news, making fake news particularly ap-
pealing and troublesome. But this doesn’t hold in our context of public WhatsApp
groups related to the Venezuelan refugee crisis. Indeed, we found in field work that
migrants treat these groups as sources of employment, resources, assistance, and day-
to-day information. Political misinformation likely matters much less in this context,
but economic scams matter much more, since they may be particularly appealing to
migrants desperate to cross the border or longing for employment.
8.1 Labeling Misinformation
Fact-checking sources are prevalent in Colombia and even Venezuela—in November
2019, the Poynter Institute, a highly-acclaimed American nonprofit journalism re-
search institute, published an article titled, “Against all odds, fact-checking is flour-
ishing in Venezuela” [44]. Colombian and Venezuelan fact-checking websites center
on content shared by official sources, including Venezuelan president Nicols Maduro
and Venezuelan opposition representatives, as well as viral content shared over social
media like Facebook and WhatsApp.
Using two Colombian sources—La Silla Vaca and ColombiaCheck (the two Colom-
bian fact-checkers recognized by Poynter)—we construct a repository of fake news
corpuses. We also manually inspect “popular” content shared in our groups (any
messages that are at least 20 characters long and identically shared thrice or more,
by any user/in any group), and include fake news corpuses obtained that way.
We then apply the canonical methods for processing text and detecting text simi-
larity [45]. Specifically, put our WhatsApp messages as w1, . . . , wn and our fake news
corpuses as f1, . . . , fm so that D = {w1, . . . , wn, f1, . . . , fm} is our set of WhatsApp
messages and fake news corpuses. Put T = {t1, . . . , tp} as the set of distinct terms in
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D. We do not include stop words, commonly used words that don’t significantly alter
the meaning of a document. In English, stop words are words like “what,” “their,”
and so on; we obtain stop words from the Python Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK)
package.2
After removing stopwords, we replace punctuation with spaces.3 We also “stem”
words, using the NLTK Snowball algorithm (Spanish) [46], which maps similar words
with different endings to the same root. For example, chico (meaning boy or small)
and chica (meaning girl or small) both map to chic, while chicago maps to chicag
and no further.
Our next step is to vectorize each text as a p×1 feature vector, whose i-th term is
the count of how many times ti appears in the text. But instead of just using counts
directly, we normalize the counts by inverse document frequency, or log |D||{d∈D:ti∈d}| .
This gives us the well-known statistic TF-IDF (term frequency-inverse document
frequency) [47], which measures how uniquely relevant each term is in a document.
Consider, for example, the set of articles written about Princeton: “university” would
likely appear in almost all of them,4 and quite frequently in each, so the frequency of
“university” in an article isn’t informative about the article. A word like “Eisgruber”
2The NLTK package directly provides stop words in Spanish. They include: de, la, que, el, en,
y, a, los, del, se, las, por, un, para, con, no, una, su, al, lo, como, ms, pero, sus, le, ya, o, este, s,
porque, esta, entre, cuando, muy, sin, sobre, tambin, me, hasta, hay, donde, quien, desde, todo, nos,
durante, todos, uno, les, ni, contra, otros, ese, eso, ante, ellos, e, esto, m, antes, algunos, qu, unos,
yo, otro, otras, otra, l, tanto, esa, estos, mucho, quienes, nada, muchos, cual, poco, ella, estar, estas,
algunas, algo...
3Commonly, pre-processing for text similarity involves directly removing punctuation (as op-
posed to replacing it with spaces); “anti-communist,” for example, is probably better represented
as “anticommunist” rather than “anti” and “communist,” since the latter will pickup similarities
with “communist.” In our circumstances, however, many scams involve hyperlinks, where it makes
more sense to separately tokenize the domain names and post-domain parts of the URL. One scam
purporting to offer free coupons for the Plaza/Vea chain of grocery stores, for example, uses the
URL http://bit.ly/plazavea-cupon. Future iterations of the scam may involve variations on the
url, such as http://tinyurl.com/plazavea-cupon or http://bit.ly/something-else. Splitting strings by
punctuation allows us to detect both of these variants (since the original URL is tokenized as [“bit”,
“ly”, “plazavea”, “cupon”]), while simply removing punctuation would tokenize the original URL
as [“httpbitlyplazaveacupon”] (a single token) and fail to match future variants.
4We do not automatically remove “university” as a stop word, since it’s not so commonly used
across English language texts in general.
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might appear in relatively few documents, on the other hand, so using TF-IDF would
weight its appearances more, and this is meaningful to us in helping differentiate the
articles. An article that mentions Eisgruber 13 times is likely much more similar to an
article that mentions Eisgruber 11 times, than an article that mentions “university”
13 times is to one that mentions “university” 11 times.
In deciding a distance/similarity measure to compare feature vectors with, we
might consider Euclidean distance, letting distance d(x, y) = ‖x − y‖. But such
a measure is not robust to document size; in particular, it might dictate that the
abstract of this thesis is more similar to the abstract of a thesis about giraffes, than
it is to the body of this thesis.5
Instinctively, we de-norm our feature vectors, so d(x, y) = ‖ x‖x‖ − y‖y‖‖. This
immediately motivates cosine similarity, s(x, y) = 〈x,y〉‖x‖‖y‖ , as a similarity measure
since ‖ x‖x‖ − y‖y‖‖ =
√
xT x
‖x‖2 − 2 x
T y
‖x‖‖y‖ +
yT y
‖y‖2 =
√
2− 2 · 〈x,y〉‖x‖‖y‖ . Cauchy-Schwarz gives
us 0 ≤ s(x, y) = 〈x,y〉‖x‖‖y‖ ≤ 1, and this measure is 1 iff x and y are parallel. Particularly
relevant, cosine similarity is independent of document length.
We collected 56 fake news corpuses from the two fact-checking sources; all 56 were
present in our data. Additionally, from our manual inspection of popular messages in
our dataset, we extracted 64 further fake news corpuses; these 64 corpuses involved
291 different messages.
To exclude messages like “hola,” “gracias,” and so on, and to reduce the prob-
ability of false positives, we only considered messages as possible fake news if their
tokenization was at least five words long. Ultimately, after removing the 291 messages
that we already (manually) flagged as fake news, this resulted in 43,734 candidates.
5Let the abstracts be, for example, “whatsapp venezuela” and “giraffe neck” repeated 3
times, and let the thesis body be “whatsapp venezuela” repeated 100 times. Then if T =
{whatsapp, venezuela, giraffe,neck}, the feature vectors are (without slight TF-IDF adjustments)
(3, 3, 0, 0), (0, 0, 3, 3) for the abstracts and (100, 100, 0, 0) for the thesis body; clearly, the abstracts
are closer.
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For each of the 43,734 candidates, we calculated their maximum cosine similarity
to any known fake news corpus, and manually inspected 497 messages with maximum
cosine similarity over 0.3. In [19], Resende et al. only considered cosine similarity
over 0.4 (apparently, in a small manual sample they found no fake news matches when
cosine similarity was below 0.4), but we show below that a decent number of fake
news corpuses had maximum cosine similarity (to any known fake news) less than
0.4. Ultimately, we found 181 true positives (36.4%).
Figure 8.1 presents a histogram comparing the maximum cosine similarity of true
positives and the maximum cosine similarity of false positives. The former distribu-
tion peaks at 1 but continues even at cosine similarity less than 0.4.
Figure 8.1: This histogram includes all messages with cosine similarity over 0.3 to
known fake news. The cosine similarity of true positives peaks at 1.0 and quickly di-
minishes; the distribution of cosine similarity of false positives increases exponentially
at cosine similarity less than 0.4. True positives had mean cosine similarity 0.775,
while false positives had mean cosine similarity 0.400 (p < 0.001).
Clearly, limiting our manual inspection to messages with cosine similarity over 0.4,
as [19] did, would leave those messages unlabeled as fake news.6 In fact, there almost
certainly exists fake news with cosine similarity less than 0.3, but the histogram
6Resende et al. did not necessarily do anything wrong, since the range of cosine similarities can
depend on the pre-processing, the token structure, and the actual text involved. But it’s clear that
the cosine similarities of true positives are a continuous distribution on [0, 1], so imposing a bound
of 0.4 based on a small manual sample is rather suspect.
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makes clear that false positives grow exponentially by that point, really making true
positives needles in a haystack.
To label scams, as no “scam-checking” sources exist in our context, we constructed
a repository of 84 known scams through the same process of manually inspecting pop-
ular content. These 84 scams were found in 663 different messages. We pre-processed
and tokenized as we did for fake news, and ultimately filtered 43,362 candidate mes-
sages to check (as for fake news, these were messages whose tokenization was ≥ 5
words, and that were not already known to be scams).
We manually inspected 335 messages with cosine similarity over 0.3 to a known
scam, and out of these found 223 true positives (66.6%). True positives had mean
cosine similarity 0.563, while false positives had mean cosine similarity 0.354 (p <
0.001). Figure 8.2 presents a histogram comparing the maximum cosine similarity of
true positive scams and the maximum cosine similarity of false positive scams.
Figure 8.2: This histogram includes all messages with cosine similarity over 0.3 to
known scams. The cosine similarity of true positives peaks is more scattered than
before; again, the distribution of false positives’ cosine similarity exponentially grows
at cosine similarity less than 0.4. True positives had mean cosine similarity 0.563,
while false positives had mean cosine similarity 0.354 (p < 0.001).
Note that the cosine similarity of true positives is much more scattered than it
was for fake news: this likely arises because scams are much shorter (in sections 8.2.1
and 8.3.1, we show that fake news are much longer than other messages, while scams
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are somewhat shorter than other messages). With scams being shorter, there is less
for cosine similarity to pick up on, so we lose the cosine similarity peak at 1.0 that we
saw for fake news. We might also imagine that those responsible for scams are also
more intentionally and more frequently altering messages, resulting in lower cosine
similarity to known scams.
Again, limiting our manual inspection to messages with cosine similarity over 0.4,
as [19] did, would leave a lot of scams unlabeled. There’s a stronger case to be
made here for manually inspecting messages even below cosine similarity 0.3, but we
skip this because of time constraints, since the number of messages to inspect grows
exponentially as we drop cosine similarity.
8.2 Analyzing Fake News
With the labeling methodology described in section 8.1, we ended up labeling 472
messages as fake news. To better characterize the prevalence of fake news, we filtered
our original 171,634 messages to 44,025 messages whose text tokenizations were at
least five words (i.e., text messages with some greater meaning than greetings, etc.).
For the rest of this chapter, we call these “meaningful text messages.” Remarkably,
the proportion we found of fake news within meaningful text messages (1.1%) is nearly
the same as in [19], which found 578 fake news amongst 59,979 textual messages
(1.0%).
8.2.1 Message Dynamics
On average, fake news messages received fewer replies, as compared to other “mean-
ingful text messages”: 0.0805 versus 0.5659, a stark difference (p < 0.001). This
effect was slightly weaker when comparing fake news messages and all other messages
(which on average received 0.5415 replies), though as we described in Chapter 7, com-
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paring replies across content types is suspect. Because the distribution of replies is
so skewed (where most messages receive no replies), we can also examine differences
at the 95th percentile of fake news and other meaningful text messages, in terms of
how many replies they receive. It turns out that only 4.9% of fake news receive any
replies, while the 95th quantile of non-fake news text messages receives 3 replies.
Fake news messages were also significantly less viral, based on the structural vi-
rality metric defined in Chapter 7.3; we re-emphasize that virality is only calculated
across messages with replies (i.e., we are controlling for the fact that fake news mes-
sages receive significantly fewer replies).
The average virality of fake news in reply cascades was 0.7667, compared to 1.3565
for other meaningful text messages, and 1.5022 for all non-fake news messages (p =
0.01). The 95th quantile of fake news in reply cascades has virality 1.41, while for
other meaningful text messages this virality is 3.55.
Fake news messages were also longer (here, we only compare to other meaningful
text messages, for obvious reasons). On average, fake news was 1384 characters long,
compared to 318 characters long for other meaningful text messages, and involved
233 words compared to 49 words (p < 0.001 for both).
As with text messages in general, we can use latent dirichlet allocation to parse
out topics underlying fake news messages. Setting parameters of 10 topics with 10
words each, we obtain the following topics:
1. virus chin mund salud pais cas egipt limon pas merc
2. virus dias pulmon tom vias agu chin evit pais sol
3. alert hij inform nin pas compart ser pais segur escuel
4. limon tom agu pued calient cuerp celul cuid alcalin sustanci
5. agu tom inclu ibuprofen sintom sal favor salv ajo virus
6. contact virus pasal urgent celular mensaj llam dil vide murcielag
7. chin accion telon mund coronavirus mundial virus empres compr tod
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8. virus pued calient sol agu coronavirus man hor beb hac
9. 40 dios dias person jesus mand mensaj pued despu famili
10. chin virus caf wuh mund coron quimic pacient km beijing
Unsurprisingly, eight of these ten topics involve the coronavirus (topic 3 is a fear-
mongering news alert about organ-trafficking mafias, and topic 9 is a religious chain
message). Topics 6, 7, and 10 center on current events related to the coronavirus;
topics 1, 2, 4, 5, and 8 include fake scientific and medical information.
8.2.2 User Dynamics
In total, 309 unique users shared fake news (3.9% of 7,860 active members). Figure
8.3a plots a histogram of the number of times users shared fake news; 74.4% of sharers
only shared fake news once, and 14.9% of sharers only shared fake news twice.
(a) A histogram of the number of fake
news messages sent by users who’ve
shared fake news.
(b) A histogram of the prevalence of fake
news amongst fake news sharers’ mean-
ingful text messages.
Figure 8.3: Histograms with users who’ve shared fake news.
We move on to analyzing the prevalence of fake news, which we define as the
proportion of fake news amongst all meaningful text messages sent by a user. Of
4,645 users who sent meaningful text messages, 93.3% never shared fake news. But,
as seen in figure 8.3b, of users who’ve shared fake news, many haven’t shared much
other meaningful text content.
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Comparing Across Countries
An extremely interesting disparity we found was that Venezuelan users were twice
as likely to be fake news sharers as Colombian users: 10.2% of Venezuelans have
shared fake news, compared to 5.2% of Colombians (p < 0.001). Figure 8.4 graphs
the percentage of users who’ve shared fake news from our five principal countries;
around the same proportion of Peruvian, Chilean, and Colombian users have shared
fake news, while somewhat more Ecuadorians and many more Venezuelans have.
Figure 8.4: Comparing fake news senders by country. (ANOVA p < 0.001; t-tests
between VEN and PER/CHL/COL p < 0.05; t-tests between COL and PER/CH-
L/ECU and between VEN and ECU not significant.)
The same disparity holds when examining the average prevalence of fake news of
users from each country, shown in figure 8.5a.
(a) (ANOVA p < 0.001; only the t-test
between VEN and COL was significant.)
(b) (Only the t-test between COL and
CHL was statistically significant.)
Figure 8.5: Cross-country comparisons of average prevalence of fake news.
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On average, 3.3% of each Venezuelan’s user’s text content was fake news, compared
to 1.4% for each Colombian user.
The difference in average prevalence of fake news across users, however, is almost
entirely explained by the fact that a mucher higher percentage of Venezuelans have
shared fake news compared to Colombian users. Figure 8.5b shows a violin plot of
fake news prevalence across users who’ve shared fake news, with the horizontal line at
each country’s mean, and makes clear that of users who’ve shared fake news, average
fake news prevalence is roughly equal across countries (in particular, the difference
between Venezuelan users and Colombian users is not statistically significant).
Even when looking at the raw number of fake news shared, Venezuelan users
shared significantly more fake news. On average, each Venezuelan user shared 0.167
fake news messages, compared to 0.078 for Colombian users (p < 0.001). Again, this
difference was mostly accounted for by more Venezuelans having shared fake news:
when only considering users who’ve shared fake news, users from each of the countries
shared 1.0-1.5 fake news messages on average. The graph in figures 8.6a plots the
averages, and the violin plot in figure 8.6b shows per-country distributions of how
many fake news messages have been shared, by sharers of fake news (the horizontal
line indicates each country’s mean).
(a) (ANOVA p < 0.001; t-tests between
VEN and PER/COL p < 0.05.)
(b) (No statistical significance.)
Figure 8.6: Cross-country comparisons of average frequency of fake news.
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Even though we’ve found that Venezuelans are twice as likely to have shared
fake news, we argue that this is actually an underestimate. Recall that the two
fact-checking sources we used were both from Colombia, making our methodology
inherently more likely to catch fake news that is relevant to Colombians; that even
with this bias we found such a discrepancy suggests the actual effect is even stronger.
Why are Venezuelans so much more likely to share fake news? Generally, anyone
with even passing knowledge of Latin America would point to the country’s polit-
ical environment, and the “information desert” in Venezuela that we described in
the introduction to this chapter.7 Misinformation has been spread by the Maduro
regime over both official state channels and social media; a 2018 article from The
Guardian puts it bluntly by describing fake news as one of the dictator’s “weapons”
[48]. Unsurprisingly, opposition forces under Juan Guaido have responded with the
same strategies.8
In our case, however, one particular circumstance may best explain Venezuelan
users’ disposition to fake news. Our data collection period included late March and
early April 2020, when the coronavirus pandemic arrived and exponentially worsened
in Colombia and Venezuela. Most fake news messages in our dataset were coronavirus-
related, and a significant portion related to home cures against the virus, like lemon
water or leaving clothes in the sun. In a country with a collapsed health system,
promised cures to a devastating illness may be especially appealing.9
7We emphasize that Venezuelans are particularly susceptible to fake news because of their “post-
truth” environment, not because of differences in intelligence. In field interviews, most Venezuelan
migrants, even those living in informal settlements without electricity or running water, clearly had
high levels of education.
8In a more personal encounter, one of the reasons Princeton’s travel oversight staff gave for not
approving our proposed field travel to Cucuta was that, “anti-Maduro groups send people over the
border to use their phones to send messages and information to a wider network over WhatsApp or
Telegram.”
9Of course, not everyone is fooled. Within our groups, rebuttals to these false cures include “Now
if we screwed up, the eighth plague of Egypt arrived” (in response to fake news announcing that
Chinese doctors had cured the coronavirus with an Egyptian serum), as well as, “What a mess, we
will end up drinking garlic water.”
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8.2.3 Group Dynamics
For each group, we construct two measures for the prevalence of fake news within that
group: first, the proportion of meaningful text messages in that group that involve
fake news—which we call the “message prevalence” of fake news—and second, the
proportion of users in that group who’ve shared fake news (in the same group), which
we call the “user prevalence” of fake news.
Of 174 groups, over 64% (112 groups) did not have any messages flagged as fake
news. The histogram in figure 8.7a reveals that across even groups where fake news
was shared, message prevalence was low; in 54 of the 62 groups were fake news was
shared, fake news made up less than 10% of the group’s meaningful text messages.
The scatter plot in figure 8.7b reveals that message prevalence and user prevalence
were both typically low. The two groups where fake news made up over 40% of
meaningful text messages were both quite inactive (one had only two messages in our
months-long collection period, and the other had 24).
(a) Histogram of message prevalence of
fake news.
(b) Scatter plot of message prevalence
and user prevalence of fake news.
Figure 8.7: Plots involving groups with fake news.
Across all groups (including the 112 groups where no fake news was shared), the
proportion of users who shared fake news was correlated, unsurprisingly, with the
Venezuelan user proportion of groups. On average, an increase in the Venezuelan
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user proportion by 10% increased the proportion of users who shared fake news by
0.45% (p < 0.01).
Finally, figure 8.8 shows a histogram of the raw number of fake news messages in
groups with fake news.
Figure 8.8: A histogram of the number of fake news messages sent in groups, for
groups where fake news was shared.
To better understand group dynamics, we move on to looking only at groups
where fake news was shared. In these groups, the message prevalence of fake news
was weakly negatively correlated with group size and activity, moderately positively
correlated with group concentration, moderately negatively correlated with virality,
and strongly negatively correlated with Gini (group inequality). An OLS regression
of fake news message prevalence on these factors is shown in table 8.1.
Table 8.1: OLS regression of fake news message prevalence on group size, activity,
concentration, virality, and inequality; we only include groups with fake news.
Coefficient (Std. Err.) t P-Value
Intercept 0.2825(0.051) 5.496 0.000∗
Size 0.0000(0.000) 0.509 0.612
Activity 0.0001(0.000) 1.047 0.299
(H-H) Concentration 0.1592(0.070) 2.276 0.027∗
Gini/Inequality −0.3662(0.082) −4.451 0.000∗
Virality −0.0348(0.037) −0.932 0.356
n = 62 (56 d.f.) R2 = 0.506
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Yet because of the power-law distribution of message prevalence across groups,
where fake news made up less than 10% of text content in 54 of 62 groups where fake
news was shared, any regression is strongly affected by the two aforementioned outlier
groups, where fake news made up over half of textual content. We perform another
OLS regression dropping those outliers, obtaining the coefficients in table 8.2.
Table 8.2: OLS regression of fake news message prevalence on group size, activity,
concentration, virality, and inequality; we only include groups with fake news, and
dropped groups with fake news message prevalence over 0.4.
Coefficient (Std. Err.) t P-Value
Intercept 0.1653(0.034) 4.804 0.000∗
Size 0.0000(0.000) −0.172 0.864
Activity 0.0000(0.000) 0.077 0.939
(H-H) Concentration 0.0932(0.055) 1.681 0.098
Gini/Inequality −0.2159(0.061) −3.536 0.001∗
Virality 0.0027(0.024) 0.114 0.910
n = 60 (54 d.f.) R2 = 0.337
From these regressions, more concentrated groups are linked to greater fake news
prevalence, while more unequal groups are strongly linked to less fake news prevalence,
even while controlling for group size, activity, and virality. That these coefficients are
in opposite directions should not surprise us; we previously saw that group concen-
tration and group inequality are distinct measures (in particular, group inequality
increases significantly when there are many “poor” individuals with few messages,
though they barely affect concentration10).
There are clear hypotheses for why more concentrated groups might have higher
fake news prevalence: “echo chambers” on social media networks, where like-minded
individuals are insulted from diverse and alternative perspectives, have been well
studied, especially since the 2016 U.S. presidential election [49] [50]. We might also
10Imagine wealth in New York City: 8 million poor individuals arriving in the city would sig-
nificantly increase inequality measures, but have little impact on concentration of wealth at the
top.
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hypothesize that more concentrated groups feel more familiar to at least the frequent
users, since a small subset of the group dominates conversation, so they may pass on
information more inattentively (in a “Forwards from Grandma” kind of manner11).
This second point might explain why fake news message prevalence decreases as
group inequality rises: highly unequal groups may appear to include many strangers
(i.e., members who send few messages). Users may fear getting called out for shar-
ing fake news, or may simply pay more attention to messages they forward along.
More directly, these message-poor members may occasionally chime in with alternate
perspectives.
8.2.4 Variants of Fake News
Above, we looked at fake news in aggregate; now we identify unique pieces of fake
news. Because fake news is slightly altered as users pass it on, whether insiduously
or not,12 we must aggregate together fake news messages with subtle differences.
Take, for example, the following message, which provides false medical advice
about the coronavirus (that the sun kills the coronavirus13):
*Consejo del Dr. Yuri Ortega Sotelo +51987453411
El coronavirus es de gran tamano con un diametro celular de 400-500 micras,
por lo que cualquier mascara impide su entrada, por lo que no es
necesario explotar a los farmaceuticos para comerciar con bozales.
El virus no se instala en el aire, sino en el suelo, por lo que no se
transmite por el aire.
El virus, cuando cae sobre una superficie de metal, vivira durante 12 horas
, por lo que lavarse bien las manos con agua y jabon sera suficiente.
El virus cuando cae sobre las telas permanece durante 9 horas, por lo que
lavar la ropa o exponerla al sol durante dos horas es suficiente para
matarlo.
11https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/forwards-from-grandma
12We can imagine malicious users altering content slightly to avoid spam filters, for example, but
also innocent users rewording false medical advice to be more credible and context-specific. For
example, false medical advice in our dataset usually cites an invented doctor, but the nationality of
this doctor changes based on the group it’s sent to.
13At the time of publication, this is unsupported by medical experts.
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El virus vive en las manos durante 10 minutos, por lo que llevar un
desinfectante con alcohol en el bolsillo y aplicar es suficiente para
prevenirlo.
Si el virus se expone a una temperatura de 26-27 C, se matara, no vive en
areas calientes. Tambien es suficiente beber agua caliente y exponerse
al sol. Mantenerse alejado del helado y la comida fria es importante.
Hacer gargaras con agua tibia y sal mata el virus en las amigdalas y evita
que se filtren a los pulmones.
Cumplir con estas instrucciones es suficiente para prevenir el virus.
Dr. Yuri Ortega Sotelo
The following variant is a shorter snippet of the first message, and also changes
the supposed medical source from a doctor to UNICEF.
Consejos de la Unicef
El coronavirus es de gran tamano con un diametro celular de 400-500 micras,
por lo que cualquier mascara impide su entrada, por lo que no es
necesario explotar a los farmaceuticos para comerciar con bozales.
El virus no se instala en el aire, sino en el suelo, por lo que no se
transmite por el aire.
El virus, cuando cae sobre una superficie de metal, vivira durante 12 horas
, por lo que lavarse bien las manos con agua y jabon sera suficiente.
El virus cuando cae sobre las telas permanece durante 9 horas, por lo que
lavar la ropa o exponerla al sol durante dos horas es suficiente para
matarlo.
El virus vive en las manos durante 10 minutos, por lo que llevar un
desinfectante con alcohol en el bolsillo y aplicar es suficiente para
prev...
To detect altered messages, we again use cosine similarity, purely within the set of
fake news messages and with a manually-tuned baseline of 0.8. Out of 214 different
fake news texts, we identified 98 that were variants of other messages, leaving 116
unique fake news messages. Two particularly viral messages involved seven variants
each; both promised cures to the coronavirus.
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Figure 8.9 depicts a histogram of how many times each of the 116 unique fake news
pieces was shared; the two messages that were shared most frequently were about a
child-kidnapping organ-trafficking mafia (with 23 shares) and another advising that
the Chinese cured coronavirus with hot liquids and gargling with saltwater (19 shares).
Figure 8.9: Histogram of the number of times each unique fake news was shared.
Finally, the histograms in figure 8.10 show that the vast majority of fake news were
shared by five or fewer users and in five or fewer groups. For each unique fake news, we
calculated the average number of shares per user (who shared the message), and the
average number of shares per group (where the message was shared). Across the 116
fake news, these averaged to 1.06 and 1.28 respectively, showing that users typically
only shared each fake news message once, and that fake news weren’t repeatedly
shared in the groups they reached.
Figure 8.10: Histograms of how many different users shared each fake news piece, and
in how many different groups each fake news piece was shared.
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8.3 Analyzing Scams
In analyzing scams, we proceed nearly identically to the previous section (though we
expect, and proceed to show, completely different results).
With our labeling methodology, we identified 886 messages as scams (88% more
messages than fake news messages), and again separated out 44,025 “meaningful”
text messages (i.e., text messages with at least five words in their tokenization).
8.3.1 Message Dynamics
Like fake news messages, scam messages received starkly fewer replies: 0.1219 replies
on average, compared to 0.5697 for other meaningful text messages, and 0.5424 across
all non-scam messages (p < 0.001). The 95th quantile of scams received only one
reply, while the 95th quantile of non-scam text messages received three replies.
As with fake news, scams in even reply cascades went significantly less viral, with
average virality 0.6695, compared to 1.3590 across other meaningful text messages,
and 1.5029 across all non-scam messages (p < 0.001). The 95th quantile of scams
and non-scam meaningful text messages had viralities 1.28 and 3.55, respectively.
While fake news messages were much longer than other text messages (435% as
long), scams were actually slightly shorter than other meaningful text messages, at
297 vs. 330 characters on average (n.s.), and 41 vs. 51 words long (p < 0.01).
A latent dirichlet allocation parameterized with 10 topics of 10 words each yields
the following topics within scam messages:
1. bon pais prestam http com cupon diner hol exit 000
2. internet gb 100 dat gratis obteng ahor https consiguel cualqui
3. grup vide bienven prestam https siguient pas va voy javi
4. ayud resib us 77 alimentari onu earn 00 invest clic
5. prest 000 prestam personal 3 eur tas plaz whatsapp interes
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6. https whatsapp and oscur com ly bit of to activ
7. https 000 sisb netflix period aislamient cupon com entra rap
8. netflix period aislamient https pandemi dand gratis deb coronavirus mund
9. https com chat diplom whatsapp ayud c z l grup
10. tarjet alimentari madr cp https nuev solicitud bon to crypto
The topics of scams are a bit more varied than topics in fake news messages.
Topics 7 and 8 involve free Netflix accounts during the coronavirus quarantine; topics
4 and 10 offer financial assistance from the government; and topic 2 purports to offer
free internet. Topics 1, 3, and 5 are fake loan offers, while topic 6 involves WhatsApp
(i.e., “Change the color of your WhatsApp!”).
8.3.2 User Dynamics
Scams were shared by 473 users, 6.0% of the 7,860 users in total. Like with fake news,
most users who shared scams only shared them once (70.8%, compared to 74.4% of
fake news sharers), and 16.1% shared scams exactly twice. But as figure 8.11 shows,
the tail of this distribution is a lot higher than for fake news.
Figure 8.11: The left includes all users who shared scams; the right only includes
frequent scam-sharers.
Users who shared fake news shared a maximum of 11 fake news messages, but
the right graph in figure 8.11 makes clear that some users are frequent scam-sharers.
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This is expected: even setting aside intentional troublemakers, we may imagine that
scam victims have had their accounts commandeered to bulk-send scams.
We move on to analyzing the prevalence of scams, which we similarly define as the
proportion of scams amongst all meaningful text messages sent by a user. Of 4,645
users who sent meaningful text messages, 89.8% never shared scams. But, as seen
in figure 8.12a, of 473 users who’ve shared scams, 251 users (53.1%) have only sent
scam messages and no other meaningful text messages!
Figure 8.12b plots again the relevant histogram for fake news sharers; these graphs
are starkly different. Comparing these two distributions allows us to better charac-
terize scam sharers, but also provide remedies. Whereas banning fake news sharers
would prevent them from sharing other meaningful content, most scam sharers don’t
share any other meaningful content!
(a) Most users who share scams only
share scams.
(b) Most users who share fake news share
other meaningful text content.
Figure 8.12: Prevalence of scams amongst sharers, compared to prevalence of fake
news amongst sharers.
Across users, sharing fake news and sharing scams were very weakly positively
correlated (r = 0.03, p = 0.01). 9.4% of users who’ve shared fake news also shared
scams, compared to 5.9% of users who haven’t shared fake news; similarly, 6.1% of
users who’ve shared scams also have shared fake news, compared to 3.8% of users
who haven’t shared scams.
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The prevalence of fake news and scams for each user were not correlated (or,
rather, very weakly negatively correlated with no statistical significance), which might
be due to crowding-out effects between fake news and scams. Of users who’ve shared
fake news, scams on average made up 0.8% of users’ messages, compared to 2.7% of
messages from users who’ve never shared fake news; fake news prevalence was 0.5%
amongst scam sharers, and 0.7% for non-scam sharers.
Comparing Across Countries
Before, we had seen that Venezuelan users were more likely to have shared fake news.
It turns out that this disparity is flipped on its head for scam-sharers: Colombian users
were 240% as likely to share scams, compared to Venezuelans! Specifically, 11.2% of
Colombian users have shared scams, while only 4.6% of Venezuelan users have. The
bar graph in figure 8.13 shows that Chileans and Venezuelans are significantly less
likely to have shared scams than users from Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador.
Figure 8.13: Comparing scam senders by country. (ANOVA p < 0.001; t-tests be-
tween VEN and PER/COL/ECU, and between COL and CHL, p < 0.001.)
This presents an interesting juxtaposition to the crime narrative-based xenopho-
bia against Venezuelan migrants that is so present in Colombia (even in field inter-
views with Venezuelan migrants, they also shared narratives where Venezuelan mi-
grants were disproportionately responsible for criminality). In our collection of public
WhatsApp groups, Colombian users, not Venezuelans, are significantly more likely to
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be the ones sharing scams! Of course, this comes with numerous disclaimers—many
(or most) Colombian users may be Venezuelan migrants, users who share scams may
be doing so unintentionally (perhaps as victims themselves), and so on—but it’s cer-
tainly interesting that only knowing a user’s country code, we should be much more
wary of messages from Colombian users.
The same disparity exists when examining the average prevalence of scams for
users from each country. On average, 7.0% of each Colombian user’s text content
involves scams, compared to 2.7% for Venezuelan users. Figure 8.14a plots these
proportions by country; for the average Venezuelan user, fewer of their text messages
are scams, compared to the average Peruvian, Colombian, and Ecuadorian users.
This difference, however, is almost entirely explained by the fact that a higher
percentage of Colombians (and Peruvians/Ecuadorians) have shared scams compared
to Venezuelans. The violin plot in figure 8.14b only includes users who’ve shared
scams; for these users, scams make up roughly 60% of their meaningful text content
regardless of what country they’re from.
(a) (ANOVA p < 0.001; t-tests between
VEN and PER/COL/ECU, and between
COL and CHL, p < 0.001.)
(b) (No statistical significance.)
Figure 8.14: Cross-country comparisons of average prevalence of scams.
Finally, when looking at raw number of scams shared, Colombian users on average
have shared 0.17 scams, compared to 0.08 scams for Venezuelan users (p < 0.001).
Again, this difference was mostly accounted for by more Colombians (and Peruvian-
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s/Ecuadorians) having shared scams: when only considering users who’ve shared
scams, users from each of the countries all shared 1.0-1.5 scams on average. The bar
graph in figure 8.15a and the violin plot in figure 8.15b show these frequencies.
(a) (ANOVA p < 0.001; t-tests between
VEN and PER/COL, and between COL
and CHL, p < 0.01.)
(b) (No statistical significance.)
Figure 8.15: Cross-country comparisons of average frequency of scams.
8.3.3 Group Dynamics
For each group, we again construct two measures for the prevalence of scams within
that group: first, the proportion of meaningful text messages in that group that
involve scams—message prevalence—and second, the proportion of users in that group
who’ve shared scams—user prevalence.
Of 174 groups, only 49.4% (86 groups) did not have any messages flagged as scams;
this was significantly lower than the 112 groups where no fake news was shared. In
the 88 groups where scams were shared, however, the message prevalence of scams
was low: in 54 of these groups, less than 10% of text messages consisted of scams; the
histogram in figure 8.16a looks extremely similar to the histogram before of message
prevalence of fake news. Considering both message prevalence and user prevalence,
the prevalence of scams wasn’t correlated to fake news prevalence within groups.
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(a) Histogram of message prevalence of
scams.
(b) Scatter plot of message prevalence
and user prevalence of scams.
Figure 8.16: Plots involving groups with scams.
The scatter plot in figure 8.16b reveals a weak correlation between user prevalence
and message prevalence of scams in groups (Pearson r = 0.35, p < 0.001). Of the
seven groups where scams made up over 50% of group text messages (i.e., message
prevalence over 0.5), six were mostly inactive (with few messages over our months-
long collection period), but one was a highly active internet money-making group
that, as the topic suggests, was filled with scams.
Finally, figure 8.17 shows a histogram of the raw number of scams across groups
with scams. The scam-filled group seen to the graph’s right was a very active gaming
group, where 156 scams were part of 1751 text messages.
Figure 8.17: A histogram of the number of scams sent in groups, for the 88 groups
where scams were shared.
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Across all groups (including the 86 groups where no messages were flagged as
scams), the message prevalence of scams was correlated with group entropy (geo-
graphic heterogeneity) and average group virality. An OLS regression of message
prevalence on those factors is presented in table 8.3.
Table 8.3: OLS regression of scam message prevalence on group entropy and group
virality; we include all groups, including groups where no scams were shared.
Coefficient (Std. Err.) t P-Value
Intercept 0.0750(0.022) 3.345 0.001∗
Entropy 0.0867(0.023) 3.726 0.000∗
Virality −0.0863(0.022) −3.855 0.000∗
n = 174 (171 d.f.) R2 = 0.104
Higher entropy in groups (more geographic diversity) is weakly linked to higher
message prevalence, which could be for a number of reasons: users may be less familiar
with each other, or these groups are more centered on general/online themes (as
opposed to groups for specific locations in Colombia, etc.), and so on. Higher scam
message prevalence is also linked to lower virality within groups. This could be a
result of less interaction in the group—scammers may be less afraid of being called
out—though we previously showed that scam messages are generally much less viral.
Scam user prevalence was weakly negatively linked to Venezuelan user proportion
(which should be clear from what we’ve already discussed), and weakly positively
related to group inequality. The OLS coefficients are shown in table 8.4.
Table 8.4: OLS regression of groups’ scam user prevalence on group proportion VZ
and group Gini.
Coefficient (Std. Err.) t P-Value
Intercept 0.0012(0.010) 0.120 0.904
Proportion VZ −0.0481(0.019) −2.555 0.011∗
Inequality/Gini 0.0699(0.018) 3.950 0.000∗
n = 174 (171 d.f.) R2 = 0.104
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The relationship with Gini/inequality is opposite that found with fake news mes-
sage prevalence (where message prevalence of fake news decreased with inequality),
but message prevalence and user prevalance are different characteristics.
In particular, higher inequality means more strangers in the group: these strangers
can make fake news messages less likely (say, by potentially calling out fake news, or
by bringing in alternate perspectives), but can also mean that more users are sharing
scams (perhaps these very strangers are sharing scams). Still, these relationships are
weak across both fake news and scams, so we don’t discount the possibility of these
simply being spurious coefficients.
We now only examine groups where scams were shared to obtain stronger effects.
Message prevalence of scams was correlated with size, activity, degree, concentration,
inequality, and virality; results from our kitchen sink regression are shown in table
8.5. Remarkably, these results are exceedingly similar to those for fake news message
prevalence: again, concentration and group inequality are significant, concentration
in the positive direction, and inequality in the negative direction.
Table 8.5: OLS regression of groups’ scam message prevalence on group size, group
activity, group degree, group concentration, group virality, and group inequality. Only
across groups where scams were shared.
Coefficient (Std. Err.) t P-Value
Intercept 0.5147(0.083) 6.232 0.000∗
Size 0.0003(0.000) 1.105 0.272
Activity 0.0000(0.000) 0.459 0.647
Degree 0.0003(0.001) 0.379 0.706
(H-H) Concentration 0.4887(0.156) 3.140 0.002∗
Inequality/Gini −0.7290(0.137) −5.307 0.000∗
Virality −0.0363(0.070) −0.520 0.605
n = 88 (81 d.f.) R2 = 0.489
The high positive coefficient on concentration is a bit surprising, since “echo
chambers” are less applicable in this case. We might imagine, however, that if users
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who mostly share scams are behind the concentration—as they are in the afore-
mentioned internet money-making group, and perhaps other groups—concentration
breeds greater scam prevalence. As before, higher inequality likely means that
“strangers” (message-poor users) will call out messages, or that users will pay more
attention before forwarding on scams.
8.3.4 Variants of Scams
Like with fake news, scams are altered as they’re shared, though likely more insidu-
ously than fake news. Consider, for example the following message, which purports
to offer a loan:
Buenos dias . Para todos aquellos que necesitan prestamos de dinero, el
servicio de prestamos lo ayudara al ayudarlo en varias areas de
prestamos de dinero. Para la comunicacion
whatsapp: +229 636 963 16
and:
Buenos dias . Para todos aquellos que necesitan prestamos de dinero, el
servicio de prestamos lo ayudara al ayudarlo en varias areas de
prestamos de dinero. Para la comunicacion
whatsapp: +22 963 696 316
The formatting of the number has been slightly changed in the second message,
likely to disguise the country code (the country code +229 is from Benin, in West
Africa, while a +22 country code—which doesn’t exist, since country codes must be
instaneous ⇔ no code is a prefix of some other code—might seem European).
Or take the following message, also a fishy loan offer:
OFERTA DE PReSTAMO DE DINERO
Somos una empresa que ofrece prestamos para la vivienda, prestamos de
inversion, prestamos para automoviles, prestamos personales que van
desde 4,000 [Euros] a 1,000,000 [Euros] con una tasa de interes del 3%
sobre capital a corto y largo plazo. Si estas interesado contactanos
por whatsapp: +33752534155
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In one variant, the heading has been slightly modified (from “LOAN OFFER” to
“We offer the loan”), amounts in the messages are different (and the currency was
even changed from Euros to Kuwaiti dinars?!), and an additional sentence was added:
Ofrecer el prestamo
Somos una empresa que ofrece prestamos para vivienda, prestamos de
inversion, prestamos para automoviles, prestamos personales que van
desde 5,000 hasta 1,000,000 de dinares kuwaities con una tasa de
interes del 3% sobre capital a corto y largo plazo.
Con este prestamo, puede restaurar completamente su hogar, pagar sus
impuestos y contribuir a sus necesidades personales y familiares. Si
esta interesado, contactenos a traves de WhatsApp: +33752534155
With 247 unique scam messages, we again use cosine similarity (with manually-
tuned limit again 0.8) to find 105 that are variants on other scams. After merging,
we end up with 142 unique scams; all but one were shared fewer than 50 times. But
this message, which purports to offer free mobile data, involved 26 variants (!), which
were shared 116 times (!) by 77 unique users (!) across 40 unique groups (!):
100 GB de datos de Internet sin ninguna recarga
Obtenga 100 GB de datos de Internet gratis en cualquier red movil durante
60 dias.
Consiguelo ahora \nhttps://internet4goffers.com/es
Another message involved 29 variants (!), and purports to offer free cash transfers
(from the UN and an unnamed “government”):
La OMS y el Gobierno han destinado un BONO de dinero para todos los paises
por Motivo de CUARENTENA (CORONA VIRUS)
Obtenga su BONO gratis en cualquier pais.
Consiguelo ahora AQUI
https://bit.ly/Bono-Comida-8
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Figure 8.18 gives a histogram of how many times each of the 142 unique scams
were shared.
Figure 8.18: Histogram of the number of times each unique scam was shared.
Finally, the histograms in figure 8.19 show that of all unique scams, the vast
majority were shared by five or fewer users, and in five or fewer groups (just like with
fake news).
Figure 8.19: Histograms of how many different users shared each unique scam, and
in how many different groups each unique scam was shared.
For each unique scam, we calculated the average number of shares per user, and
the average number of shares in each group. Across all scams, these averaged to 2.52
and 2.64 respectively, significantly higher than we found for fake news. Clearly, there
seems to be greater intent and greater maliciousness behind the sharing of scams.
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8.4 Detecting Scams with Machine Learning
Given that many scams rely on the same nuances (like offering something for free or
conveying a sense of urgency), it may be possible to automatically flag scam messages.
In this section, we put various machine learning classifiers to this task, using certain
characteristics of scams based on our results from Chapter 8.3:
1. Text only (tokens)
2. Tokens and message length
3. Tokens and user country code
4. Tokens and group dynamics (concentration and inequality)
We proceed with the same labeled data as before, and only work with messages
with 5-word tokens or longer, leaving us 44,025 messages with 886 labeled scams.
Immediately, we perform an 80-20 train-test chronological split, giving us a size 35,225
overall training set, and a 8,800 sample overall test set.14
Within our overall training set, we create four cross-validation folds by “forward
chaining,” which ensures that in each fold we never train on data after the beginning
of that fold’s test. Specifically, we chronologically split our training set into five equal
sets, then: train on {1} and test on 2 (fold 1), train on {1, 2} and test on 3 (fold 2),
train on {1, 2, 3} and test on 4 (fold 3), and train on {1, 2, 3, 4} and test on 5 (fold
4). Clearly, we should give higher credence to performance in folds 3 and 4, since
training set size in those folds nears the actual training set size.
Given that 98% of our data are true negatives, overall accuracy is a poor measure
of performance here; indeed, any metric with true negatives in the denominator will
14Note that our methodology does not perfectly exclude test data from processing: previously,
to find and label scams, we had manually verified messages that were shared identically thrice or
more, including during the test set period. If a message was only shared twice in the training time
period but twice more in the test set period, we still manually reviewed and labeled it. This is an
extremely minor violation, since we could’ve avoided it with simply more manual labor.
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be uselessly close to 0 or 1 (in particular, just classifying everything as “not-scam”
results in an outstanding 98% accuracy with an amazing 0% false positive rate).
We settle for recall, TP
TP+FN
, which measures our detection rate of actual scams, and
precision, TP
TP+FP
, which measures how precise our positive (scam) prediction is.
8.4.1 Text Only
We proceed with five well-known classifiers: logistic regression, SVM, nearest neigh-
bors, decision trees, and random forest. Although applications of Naive Bayes classi-
fiers to the spam detection problem are well-known, here we discard those classifiers
because they assume strong independence between features. In our dataset, the re-
lationships between tokens do matter—“free” and “http” each become much more
suspicious in combination.
Given our extremely high-dimensional feature space (with 42,904 tokens), we test
each classifier with various regularization parameters. The first two classifiers are both
linear, which may be a setback given our circumstances: some tokens are likely to be
red flags for scams regardless of context (e.g., “free” or “loan”), but some tokens only
become red flags in combination. Consider, for example, the tokens “United Nations,”
“assistance” and “http”: none of these tokens by themself is very suspicious (indeed,
most messages about the UN are probably news-related), but in combination, these
immediately signal the assistance/cash-transfer scams we discussed earlier.
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The plots in figures 8.20 and 8.21 show the performance of L1 and L2-regularized
logistic regression, respectively, with recall (detection rate of actual scams) in the left
graph and precision (quality of positive predictions) in the right graph. In each plot,
the different lines represent different regularization parameters C (C is the inverse of
the conventional regularization penalty λ, so a low C means stronger regularization).
Figure 8.20: Performance of L1-penalty logistic regressions.
Figure 8.21: Performance of L2-penalty logistic regressions.
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In the L2 regularization, we notice that C ≤ 1 quickly brings coefficients in the
logistic regression to 0, resulting in very low recall (but near-perfect precision, since
we’re not flagging anything).
L1-regularization, which more likely yields sparse solutions given the shape of
the 1-norm unit ball, results in around the same recall as the L2 penalty, but worse
precision: more of the predicted scams turn out to be false positives. We might
imagine that this arises simply from having to consider fewer tokens. Imagine, for
example, that hyperlinks are generally suspicious, but links ending in “.gov” are
generally legitimate: if there are few .gov links, the L1 penalty might only assign a
positive coefficient to the token “http”, while the L2 penalty could assign a positive
coefficient on “http” and a negative coefficient “gov” for the same cost.
Next, in figure 8.22, we show recall and performance from SVM classifiers with
varying regularization. With C ≥ 0.75, the classifiers begin to converge, with quite
similar performance, SVM the classifiers have worse recall than logistic regression.
Figure 8.22: Performance of SVM classifiers.
Precision of SVMs is generally better than in logistic regression, but this is simply
the recall-precision trade off (in predicting fewer scams overall). Given our context,
it’s more important to prioritize recall—being able to identify more scams—even at
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the cost of false positives (especially since the false positive rate is still exceedingly
low in general, given that 98% of messages aren’t scams).
Figure 8.23 plots performance for decision trees of varying depths. There seem to
be little gains, and substantial risk of overfitting, once the depth of a decision tree is
12 or so; these trees seem to perform equally well as L2-penalized logistic regression,
though noise with our small sample size makes comparison difficult.
Figure 8.23: Performance of decision tree classifiers.
Figure 8.24 plots performance for random forests of varying depth.
Figure 8.24: Performance of random forest classifiers (100 trees).
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Random forests have much worse performance decision trees (in particular, the
1.00 precision signals that our classifier flags very few scams), and we might attribute
this to the bootstrap sampling involved in fitting each decision tree within the random
forest. Because there are relatively few positives (scams) in our dataset, comprising
only 2% of messages, bootstrap sampling is likely to leave out important training
examples altogether, and consistently do this across trees.
Finally, in figure 8.25 we plot the performance of k-nearest neighbors classifiers,
which seem to do substantially better than our other classifiers. This shouldn’t sur-
prise us, at all: because scams develop so many variants over time, a close match on
some tokens to a known scam should be an immediate red flag (this, after all, was
our motivation for using cosine similarity to label scams and then to merge variants).
Figure 8.25: Performance of k-nearest neighbors classifiers.
8.4.2 Text and Message Dynamics
Given our results in Section 8.3.1 (where we studied the message properties of scams),
we add text length (in number of words, normalized) as a feature. Scams involved
nearly 20% fewer words on average than other meaningful text messages. Given poor
performance in the previous section of random forests and L1 logistic regression, we
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only focus in this section on L2 logistic regression, SVM, decision tree, and k-nearest
neighbors classifiers.
The performance of L2-regularized logistic regression (hereafter, just “logistic re-
gression”) is presented in figure 8.26. There appears to be no difference in perfor-
mance from before, which makes sense since the importance of message length differs
based on the token context. Under specific scenarios, say when receiving a message
that includes tokens about the United Nations, message length might be extremely
important—shorter messages are likely scams, while longer messages about the UN
are likely news. But because logistic regression is linear in the feature space, it can’t
incorporate these non-linear nuances. SVM with word length also performs similarly
as SVM with only tokens (figure omitted).
Figure 8.26: Performance of L2-penalty logistic regressions, using message length.
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Decision trees perform substantially better when incorporating word length, likely
for the reason we just discussed, where message length becomes important in certain
scenarios. In figure 8.27, recall is around 10-20% higher than before, on average! This
improvement comes without any significant loss in precision.
Figure 8.27: Performance of decision tree classifiers, using message length.
Performance for k-neighbors classifiers using message length is shown in figure
8.28. There is little improvement, likely because word counts only matter in specific
contexts—and those contexts are already accounted for by the neighbors matching.
Figure 8.28: Performance of k-nearest neighbors classifiers, using message length.
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8.4.3 Text and User Dynamics
Now, alongside tokens, we incorporate information about senders, but only whether
they have a VZ or CO country code (or neither). A more sophisticated approach
would surely take into account specific telephone numbers, but that would quickly
converge towards simply blacklisting certain users, given what we saw in section 8.3.2;
we leave this strategy out of our analysis, since it would lead to overestimates of our
scam detection performance in more general contexts.
As with incorporating message length, there are no substantial improvements in
either logistic regression or SVM, because of what we discussed earlier. Performance
of decision trees with message length, shown in figure 8.29, is slightly better than
decision trees on tokens only (and around the same as decision trees with message
length). With user country code, the k-nearest neighbors classifier performs the same,
if not worse (figure omitted).
Figure 8.29: Performance of decision tree classifiers, using user country code.
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8.4.4 Text and Group Dynamics
Finally, we incorporate measures of group concentration and inequality,15 which we
found to have statistically significant relations (in opposite directions) with scam mes-
sage prevalence. As with users, blacklisting/whitelisting certain groups might make
more sense for an actual scam detection algorithm, but here we attempt to determine
if more abstract group characteristics can be applied towards scam detection.
Unsurprisingly, logistic regression and SVM again perform no better than using
only tokens (though this conclusion isn’t necessarily obvious, because group dynamics
may linearly interact with message content, whereas message length likely has non-
linear interactions). Performance of decision trees is slightly better than the baseline
decision tree classifier, as shown in figure 8.30. The performance of the k-nearest
neighbors classifiers remains unchanged (figure omitted).
Figure 8.30: Performance of decision tree classifiers, using group concentration and
inequality.
15There is a bit of cheating from the test set here, since in chapter 8.3.3 we used the entire dataset
to determine that group concentration and inequality were linked with scam prevalence. But that’s
an extremely minor violation, since it’s not like we borrow coefficients or anything.
A larger issue might be that we use group concentration and inequality as calculated across
our entire dataset (for both the training feature vectors and the test feature vectors). This is still
a relatively small violation, and can be completely ignored if we assume that these are permanent
underlying characteristics of a group (that can be perfectly sampled), which seems fine.
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8.4.5 Test Results
Given these findings, we lean towards using a k-nearest neighbors classifier with three
neighbors and only text tokens. We compare this with another decent classifer, a 12-
level decision tree that incorporates text tokens, user country code (more specifically,
whether they’re CO or VZ), and message length (in words).
The confusion matrix for the 3-nearest neighbors classifier is
TP = 103 FP = 11
FN = 49 TN = 8637
,
giving recall 67.8% (not bad!) and precision 90.4%.
The confusion matrix for our decision tree is
TP = 58 FP = 7
FN = 94 TN = 8641
, which is
clearly much worse, at recall 38.2% and precision 89.2%. To briefly provide some
interpretability to our decision tree, in figure 8.31 we show a 3-level decision tree
(which, to be clear, has much worse performance).
Figure 8.31: 3-level decision tree fit on training data.
The feature for number of words appears in the second level; important tokens
in the decision tree include “obteng” (obtain), “prestam” (loan), and “click” (click
here).
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Chapter 9
Coronavirus
The 2019-20 coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic began in December 2019, in Wuhan,
China, but spread worldwide in the early months of 2020; the World Health Orga-
nization recognized it as a pandemic on March 11, 2020. Cases began appearing in
Colombia in early March [51], while Venezuela reported its first two cases on March
13 [52]. The effects of the coronavirus pandemic are as visible in public WhatsApp
groups as they are on Bogot’s empty streets. Figure 9.1 shows the daily proportion
of all 5+ word text messages that mention coronavirus, virus, and quarantine.
Figure 9.1: Plot of keyword popularity amongst all text messages with 5+ words.
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No matter what topics groups were originally cented on, discussions came to
include the virus itself, its worldwide spread, and its socioeconomic effects in Colombia
and Venezuela. In Chapter 8, we’ve already seen how widespread coronavirus-related
misinformation is: fake news about cures, fake news about cases, and internet scams
offering food aid or free mobile data in this especially difficult time. Even religious
chain messages have come to center on the coronavirus—take the following snippet, a
Biblical allusion passed around in multiple groups (we share the English translation):
"WHAT WOULD YOU DO IN THIS CASE? [...]
Everyone hears the news: 2 women have died in New York. Within hours, the
disease seems to be invading everyone. Scientists are still working to
find the antidote, but nothing works. And suddenly, the expected news
comes: The DNA code of the virus has been deciphered. You can make the
antidote. It is going to require the blood of someone who has not been
infected and in fact throughout the country the word is spread that
everyone should go to the nearest hospital for a blood test. [...]
Suddenly the doctor comes out yelling a name he has read in the registry.
The smallest of your children is next to you, grabs your jacket and
says: Daddy? That’s my name! [...] The older doctor comes up to you and
says: Thank you, sir, your son’s blood is perfect, it is clean and
pure, you can make the antidote to this disease ... The news spreads
everywhere, people are praying and crying with happiness.
Then the doctor approaches you and your wife and says: Can we talk for a
moment? We did not know that the donor would be a child and we need you
to sign this form to give us permission to use their blood. When you
are reading the document you realize that they are not putting the
amount they will need and you ask: How much blood? ... The doctor’s
smile disappears and he replies: We did not think it would be a child.
We were not prepared. We need it all ... You can’t believe it and you
try to answer: ’But, but ... ’. The doctor keeps insisting on you, ’You
don’t understand, we are talking about the cure for everyone. Please
sign, we need it ... "
In this chapter, we analyze two aspects of the coronavirus pandemic that we’re
uniquely poised to investigate: interest in trochas, illegal border crossings which
surged in popularity after Colombia shut down its borders, and the effects of Colom-
bia’s mandatory nationwide quarantine.
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9.1 Proliferation of Trocha Crossings
On Friday, March 13, Venezuela reported its first two cases of coronavirus; the same
day, President Ivn Duque of Colombia began restricting entry for visitors from Europe
and Asia, and announced a closing of all border crossings with Venezuela [53].
Many have criticized the Colombian border shutdown, given the vulnerabilities of
Venezuelans amidst their country’s collapsed health system [54]. Moreover, near the
two largest crossings, in Ccuta and Maicao, are hundreds to thousands of trochas,
irregular border crossings controlled by criminal organizations and paramilitaries,
who require payment for passage, and often rob and/or assault migrants. The belief
of regional experts, and many along the border, is that shutting down the official
border directly means increasing trocha crossings [54].
Figure 9.2 plots the popularity of “frontera” (border) and “trocha” keywords
amongst all 5+ word text messages. Both peak in popularity just after March 13,
when Colombia announced its border shutdown (which took effect at 5:00 AM local
time the next day).
Figure 9.2: Plot of keyword popularity for border-related topics amongst all text
messages with 5+ words. “Frontera” is border, and “troch” refers to the illegal
crossings. The red line indicates March 13, 2020, when Colombia decided to close its
land border with Venezuela.
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On March 14, nearly 5% of all text messages discuss trochas, and over 10% of all
text messages involve the border. Of all 5+ word text messages sent before March
13, only around 0.2% are related to trochas, and only 1.2% are related to the border.
We can look more generally at March 13-15: 2.4% of all text messages sent involve
trochas, compared to 0.3% of text messages outside this period (p < 0.001); 5.8%
of messages between March 13-15 discuss fronteras, compared to 1.3% of messages
outside this period (p < 0.001).
This effect is even larger when analyzing the groups these topics are discussed
in. For each day we collected day, we consider groups with messages from that day.
Figure 9.3 displays what proportion of such groups include mentions of our keywords:
on March 14, 25% of active groups are discussing trochas!
Figure 9.3: Plot of popularity of border-related topics (% of active groups where
keyword is mentioned that day). “Frontera” is border, and “troch” refers to the
illegal crossings. The red line indicates March 13, 2020, when Colombia decided to
close its land border with Venezuela.
Given our previous exploration of group characteristics, we hypothesize that dis-
cussion of trochas is likely linked to group properties like entropy, which estimates
how transnational the group is, and proportion of VZ members. We set a dummy
variable for groups that discuss trochas starting from March 13, the day the border
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closure was announced (n = 23 of 174 groups); this is positively correlated with pro-
portion of VZ members, group degree, inequality, and discussion of trochas before
March 12 (n = 16), and negatively correlated with proportion of CO members and
concentration.
A Probit model regression on these factors yields the estimates in table 9.1. Un-
surprisingly, discussion of trochas before the closure makes groups significantly more
likely to discuss trochas after the closure; the Probit model estimates a marginal
effect (average of marginal effects at each observation) of 0.17. Many groups where
trochas are discussed following the closure are news groups or border-related groups
that likely discussed the trochas before the closure. But there is an even stronger
marginal effect for proportion of VZ members of 0.36 (again, overall marginal effect
averaged from each observation), meaning that groups with more VZ members are
more likely to discuss trochas.
Table 9.1: Probit regression of trocha discussion dummy in a group (since announce-
ment of border closure), on various group characteristics.
Coefficient (Std. Err.) z P-Value
Intercept −4.2230(1.119) −3.775 0.000∗
Prev. Discussion of
Trochas
1.5696(0.480) 3.271 0.001∗
Size 0.0037(0.003) 1.472 0.141
Proportion VZ 3.3837(0.983) 3.444 0.001∗
Proportion CO 0.9074(0.728) 1.246 0.213
Degree 0.0013(0.006) 0.200 0.842
H-H Concentration −1.0468(1.206) −0.868 0.385
Gini/Inequality 2.4242(1.331) 1.821 0.069
n = 174 (166 d.f.) Pseudo R2 = 0.491
Analyzing this trend in terms of users reveals the same tremendous rise in trocha
interest following the border closure. In figure 9.4, we include users who send 5+ word
messages on each day, and plot what proportion of such users mention coronavirus,
frontera, and trocha. No matter how we understand this trend—whether from the
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perspective of messages, groups, or users—the conclusion is clear: the coronavirus-
related border shutdown unmistakably sparked interest in trochas, and redirected
migrants who would’ve crossed legally to instead attempt irregular crossings.
Figure 9.4: Plot of popularity of border-related topics (% of active users who mention
keyword that day). “Frontera” is border, and “troch” refers to the illegal crossings.
The red line indicates March 13, 2020, when Colombia decided to close its land border
with Venezuela.
The effects we’ve found in WhatsApp users/groups are almost certainly underesti-
mates. Our field work revealed that migrants with more financial resources are more
likely to use WhatsApp, but also to cross legally, given the high cost of obtaining
Venezuelan documents needed to enter at official crossings. So if even this wealth-
ier, WhatsApp-using subset of migrants has shifted towards using trochas, we should
expect that much higher proportions of poorer migrants are attempting irregular
crossings.
While this effect could’ve been predicted by almost anyone on the porous border,
this is—to our knowledge—the first large-sample evidence of significantly increased
interest in trochas. The question of how many more irregular crossings actually hap-
pened is much more difficult to answer (if not impossible, given who runs trocha
operations), but any increase has welfare implications for migrants, and political
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implications for Colombia. Being robbed of smartphones and other valuables is in-
evitable along trochas, and migrants frequently encounter violence and sexual assault;
more vulnerable migrants means a greater burden on places like Maicao. We note
that coronavirus-related shutdowns have also impacted aid organizations [54], further
exacerbating the crisis.
9.2 Quarantine
Coronavirus lockdowns have uprooted life globally; here, we explore how usage pat-
terns have changed across our groups. In Colombia, President Ivn Duque announced
a 19-day nationwide quarantine on March 20th, which would begin at midnight on
March 24th [55]. Previously, local officials in cities including Bogot and Cartagena
had announced curfew and isolation measures; the ELN (National Liberation Army),
an armed Marxist group long involved in the Colombian civil conflict, even called a
ceasefire amidst the coronavirus pandemic [56].
We separate messages from two relevant periods: a pre-pandemic period that
includes all messages on or before March 10 (when most countries were functioning
normally; the WHO declared the coronavirus a global pandemic on March 11), and a
post-quarantine period, which includes all messages from March 24 and after, when
the national lockdown began.
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Nocturnal Activity
Figure 9.5 shows a density estimate of WhatsApp usage by Colombian users during
weekdays, in both the pre-pandemic and lockdown periods. While some usage pat-
terns remain constant—usage peaks around noon and later around 8 PM—we notice
a sharp increase in early AM activity during the lockdown period. Previously, usage
would wind down by 12:30-1:00 AM on weekdays, but usage remains high until nearly
3 AM, and there is twice as much activity between 12-1 AM. Message activity also
takes longer (around one to two more hours) to rise in the morning, probably because
people are taking longer to rise in the morning.
Figure 9.5: Plots of weekday WhatsApp activity of Colombian users, before and after
the coronavirus quarantine.
To quantify this discrepancy, we can record a dummy for messages sent between
12:00-5:00 AM; in the pre-pandemic period, this was 1.5% of all weekday messages,
but 7.8% of weekday messages during the quarantine period (p < 0.01).
Figure 9.6 plots the same usage patterns, but on Saturday and Sunday. Usage
patterns during the lockdown are more similar to activity before the lockdown; in
particular, there is no sharp increase in late-night usage. In the pre-pandemic period,
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4.8% of messages were sent before 5 AM, compared to 7.3% during the lockdown
(difference not statistically significant).
Figure 9.6: Plots of weekend WhatsApp activity of Colombian users, before and after
the coronavirus quarantine.
Finally, figure 9.7 plots the weekday and weekend activity of Venezuelan users
(in hour buckets because there are fewer Venezuelan users and less data in certain
buckets). There appears the same trend of more noctural activity on weekdays (and
morning activity taking longer to ramp up) during the quarantine period, though
with less disparity than with Colombian users; as with Colombian users, weekend
activity is relatively unchanged.
Figure 9.7: Plots of weekday and weekend WhatsApp activity of Venezuelan users,
before and after the coronavirus quarantine.
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Message Length
On average, text, audio, and video messages during the lockdown period are longer
than messages from before the pandemic. Table 9.2 shows average length of messages
from both periods, for all messages as well as non-forwarded messages (to better dif-
ferentiate, say, between professional content producers creating longer content and
individual users spending more time on their messages). Across both categories, all
messages and non-forwarded (“original”) messages, all message types experience sta-
tistically significant increases in length during the quarantine period (with the single
exception of non-forwarded audio messages, where the increase is not statistically
significant).
Table 9.2: Average length of messages from the pre-pandemic (on or before March
10) and quarantine (March 24 and after) periods.
Pre-Pandemic Quarantine t P-Value
(Average Length) (Average Length)
All Messages
Text 20.80 words 22.61 words 3.55 0.000∗
Text 136.41 chars. 146.12 chars. 2.97 0.003∗
Audio 100.00 secs. 123.34 secs. 5.66 0.000∗
Video 79.06 secs. 105.54 secs. 10.98 0.000∗
Non-Forwarded Messages
Text 15.57 words 16.72 words 2.59 0.010∗
Text 99.77 chars. 107.42 chars. 2.67 0.008∗
Audio 72.02 secs. 77.89 secs. 1.61 0.106
Video 72.23 secs. 93.13 secs. 7.42 0.000∗
We might wonder if this is simply a trend in WhatsApp use completely unrelated
to the pandemic: over time, perhaps users come to share longer messages. Even
though common sense tells us isn’t the case, we still perform a falsification test,
regressing the lengths of messages on when they’re sent (specifically, seconds since
00:00 UTC-5 on February 13, 2020, when we began collecting data).
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In these OLS regressions with message length, it turns out that the coefficients
on when messages are sent are almost all (very weakly) negative, suggesting that if
there’s any trend in WhatsApp use, it’s that messages become shorter over time. Out
of eight falsification tests (regressions of text word length/text character length/audio
length/video length on when they were sent, for all messages and for non-forwarded
messages), only the regression for non-forwarded audio messages has a (miniscule)
positive coefficient, likely the result of random chance.
General Activity
We can also examine user activity more generally, by considering how many messages
each users sends on each day they’re active. Specifically, for each user, we construct
a user-date pair for day i ∈ [1, 53] if they’re active on day i, and for that user-date
pair record how many messages they send on day i.
In the pre-pandemic period, on each day they were active, users sent an average of
5.51 messages, while in the quarantine period, users sent on average of 6.09 messages
on each day they were active (t = 3.02, p < 0.01). We perform another falsification
test, regressing number of messages for each user-date pair on days since February
13, 2020, which yields a small and non-significant positive coefficient (0.0047, with
standard error 0.005).
Messages in the quarantine period also receive more replies, on average, than
messages in the pre-pandemic period, at 0.624 compared to 0.572 (t = 4.88, p <
0.001). To better account for possible discrepancies in content type, we can also
examine the average virality of messages in reply cascades during both periods; again,
quarantine-period messages in reply cascades are of average virality 1.624, while pre-
pandemic messages in reply cascades are of average virality 1.531 (t = 7.50, p <
0.001). As a falsification test, we regress virality on seconds since 00:00 UTC-5
Feburary 13, 2020 for all messages in reply casacdes, and obtain a very weakly negative
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coefficient, suggesting there isn’t some general trend of increased virality unrelated
to the pandemic.
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Chapter 10
Conclusion
There are no straightforward conclusions from our work; there shouldn’t be. Instead,
what we’ve found broadly falls along three themes: characterizing public Whats-
App groups as a data source, understanding migrant dynamics within these groups,
and theorizing how intervention in WhatsApp groups can best improve the lives of
migrants.
10.1 Public WhatsApp Groups as a Data Source
In our field work, we found that smartphones were relatively popular amongst
Venezuelan migrants, though estimates for their prevalence varied wildly. Among
those with smartphones, however, literally everyone used WhatsApp, primarily for
communicating with family and friends in one-on-one chats and small (private)
groups—indeed, WhatsApp is typically the primary reason for migrants to own a
smartphone, with one migrant even calling the app “primordial.”
Everyone—elderly people and migrants without smartphones included—knew
about WhatsApp and Facebook, and nearly everyone knew about the existence
of public groups on these networks. Around 50% of migrants with smartphones
reported being active members of such groups, either currently or previously, and
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said they turned to these groups for news, personal transactions, and employment
opportunities. But even amongst migrants who frequented public groups, few placed
significant trust in such groups—everyone had a story of a friend or acquaintance
who fell into trouble, usually from fraudulent employment offers.
What this means is that activity in public WhatsApp groups may not be represen-
tative of WhatsApp use by migrants: public groups involve more strangers and lower
trust than the private groups/chats that matter most to migrants. WhatsApp users,
of course, are also not representative of migrants in general; migrants on WhatsApp
are typically wealthier and more educated than those without smartphones (the cost
of phones and data plans is typically what limits smartphone use).
In spite of all this, our field work suggests that public WhatsApp groups do retain
some significance in the experience of Venezuelan migrants to Colombia. Migrants
may not trust these groups very much, or frequent these groups nearly as much as
groups with close friends, but they do turn to public groups, at least once in a while.
More than this, our data suggests that relationships and activity in these groups
provide reasonable approximations of overall WhatsApp use by migrants. Public
WhatsApp groups with strangers are incredibly different from private chats with
friends, but our data tells us that the two are much more closely connected than, say,
WhatsApp groups and Facebook groups or WhatsApp groups and Twitter.
In Chapter 5, we saw that the dynamics of membership in these groups follow
patterns we should expect, both from general social networks and our specific context.
As with most social/social media networks [9], we find power-law distributions in
group participation, and discover giant connected components in networks of both
groups and users.
Most groups had more users from Colombia, an important sanity check since we
expect these groups to center on Venezuelan migrants in Colombia; groups with more
Venezuelan users were typically larger. Users from Ecuador and Peru were equally
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well-connected to Venezuelan and Colombian users, while users from Chile were better
connected to Venezuelan users—a natural result of Ecuador and Peru sharing land
borders with Colombia, and Chile being much farther away.
We also calculated entropy as a measure of geographical heterogeneity within
groups. Groups with few Colombian users were relatively diverse, while groups with
few Venezuelan users were more homogeneous, making clear that these groups do
center on Colombia. Larger groups and more heterogeneous groups are connected to
more groups (where we defined connection as sharing one or more users), and the
relationship holds when controlling for each factor.
In Chapter 6, we saw that text messages follow the power-law distribution we
expect of more-personal communications platforms like SMS and private WhatsApp
chats (as opposed to more-public communication like Twitter tweets, where length
peaks at around 10 words). We modeled text topics, and found that they center
on topics we would expect migrants to discuss, like general greetings, Venezuelan
politics, and the coronavirus. We also noticed power-law distributions in average
group activity, measured in number of messages per day, which fits the common
assumption of exponential distribution of user participation (popularly known as the
80/20 rule) [57].
We end the restating of results here, but the list goes on in further chapters. Many
of these patterns are obvious and expected, fitting what we know of online social
media networks and the context of Venezuelan migrants to Colombia. There is no
novel discovery here; instead, these findings should reassure us that public WhatsApp
groups aren’t as skewed, distorted, or misrepresentative as we might initially fear.
In other words, public WhatsApp groups are used by only a subset of migrants,
and even that subset uses these groups differently than groups with friends and family,
but public WhatsApp groups do allow us to meaningfully research the complicated
dynamics of the Venezuelan migrant crisis.
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10.2 Migrant Dynamics within WhatsApp Groups
We found a broad range of results related to how migrants connect to each other in
these groups. Some of those results we discussed in Section 10.1, but below we discuss
several more.
We found that larger groups and more geographically heterogeneous groups were
less concentrated (controlling for these and other factors in an OLS regression) in
Chapter 6, while geographically heterogeneous groups were also more unequal. We
put the latter in the context of cross-border groups where many transient users enter
to conduct one-time business or ask one-time questions, while a contingent of sta-
ble users maintain the group; such a structure which would produce geographically
heterogeneous but highly unequal groups.
Later in the same chapter, we found that while most multimedia content is only
shared once, content that is first shared in less concentrated, highly unequal groups
is more likely to be re-shared. We found that the average number of replies, and
even the average virality of replies (which allows us to generalize across groups with
many/few replies or with different content types), are both positively linked to group
geographic heterogeneity, and both negatively linked to group concentration. We
discuss these patterns more later on, in Section 10.3.
In Chapter 8, we found that fake news is much longer than other text messages,
and that fake news and scams receive replies at lower rates than other messages, per-
haps illustrating how users perceive and respond to misinformation differently than
other messages. We showed that Venezuelan users are much more likely to share fake
news, at almost double the rate of Colombians, but that Colombian users share eco-
nomic scams at much higher rates. Concentrated groups are more likely to breed fake
news and internet scams, but inequality in groups was linked to lower prevalence of
misinformation amongst messages. The former conclusion aligns nicely with common
understandings of “echo chambers”; the latter conclusion is a bit counterintuitive, but
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likely stems from message-poor users either chiming in with alternate perspectives,
or such users subconsciously causing other members to filter what they share.
In Chapter 9, we explored dynamics related to the coronavirus pandemic, and
found that interest in trochas, illegal crossings controlled by armed criminal groups,
proliferated immediately after Colombia announced it would close its border with
Venezuela. Groups with a higher proportion of members from Venezuela were more
likely to discuss these illegal crossings; on March 14, the day the border closure took
effect, nearly 10% of text messages involved trochas, and trochas were being discussed
in 25% of active groups. Though nearly anyone on the border would have predicted
increased interest in trochas following the border closure, this is the first large-sample
evidence of such interest, and we argued that this is only an underestimate.
We also explored how the coronavirus shifted usage patterns in WhatsApp groups.
Particularly, all types of messages were longer during the quarantine period than in
pre-pandemic times, and there was significantly more late-night activity on weekdays
(but not weekends). These may seem like obvious findings, but they allow us to put
numbers on the efficacy of shutdown measures in a country where traditional data
sources are less effective. They allow us to measure, at large-scale and with little
cost, if migrants—most of whom work in informal roles, and many of whom live in
informal settlements—are staying home or reducing their hours on the street. If we
had more detailed location information, we might be able to test, for example, if the
messaging activity of migrants in Bogota, which was one of the first places to begin
quarantine measures, changed earlier than in other cities.
10.3 Intervention in WhatsApp Groups
In interviews with both migrants and aid organizations, we heard very few stories
of official actors—aid organizations and governments—paying attention to public
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WhatsApp groups. In the previous section, we discussed important analytical re-
sults obtained from these groups, and those are certainly reasons to at least monitor
groups. More than this, however, there are also reasons for official actors to consider
actively intervening in public WhatsApp groups. These reasons fall along two broad
avenues: reducing harms and sharing official information.
The first centers on misinformation in these groups which, beyond directly harm-
ing victims who believe false information or fall prey to internet scammers, lowers
the trust and social responsibility shared in these groups. Migrants may not trust
true information about crossing the border in a group with many internet scams,
or migrants may hesitate to ask about medical clinics in a group that shares fake
coronavirus cures; this is exactly broken windows theory.
In Chapter 8, we shared a rather-successful methodology for identifying fake news
and economic scams using only public fact-checking sources and very limited manual
verification. We then characterized users and groups among which fake news is most
prevalent, and showed how these results differed for scams. Highly concentrated
groups, for example, are more likely to be breeding grounds for both fake news and
scams, making it worthwhile to target interventions at such groups. And, as we
already stated, Venezuelan users are much more likely to share fake news, while
scams come disproportionately from Colombian users.
We then showed how both fake news and scams often involved slightly-altered
variants, and demonstrated how automated approaches can be taken to flag scam
messages: we trained several machine learning classification methods on tokenized
messages. This involved a nuanced discussion of why the underlying language struc-
ture of scams makes certain classifiers naturally better than others: logistic regression
fails to take into account non-linear relationships between tokens, for example, while
nearest neighbor classifiers allow detection of subtly altered scams.
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The second avenue of possible intervention—sharing useful information in pub-
lic WhatsApp groups—relies on understanding what characteristics of groups spur
dissemination of information. When disseminating official information, our ultimate
goal is for users in public groups to then forward this information to private chats,
reaching the 50% of migrants on WhatsApp who don’t use public groups and would
otherwise be inaccessible.
In Chapter 6, we showed that images that first appear in diverse, unequal, and
less concentrated groups are more likely to be re-shared; the same result held for
images and videos that were shared for longer periods. When analyzing messages in
reply cascades (i.e., messages with replies or that are replies) in Chapter 7, we showed
that messages in more diverse and less concentrated groups had greater virality, their
dissemination being more decentralized and organic. These findings on information
spread should shape how official actors disseminate information, spurring them to
focus on geographically diverse groups with many “message-poor” members. This
second conclusion may be somewhat counter-intuitive, but we can imagine silent
users as the best spreaders of information to other channels.
We also showed in Chapter 6 that while text messages are generally short, over
half of audio and video messages are longer than 30 seconds, possibly offering an
alternative approach to directly sending textual information.
10.4 Limitations and Future Work
In Section 4.6, we discussed how our methodology for collecting data only recorded
the cryptographic hashes of images and videos, driven by a desire to both reduce
our project’s technical burden, and to follow the advice of researchers who’ve advised
against saving multimedia content that may be obscene and/or illegal.
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This necessarily means that our analysis of multimedia content is less interpretable
and effective than our analysis of text. In Chapter 8, we detected countless variants
of fake news and scams, and it’s certain that images, audio recordings, and videos
are also slightly altered as they’re shared in our groups. An approach like perceptual
hashing can help us detect image/audio/video variants in the same way that cosine
similarity detects variants of texts, and image recognition and OCR techniques may
grant us interpretability of multimedia content. Yet the unassailable gold standard
is simply manual processing and labeling of multimedia content, which is a realistic
possibility given services like Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.
Even in our analyses of text, our techniques were rudimentary, only using tokens
obtained from basic text pre-processing steps. But there are important textual re-
lationships in our context. A number of scams, for example, involve fake links that
appear to be links to join WhatsApp groups, with the domains whatsbpp.com or
whatsclpp.com and so on; detecting URLs that are one letter off from whatsapp.com
would nearly perfectly identify these variants. More generally, natural language is
much more complicated than the bag of words approach we took, and sophisticated
methods exist to analyze sentence and discourse structure and meaning. As other
researchers of textual misinformation have noted, many in the NLP field “have pro-
posed learning methods to automatically detect fake messages ranging from lexical
to deep learning approaches exploring linguistic and network features” [19].
We did relatively little work with temporal trends in our data, only examining
patterns that arose during the coronavirus pandemic. Our use of outside sources was
also limited, with only the two public fact-checking databases we used to identify
fake news. Both of these factors necessarily mean that the power of our data is
limited, restricted to insights mostly derived from the data itself. Yet things like
crime, xenophobia, and even actual migration counts are important aspects of the
migrant crisis, and one of the highest possibilities of WhatsApp data would be stronger
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connections to these other themes. Such a result would require us to bring in outside
sources, like newspaper and government databases, and expand the time period for
which we collected to data, to better parse out meaningful trends amongst much
noise.
Finally, there are improvements abound to our methodology for collecting data.
Because of time and resource constraints, we only looked in a small set of Facebook
groups for links to groups, but links surely exist in many more groups, as well as
elsewhere on the internet. After joining groups, we could have taken steps to mitigate
the risk of us being kicked out of groups, as well as reduce any possible effects of us
joining groups. During this project, we set our names to common Spanish female
names, and used profile pictures depicting Latin American women (per [58], “most
studies [of strangers] find females more trustworthy than men”); a more rigorous
approach might involve obtaining Colombian telephone numbers, and perhaps sending
an occasional message in groups that require members to introduce themselves and/or
stay active.
There are many more shortcomings of our work—too many to list—but as the
last thought in this thesis, we re-emphasize that all of our work is preliminary. We’ve
encountered a number of interesting findings in various directions, but there is so
much more that can be done in any of these directions.
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Appendix A
Technical Implementation
A.1 Collecting Data from Groups
Our process of traversing groups involves loading WhatsApp Web, clicking each group
in the sidebar, and then in each group recording the groups members and logging the
groups messages.
Even the first step, clicking through each group, turned out to much more diffi-
cult than it sounds. In the underlying HTML, WhatsApp Web doesnt load a users
entire sidebar at a time, only the 15 or so chats that are currently visible on screen.
Initially, we attempted to navigate through all visible groups and then scroll down,
using the bottom-most group to determine scroll displacement, though even that was
complicated by the fact that WhatsApp randomly orders the 15 visible groups in
the HTML (as opposed to ordering them top-to-bottom).1 But the sidebar, ordered
by chats with the most recent activity, constantly changes when new messages are
received. The first 15 groups may be drastically different 10 minutes later.
We concluded it was necessary, then, to click through groups based on their unique
characteristics, and not simply by their position in the sidebar. Using the unique
1The solution is to check each HTML element (which represents a group) for a webpage coordi-
nate, and find the bottom-most group by the greatest Y displacement.
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group identifier found in group icon links, as described in the section on joining
groups, requires waiting for profiles picture to load every time we poll to see if a
group has already been checked; with n groups, this is significantly more than n
times, and close to n
2
2
(say the group order never changes, then to determine the first
unchecked group each time, we must first check the unique identifiers of all the groups
weve already checked2). Waiting for the profile picture identifier to load turns out
to be extremely slow, so we instead relied on only checking title HTMLs, which load
much more quickly. In our case, there were no duplicates, but this is certainly not
guaranteed; checking for profile picture identifiers and falling back to title HTMLs
would be less likely to have issues.
Once we click on a group, we record the members in that group. The subtitle,
which is directly visible (and hence recordable) from the main group page, typically
contains a comma-separated list of all members phone numbers; sometimes, however,
it has other messages, like +57 XXX XXX is typing or Click here for group info.
Our script tries to capture the member list directly from the subtitle for a certain
period (long enough so that anyone typing would stop typing), and if that fails,
reverts to clicking on a scrollable member list in the sidebar. The latter process
takes significantly longer, since the process must iterate between scrolling through
the members list and waiting for members details to load, 15 or so members at a
time.
Finally, we read messages. The traverseGroups script first jumps to the latest mes-
sage (by default, WhatsApp Web scrolls to the earliest unread message). WhatsApp
Web loads messages in reverse chronological order, so only the most recent messages
are present in the HTML. Earlier messages are loaded as a user (or bot) scrolls up
2We avoid taking any shortcuts like caching position of last checked group, since sidebar order
can always change drastically. A programmer with more time on their hands would probably create
a refined solution based on initially taking shortcuts and at the end checking for possibly missed
groups.
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in the chat. We scroll up until we reach messages from a certain time, passed as
argument into the function (i.e., we scroll until the time when we last collected data).
A.2 Preprocessing Message Data
A.2.1 Duplicate Messages
traverseGroups, the script we use to collect message data from groups every few hours,
outputs a file for each group/read-time pair with the messages from that group read
at that time. Duplicate messages arise in these files for two reasons:
1. Our methodology involves two independent WhatsApp accounts/smartphones
joining and collecting data from each group.
2. The “scrolling up” process described above is imperfect. Namely, if tra-
verseGroups checks group X at time t hours and later at t+ 3 hours, but group
X has no new messages in [t, t + 3], then traverseGroups will read and record
duplicate messages. At t+ 3, traverseGroups will not scroll up, but it will still
read the messages it read previously.3
Duplicate messages can be identified as messages with the exact same contents,
sent by the same user at the same datetime in the same group. It’s easy enough to
identify such duplicates with the standard Python data analysis library pandas, but
we must take care to preserve true duplicates. Namely, a user may actually send
two identical messages at the same time in the same group (whether intentionally or
not). We can identify such true duplicates as duplicates that are read by the same
traverseGroups process (server/read-time pair). For example, if the server collecting
data from smartphone A at datetime d reads duplicate messages in a group, then
3This is due to WhatsApp Web’s design, which makes “checking for messages since at least 7:00
AM” much simpler than “checking for messages only since 7:00 AM”.
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those are true duplicates. We identify them since they they share the server/read-
time pair (A, d); the sources of duplicates described above either involve different
servers or different read-times.
A final nuance is that we may read each set of true duplicates multiple times.
For example, if two of our WhatsApp accounts are in the same group where a true
duplicate pair is sent, both servers will collect that true duplicate pair. Or one of the
servers may, at a later time that traverseGroups is run, scroll up enough to again read
the message. We account for this by, for each true duplicate pair, only preserving its
occurrence the first time it’s read by any server/time pair.
In our data, true duplicate messages account for just over 1% of all messages, not
an insignificant amount.
A.2.2 Groups Whose UIDs Change
As we described in Section 4.4.1, on uniquely identifying groups, WhatsApp Web’s
design and intended use case make it difficult to uniquely identify groups. We settled
on a heuristic, which we called uid, based on (for groups with a profile picture) the
group’s unique identifier (if it has a profile picture), discoverable in the link to its
profile picture, or (for groups without a profile picture) the cryptographic hash of its
title.
As we said, this method isn’t foolproof, and in general there isn’t a foolproof way
to uniquely identify groups. For example, in the span of an hour, users in a group
may change its title, remove its profile picture, send hundreds of new messages, and
completely change the group’s membership—it’d be impossible to link this modified
group to the original group. Less extreme cases where our uid heuristic fails include a
group without profile picture changing its title, or a group removing its profile picture
and changing its title.
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To discover groups that change their uid, we rely on text similarity techniques, as
we did to identify misinformation in Chapter 8.1. We tokenize all messages (removing
stopwords and stemming all words), and for each group create a feature vector of
tokens sent in messages in that group. We then compute cosine similarity across
groups, and for all group pairs with cosine similarity > 0.5, do the following:
1. Compute the number of identical messages (same content, same user, same
datetime) across the two groups. After a group changes uid, traverseGroups
may again read the same messages, because of the scrolling nuance described
previously.
2. If this number is over 60% of the minimum total number of messages of each
group, we merge the groups.
We ended up finding 23 groups where the uid had changed, likely because they
changed their titles or added/removed profile pictures. Most of the groups we merged
had a 100% match in the second step, meaning that in the duplicate group with fewer
messages, all of the messages were identical to the original group.
After merging groups, we again needed to remove duplicate messages (while again
preserving true duplicates).
A.3 Code
All code for this thesis is provided at https://github.com/admchg/thesis-
production.
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Appendix B
Field and Interview Notes
For brevity and privacy, this section has been left out of the online public version.
Please contact us to request a copy with field and interview notes included.
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